Ethnic Militancy in Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and the Arab Sahel Belt (Part 1 of 3)
Sudan Events – Agencies
A comprehensive and in-depth study by researcher Yasser Zeidan explores a phenomenon he terms “ethnic mercenarism.” The concept, closely tied to the composition and conduct of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and rebel groups across the Sahel-Saharan region, describes recruitment based primarily on tribal or ethnic solidarity — a form narrower than conventional mercenarism. Unlike the purely financial motivation of paid fighters whose commitment ends with a contract, ethnic mercenarism blends kinship-driven mobilization, vengeance, and looting that continue long after territorial gains are made.
According to Zeidan, the ongoing war in Sudan has exposed this emerging trend, marked by the enlistment of Arab tribesmen from the “Baggara Arab Belt” spanning Chad, Libya, and Niger into the RSF’s ranks in its war against Sudan’s national army. The study seeks to uncover the root causes behind this new dynamic of cross-border mercenary recruitment and to examine whether ethnic networks have played a central role in sustaining it.
The researcher explains that the use of mercenary forces in Africa has a long history and has recently gained renewed influence as governments across the continent — implicitly if not explicitly — concede their armies’ inability to counter growing armed movements. Yet, Zeidan notes that existing studies often confine cross-border militia recruitment to terrorism, overlooking the rise of ethnic mercenarism now spreading across the Sahel.
Zeidan argues that cross-border Arab militia recruitment cannot be explained solely through the lenses of counterterrorism, migration, or ideology. Rather, it reflects the militarization of Arab pastoralist societies amid state collapse, environmental pressures, and shifting transnational opportunities.
The study situates the RSF within broader patterns of war economies and tribal governance in the Sahel, emphasizing the need for a new analytical framework to understand non-state militias that transcend national borders, official ideologies, and traditional models of insurgency. While most contemporary scholarship views cross-border militias through the prism of terrorism, few have explored recruitment based on ethnic identity — particularly in Sudan and the wider Sahel — even as this phenomenon now challenges national sovereignty and regional security alike.
Some analysts have attributed the trend to an “ideology of Arab supremacy,” but Zeidan’s research contends that multiple factors have driven the RSF’s recruitment of non-Sudanese Arab fighters. Undeniably, however, Arab supremacist ideology, land disputes, desertification, and both local and regional interventions have together fostered the growth of ethnic mercenarism across the Sahel.
Zeidan notes that the complex mix of factors shaping today’s ethnically based mercenaries in Sudan, Chad, and Niger demands a nuanced approach — one that considers not only colonial and postcolonial legacies but also contemporary social and security dynamics that define today’s Sahelian landscape.
Tracing these root causes leads to an alternative theory: that the preoccupation of weak states with asserting sovereignty has inadvertently enabled the rise of ungoverned zones in countries such as Sudan and Chad. Government policies of arming specific ethnic groups have also weakened the traditional tribal authorities that once maintained order in these regions.
Academic studies have shed some light on state-linked militias and transnational terrorist networks in the Sahel, but little work has examined the modern ethnic linkages among Arab militias. These connections have become evident in Sudan’s current war, where RSF-aligned forces have deployed foreign Arab fighters in their campaigns — a pattern mirrored in Libya, Chad, and Niger. This, Zeidan argues, represents the re-emergence of long-standing social dynamics dating back to Arab migrations caused by drought and displacement since the 14th century.
The study calls for greater attention to how identity, survival, and external patronage intersect to create a distinct “Sahelian model” of mercenarism — one that challenges conventional assumptions about state control, loyalty, and the organization of violence in Africa’s contemporary wars.
Sources and Methodology
The study draws on field observations and primary materials collected during the early weeks of Sudan’s 2023 conflict. The author was in Khartoum when clashes first erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF in April 2023. During this period, he held informal conversations with civilians, aid workers, and individuals with direct ties to RSF fighters, providing first-hand insights into the group’s mobilization and behavior.
Additional data came from semi-structured remote interviews with community leaders and civilians affected by the conflict, identified through purposive and snowball sampling. Zeidan also conducted systematic monitoring of social media platforms such as Telegram and Facebook, where RSF-related content and testimonies were widely shared, cross-referencing these digital sources with international media reports and prior academic research.
The methodology relied on open-source verification, establishing the origin and authenticity of content, cross-checking ethnic and political affiliations, and geolocating images and videos through terrain and landmark analysis. While acknowledging the limitations of wartime research and social media bias, Zeidan’s long-term engagement with Red Sea and Sahel politics provided valuable contextual grounding. By integrating qualitative evidence with secondary sources, the study reconstructs the socio-political dynamics underpinning the RSF’s transnational recruitment practices.
Zeidan concludes that ethnic mercenarism and the RSF’s evolution as a transnational armed force call for a rethinking of existing frameworks for studying non-state actors. Traditional classifications such as rebels, terrorists, or warlords fail to capture the hybrid nature and dual functions of groups like the RSF.
The term “ethnic mercenarism,” as defined here, refers to a mode of armed mobilization organized primarily through cross-border ethnic-tribal networks. These groups are driven by material incentives — wages, spoils, and access to war economies — while maintaining autonomy from any single state, enabling them to operate fluidly across borders with logistical and financial support from external actors.
Unlike classical mercenarism — exemplified by private military companies operating under the narrow six-part test of Article 47 of Additional Protocol I — ethnic mercenarism emphasizes identity-based recruitment, tangible material rewards, and cross-border patronage rather than corporate contracts. Nor does it resemble insurgent governance, which typically involves civilian administration, taxation, or justice systems. Instead, these actors often fight purely for profit without the intent to govern.
Similarly, unlike warlords who seek territorial control and local economic dominance, ethnic-tribal mercenarism relies on transnational kinship and external logistics, with limited ties to any single territory. And in contrast to ideologically driven insurgencies, its mobilization is rooted less in doctrine than in livelihood.
By expanding the analytical scope beyond traditional insurgency and rebel governance, Zeidan argues that ethnic mercenarism captures a hybrid model of power — one in which groups like the RSF provide security, economic incentives, and even fragments of political identity, often more effectively than the state itself. In this context, war becomes not merely a political act but a sustainable occupation, particularly among young fighters in places like Chad, where conflict is seen not as a disruption to livelihoods but as a viable profession.
To be continued…
