Al-Burhan–El-Sisi Meeting: Initial Thoughts on the Divergence Between Khartoum and Cairo’s Statements

By Ahmed Shamoukh

When Sudan’s Sovereignty Council hastened to issue its statement on the meeting between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi—before Cairo released its own—it was clear that Khartoum intended to preempt Egypt’s narrative and avoid any premature commitments that might tie Sudan to binding positions.

The Sudanese statement was notably broad and noncommittal, making no mention of the “Quartet” mechanism or any concrete joint stances. In contrast, the delayed Egyptian statement was far more detailed and politically charged, reflecting Cairo’s established positions directed both toward the region and Western powers—apparently in anticipation of the upcoming Quartet meeting in Washington later this month.

This divergence in tone, timing, and content points to a calculated division of roles between Khartoum and Cairo, driven by shared strategic priorities. The Egyptian statement reaffirmed these priorities through President El-Sisi’s emphasis that: “Egypt reiterates its steadfast position on Sudan, affirming full support for the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while rejecting any attempts that could undermine its national cohesion or establish parallel governance structures to the legitimate Sudanese government.”

The meeting also underscored the importance of the Quartet mechanism as a framework for advancing a political settlement, halting the war, and restoring stability. Both leaders expressed hope that the upcoming Washington meeting would yield tangible progress toward a ceasefire and a sustainable resolution to the crisis.

In essence, the joint objective of this encounter appears to be avoiding direct confrontation with the Quartet while maintaining open lines of communication with Washington—an effort to navigate a new diplomatic battlefield shaped largely by Abu Dhabi’s non-military maneuvers.

Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi seems to be the biggest loser—at least so far—in its bid to pressure the Sudanese government into a ceasefire that would grant its allied militias time to regroup, rearm, and rebuild air-defense networks destroyed by the Sudanese army around El Fasher and other regions. Its attempts have faltered for over a month since the Quartet’s previous statement.

Abu Dhabi and its proxies simply lack the time Sudan is trying to buy. Repeated battlefield failures have exposed the militias’ lack of military efficiency, discipline, and leadership—despite an open aerial supply bridge from airports across the globe into Kufra and Chad. This comes in stark contrast to the Sudanese army’s exponentially growing operational and logistical capacity, even with limited resources.

Observers estimate that the militias have received nearly 300 aerial support flights over the past three months—loaded with drones, munitions, air-defense systems, and mercenaries to operate them. Yet, these efforts have failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. On the contrary, their cumulative military setbacks may soon transform such logistical flows into a broader threat to continental stability, as Abu Dhabi’s actions have fostered an open market for weapons, mercenaries, and militias—an ecosystem that could endanger regional security for years to come.

As informal international pressure mounts on Abu Dhabi, it appears increasingly unlikely that the Trump administration will be able to overlook its destabilizing activities in Sudan and across Africa—particularly as these regions remain of long-term economic and political interest to Washington. This comes at a time when Egypt, Sudan’s strategic ally, is gradually reclaiming its historic geopolitical weight, a development that could reshuffle the balance of alliances across the region.

God knows best.