International Models for Drafting Media Laws and Regulations to Protect National Security

By Sabah Al-Makki

First: Israel — Institutional Censorship in the Name of National Security

Israel is among the earliest countries to establish a formal, integrated censorship system known as “military censorship.” This unit is part of the Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) within the Israeli army and operates under the British Emergency Regulations of 1945, which the state retained after its founding.

This system requires all newspapers, channels, radio stations — and even foreign correspondents — to submit material related to security and military matters to a military censor before publication. The censor has the authority to ban, delete, or postpone any material deemed harmful to national security or to “public morale.”

Although the Israeli Supreme Court attempted to set a balancing principle called “near-certain likelihood of harm,” limiting censorship to cases where the danger from publication is almost certain, this principle is effectively suspended during wartime. Any coverage that might reveal losses or weaken the army’s public image is prohibited.

From the Lebanon War, through the Gaza incursions, to the 2023 war, the pattern has been consistent: Israeli media speak in the voice of the military institution — not the other way around. In major crises, censorship extends to digital platforms, with the Defense Ministry coordinating with local tech companies to monitor accounts accused of “serving the enemy” or “negatively affecting the home front.”

Journalists are banned from publishing any photo or geolocation of strikes unless officially approved; authorities use “impression management” mechanisms instead of outright bans. In the recent Israel–Gaza war, censorship intensified to cover details such as rocket impacts, combat locations, military casualties, and even images of destruction in settlements. Official directives barred live coverage without prior authorization.

In 2024, the Knesset passed a new law empowering the government to close foreign media outlets and seize their equipment if deemed a “security threat,” a provision later applied against Al Jazeera’s office. Thus, military censorship has evolved from a security-control tool into a political instrument that shapes the official narrative, silences dissenting voices, and grants the government near-absolute authority over information flow both domestically and internationally.

Israel provides a model of meticulous institutional censorship under a legal cover, exercised in the name of national security but in practice amounting to comprehensive management of the official narrative — allowing the world to hear only what the military institution permits and to see only what it allows. In this way, press freedom in Israel becomes a tool of national mobilization rather than a means of accountability, even as the state presents itself to the world as a “democratic oasis.”

Second: Ukraine — Unified Messaging under Martial Law

When war erupted in Ukraine in February 2022, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared martial law and merged the main national channels into a unified broadcast called “United News — the Unified News Marathon,” so that all channels delivered a single, continuous media message.

The official aim was to “counter Russian disinformation and unify the national discourse,” but in practice this temporarily suspended media pluralism in favor of a government-controlled unified narrative.

During the war, the state seized some opposition channels or outlets owned by business figures with ties to Russia, and enacted laws requiring media institutions to coordinate with the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting before publishing sensitive material, with fines and license revocations for violators.

Simultaneously, Kyiv supported digital initiatives like the “StopFake” platform for fact-checking and combating foreign propaganda and launched training programs for journalists to strengthen “national media awareness.”

Ukraine’s model strikes a balance between censorship and mobilization: it did not completely close off the independent media sphere, but it set clear national limits during wartime. The battle was fought not only on the ground but also in the digital space, where Kyiv used social media as a weapon to bolster morale and mobilize international support.

It is an example of “organized media mobilization” — politically managed, yet leaving a margin for professional journalism; a fragile but effective balance under wartime conditions.

Third: Russia — Comprehensive Censorship and the Information War

Since Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has imposed one of the broadest media censorship systems in modern history.

In March of that year, parliament passed wartime media laws criminalizing “spreading unreliable information about the army” or “defaming its reputation,” with penalties up to 15 years in prison. Measures included shuttering independent outlets such as Novaya Gazeta and Dozhd (TV Rain), blocking Western sites like the BBC and DW, and expanding the electronic oversight apparatus run by Roskomnadzor to monitor content, block sites, and track digital accounts.

Moscow did more than block content; it developed an integrated information-management system rooted in national media mobilization. The official narrative was unified across state channels and major talk shows, and “media compliance” was tied to the notion of “national loyalty.”

The state also built alternative outlets aimed at foreign audiences, such as RT and Sputnik, to present a Russian counter-narrative to what it calls “Western media hegemony.”

The government defended these policies as defensive measures to protect the home front from an information war targeting Russia politically, culturally, and economically. Western institutions view this censorship as repression of freedoms, but the reality shows that Russia succeeded in turning information into a distinct battlefield: it controls news flow, prevents internal fragmentation, and uses media both as a domestic mobilization tool and as an instrument of external influence.

Russia therefore offers a comprehensive model of “weaponizing information” — based on institutional control, disciplined messaging, and direct linking of media to national security. Despite the controversy over the limits of such censorship, the experience demonstrates that states that fail to control information in wartime risk being defeated in the informational arena even before the battlefield.

Fourth: Recent Field Practices — Qatar and the Abu Dhabi System

1. Qatar — Security-driven Secrecy after an Israeli Strike

In September 2025, when Israel launched an airstrike on Doha targeting individuals linked to Hamas, Qatari authorities handled the incident with strict security measures.

In the initial hours, access by international media — including Al Jazeera — to the strike site was restricted until Qatari security agencies completed on-site operations and damage assessments. Coverage was permitted later only through coordinated, supervised visits arranged by official bodies, citing security and diplomatic considerations.

This approach is not exceptional but common in states facing sensitive sovereignty incidents: when information intersects national security, secrecy is prioritized over transparency, even in systems that publicly claim to support press freedom. The same calculus recurs elsewhere when imagery becomes a tool of political or security leverage.

2. The Abu Dhabi System — Image before Truth

The Abu Dhabi regime adopts a strict supervisory approach toward media whenever its political security or international image is at stake. In incidents such as an armored-warehouse fire in Abu Dhabi or major industrial accidents, authorities completely control field access and investigations.

No international or local media outlet is allowed on the ground or to conduct independent investigations without direct official authorization — which is often granted exclusively to outlets aligned with the regime or designated partners under so-called “approved media cooperation.”

This policy rests on four pillars:

1. Total access control — no journalist enters without official clearance.

2. Narrative management through official channels — images and clips are curated and released to fit the regime’s preferred framing.

3. Selective engagement — coverage is granted to sympathetic outlets while independent media are kept at bay.

4. Prioritizing international image over truth — political interests come before the public’s right to know.

Thus, Abu Dhabi — though it funds and claims to support press freedom abroad — operates an inwardly closed media model that remakes events to suit its needs and conceals any scene that might harm its international image. This is precisely the modus operandi used today in its campaigns against Sudan: money, imagery, and selective censorship crafted to appear as “field facts” while being politically motivated propaganda.

What we observe goes further: Abu Dhabi manages funded media campaigns, directly supports local militias, and systematically fuels conflicts in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and other African states. It uses media as a soft veneer for hard, funded destructive projects aimed at advancing its covert agendas and expanding regional influence at the cost of regional stability.

When a state has both wealth and influence, its first instinct in a crisis is to close the independent camera and then shape the official narrative under the banner of “national interest.” Practices converge: truth is suppressed first, and then a selected image is presented to the world as the “trusted news,” turning information from a means of awareness into organized disinformation managed from rooms fortified by money and influence.

Fifth: Transitioning to the Sudanese Case

From the above, it is clear that media censorship is not exclusive to authoritarian states; it becomes a standard behavior adopted by regimes whenever their image or interests are threatened, justified under the slogan of “protecting national security” or used to carry out destructive agendas as Abu Dhabi does in the region.

The examples of Israel, Russia, and Ukraine demonstrate that media-control systems have ceased to be temporary exceptions and have become sovereign tools used to protect the official narrative and consolidate political and security influence domestically and abroad.

If those states have — each in its way — unified their media messaging and prevented moral/psychological penetration, Sudan now stands at the same frontline, waging a complex war that combines military confrontations with a narrative battle driven from abroad with money, media, and militias.

Therefore, censorship is no longer merely an emergency option; it is a struggle over consciousness, identity, and national sovereignty.

Between external disinformation and internal silence, Sudan must redefine its media battle: to build a solid national oversight system that preserves sovereignty and counters lies and misinformation with professionalism, discipline, and inclusive national consciousness.

Conclusion — Part One

Thus, the information war is not the exclusive domain of great powers but a destiny for any state besieged or targeted in its consciousness and existence. If Israel, Russia, and Ukraine settled on building censorship and media-control systems to protect their home fronts, Sudan today needs to do the same according to its national vision and specific challenges.

The war against Sudan is not only fought on the ground but also on identity, awareness, and belonging.

In Part Two — a message to the Minister of Information: The time has come for the media to shift from an administrative margin to an advanced national front. The war on Sudan is not only military; it is a war on consciousness and identity, conducted with words and images as much as with guns.

What is needed now is not rhetoric or slogans but an integrated regulatory and media framework that leads the battle for awareness with a unified national consciousness, turning media into a sovereign shield that protects the homeland rather than a tool for its penetration.

The media must rise to the level of the blood and sacrifices of our people in the field. Citizens no longer want silent or submissive media; they want media that expresses the sacrifices of the people and reflects the truth of the dignity struggle Sudanese are waging to defend their land and honor. Citizens have paid a high price — it is time for media to rise to meet those sacrifices, not to remain silent or offer excuses.

In the next article we will place the ball in the Ministry of Information’s court. We will examine current challenges, corrective steps, and then ask: will the ministry and media leaders take initiative and lead, or will they join the ranks of the silent and deepen the crisis and bleed the wound further?