Demolishing the Truce
Rashid Abdul Rahim
Discussion of the truce has been shrouded in deliberate ambiguity and misdirection by those steering the Quartet — chiefly the United States and its envoy Mas’ad Boulos — as well as by the Rapid Support Forces and Samoud. Each of these actors has its own agenda.
A truce normally means a limited cessation of hostilities to achieve a specific task. Yet these parties have portrayed it as if it were an agreement to halt the war entirely, even as they plot to secure gains for the rebellion and its ally Samoud.
The United States seeks leverage and influence in or over Sudan, and to win something for its president—who covets awards—that will flatter his ego and ambitions.
Samoud aims to polish its image and find a foothold in the country’s future political life.
The Rapid Support Forces failed to form a government for themselves in Nyala and failed to overcome the consequences of their actions in Al-Fashir.
The Council of Security and Defense met with a clear and complete message that left no room for claims that President al-Burhan had skipped the meeting because he favored the truce, nor for suggestions of a split in army leadership over the issue. The council met in full, unanimously endorsed the decisions taken, and rejected the truce. It added a decision that made its position even clearer: to continue efforts of mobilization and preparation until the rebellion is defeated.
A straightforward, uncompromising stance — to the benefit of those who will gain from it.
It was never appropriate for Sudan to accept entering a US-led Quartet initiative from the start, because the United States has repeatedly shown itself to be a declining power. More importantly, it entrusted our affairs to people with no negotiation or international-relations experience, and for the first time someone whose background is far removed from peace-making — and unfamiliar with the issues at stake — was entrusted with overseeing a peace process. He is a man whose experience lies in trading old cars and in personal proximity to his head of state; they are related by kinship.
The American presidency has come to look as if it were that of a backward state ruled by force, where the ruler selects aides from his own household and assigns weighty tasks to his son, daughter, relatives and friends. US mediation in negotiations, in this degraded state, is reason enough to reject any initiatives it leads.
Sudan must now move forward along a path that is already coming into focus, and we must complete the step of dismantling the truce that the Council of Security and Defense has taken. What matters most now is to extract the maximum benefit from the international attention and sympathy we have gained after the events in Al-Fashir, and not to squander it through inability or lethargy to maintain engagement with newly allied friends — to build relationships that keep them consistently connected to us and our causes, and to develop plans and programs to bind them to us, whether through visits to Sudan or by establishing continuous channels for information exchange.
Sudanese embassies have been active; the challenges we face should make their efforts sustained, not seasonal. The issue before us today is clear: the desired peace will only come with the defeat of the rebellion, the seizure of its military equipment, and its withdrawal from the cities and positions it has occupied.
We may face a difficult era and hard times because of the positions we have taken, fully aware of the consequences of our decisions. But we must be certain that we are capable of paying the price of victory and of purifying the country entirely of the rebellion.
