Sudan… Cross-Border Complexities with Chad

By Osman Mirghani

The war in Sudan has never been a purely domestic affair. From the outset, it has transcended national borders, evolving into an arena where the interests of nations intersect and the agendas of regional and global powers collide. While the Sudanese people pay a heavy price in blood, displacement, and suffering, external interventions continue to multiply — some calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid, others fueling the conflict from behind the scenes.

Chad has emerged as a pivotal player in this tangled scene, wavering between the role of an affected neighbor and that of an implicated party. The deep historical and tribal interconnections between the two countries have rendered their borders fragile. As military operations in Darfur have intensified, Chadian territory has increasingly served as a conduit — at times for refugees, and at other times for recruits and arms.

Since the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Chad has become one of the key corridors in the military landscape. Despite its declared neutrality, realities on the ground tell a more complicated story. Sudan’s western border has effectively turned into an open zone for the movement of fighters and weapons, amid accusations that Chad is facilitating logistical and supply routes for the RSF — an organization with cross-border tribal and communal ties extending deep into Chadian territory.

Chad, which hosts tens of thousands of refugees from Darfur, now faces a dual dilemma: managing a massive humanitarian crisis on one hand, while being perceived on the other as a passageway that sustains the war with manpower and resources. This ambiguous situation has placed N’Djamena under growing scrutiny from Khartoum, which argues that Chad’s professed neutrality does not align with realities on the ground.

Understanding Chad’s position on the Sudanese conflict requires viewing it within the broader regional security landscape. The Chadian government — itself grappling with domestic instability and a fragile political transition — regards developments in Sudan with both caution and self-interest. Some in N’Djamena’s leadership circles believe that Sudan’s ongoing turmoil could actually serve Chad’s short-term interests, elevating its regional standing as a key participant in neighboring diplomacy or as a strategic partner for Western powers seeking to contain the spread of militant groups across Africa’s Sahel region.
According to some claims, Chad has also received financial incentives in exchange for allowing its territory to serve as a transit route for RSF supplies.

Several reports have pointed specifically to the Um Jaras base in eastern Chad as a critical hub in the RSF’s supply network.

However, Chad’s involvement in Sudan’s war comes with growing costs. President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s government fears the conflict’s spillover effects on its own fragile stability — particularly as overlapping tribal loyalties and armed groups straddle both sides of the border. This week, social media footage purportedly showed groups of RSF recruits in armed pickup trucks crossing into Chadian territory, fleeing battles in Darfur. Other reports cited statements attributed to President Déby warning of armed RSF elements and vehicles carrying the group’s flags entering eastern Chad. Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of Arab fighters from across the African desert region joining RSF ranks.

Such developments are heightening anxiety in N’Djamena about deeper entanglement in Sudan’s war, especially as the flow of refugees and armed combatants across the border increases. The situation has grown even more complex with reports of some Chadian rebel groups fighting alongside the RSF, and of Chadian opposition leaders appearing in Sudan’s battlefields.

At the same time, Chad remains wary of militant activity on its other borders. The country has previously come under attack from Boko Haram, which targeted a Chadian military base near Lake Chad. This broader region — which also includes Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria — continues to experience heavy extremist activity, intensifying Chad’s security concerns and deepening its reluctance to face another potential front along its Sudanese border.

Chad cannot remain untouched by the repercussions of Sudan’s war, particularly as fighting escalates in Darfur and cross-border movements threaten to destabilize Déby’s regime the longer the conflict endures. For this reason, N’Djamena may soon be forced to reassess its position — “before the axe falls,” as the saying goes.