Benishangul… The Secret Corridor: How Ethiopia Transferred Emirati Support into Sudan

By Ammar Al-Araki

The story begins in Asosa, capital of the Benishangul–Gumuz region— a city that has quietly transformed into a logistical corridor channeling military shipments arriving from the United Arab Emirates. Asosa, a crossroads linking the region to the Sudanese border through a network of rural villages where the Ethiopian state is largely absent and official security presence is weak, has become an ideal stage for moving what Addis Ababa does not want to route through its formal channels.

Our investigative source, who has been operating inside the region for months, recounts his daily observations: heavy trucks arriving under unusual guard, equipment unloaded at night in areas off-limits to civilians, and tinted vehicles transporting “non-Ethiopian” personnel believed to be part of the Emirati logistics team.

From Asosa, the shipments move along a fixed supply line passing through a chain of highly isolated villages. The journey begins in Aboramo, a small village often used as a mid-transit point between Asosa and the Sudanese border. It then proceeds eastward to Sharqoli, a rural area surrounded by dense forests and narrow dirt roads with virtually no official movement. From there the route continues to Ahfendo, a quieter location barely present in official records—an ideal passageway for undeclared logistical activity. Finally, the shipments reach Qishen, the last Ethiopian point before the border, a village marked by rugged terrain long used by border communities, enabling cargo to cross unnoticed.

In these villages, the source says he personally witnessed shipments carrying drones, protected electronics cases, and advanced night-operation gear. “These are neither commercial nor humanitarian consignments… they are military-operational equipment,” he says.

But the most alarming revelation was not what moved on the ground, but what was being transported by air. From a high vantage point near Qishen, the source documented four aerial missions carried out by Ethiopian aircraft directly to Yabus in Sudan—the mountainous town that traditionally hosts the SPLM faction led by Joseph Tika. According to his observations, these flights carried drones, munitions, and surveillance equipment, delivering them to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied armed groups. “Ethiopia is not funding… it is transporting,” the source asserts, emphasizing that what’s happening goes beyond facilitation—it is a direct role in channeling Emirati support.

The drones that struck Damazin and Kurmuk were launched from Yabus itself, from Maklaf, a rugged border zone used by fighters, and from Balila, a relatively exposed point considered the nearest offensive platform toward Blue Nile towns. These three locations align geographically with the supply route originating in Benishangul, completing the chain: shipments from the UAE, Ethiopian transfer, distribution in Yabus, followed by strikes inside Sudan.

The picture expands further with the establishment of a new Emirati camp in Wendelu locality—a vast, sparsely populated area east of the region with minimal security presence. Inside this locality lies Al-Ahmar village, which held no strategic value until recent weeks, when it transformed into an emerging military hub. The source documented the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers and heavy trucks, training units, RSF and SPLM fighters, and trainers believed to be Emiratis or contractors from private security firms. The camp, he says, resembles a special-operations training base rather than a typical rural outpost—indicative of a new phase in military development within the region.

In this landscape, Benishangul—a region originally Sudanese—no longer appears as mere geography; it becomes the heart of the unfolding scene. It is a region of weak governance, with cross-border tribal entanglements, unresolved boundary lines, proximity to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and one of the most accessible corridors for projecting cross-border influence.

The UAE’s choice of this region is no coincidence. It fits into an operational project aimed at cementing military influence near Sudan while avoiding Red Sea oversight, securing Ethiopia’s loyalty amid severe political, security, and financial crises, and opening a corridor that stretches from Berbera in separatist Somaliland to Addis Ababa in Oromia, then to Benishangul, and onward deep into Sudan. This forms part of Abu Dhabi’s broader attempt to rebuild its lost leverage in other parts of the Horn of Africa.

This activity represents the most serious direct threat to Sudan’s national security since the war began, marking a fundamental shift in Ethiopia’s role—from a covert meddling neighbor to an openly involved participant. It also raises the prospect of militias expanding into new border fronts and the potential for the entire region to erupt if weapons routes intersect with deeply rooted tribal and political tensions.

In Conclusion:

What is unfolding in Benishangul goes far beyond smuggling or isolated support for the RSF. It is the structured construction of a long-term war infrastructure extending beyond Sudan to the entire region. It is the rise of an Emirati chaos-engineering project stretching from Addis Ababa to the edges of the Blue Nile—one in which the UAE transforms from an external supporter into an on-the-ground architect, and Ethiopia transitions from neighboring state to active partner in this architecture.

If this corridor is not disrupted now, the Horn of Africa may face a new generation of cross-border wars—wars that may begin in Benishangul but will certainly not end at Sudan. They could sweep across all of Africa.