After Hemetti’s Uncle Leaves… Uncertainty Grips the “Braves”

Sudan Events – Agencies

As voices rise in some places and fade in others — amid whispers that a certain commander who was arrested and transferred to Nyala has died in custody, and another who was relocated perished on the way, while Abu al-Joud was killed and “al-Farshoun” and “Ayn al-Shaytan” met similar fates — the situation is beginning to form something close to a complete picture. Arrests driven by suspicion are becoming more frequent; orders are being rejected; and protests are mounting over the treatment of the wounded. One senior figure even stated that the injured are nothing more than “losses,” adding that most of them, even if treated, may never return to fight because they have lost limbs — and therefore their usefulness. Their presence, he said, has become “a burden.”

Internal discussions within the militia have grown increasingly tense due to pressure on the battlefronts and the army’s insistence on continuing operations. This has led some commanders and rank-and-file fighters to check their phones constantly, searching for a chance to leave safely. The question of whether the door to return is still open — or has already closed — remains unanswered.

These escape attempts have continued, albeit discreetly, because trying to leave and defect to the army is an offense punishable by immediate execution within the militia. Until only a few months ago, it was a deadly risk for anyone considering departure. Such moves were typically arranged through specific intermediaries who had good relations with both sides and could facilitate information exchange and safe passage.

Recently, the militia issued an arrest warrant for Hemetti’s uncle, Colonel Issa Bashara Issa, who served as the militia’s intelligence chief in Ed Daein and supervised its prisons and torture centers. Issa is known for a long record of horrific crimes, systematic killings, and extrajudicial executions. He oversaw execution sites and took part in the massacres of al-Sareeha and al-Hilaliya, and he commanded the force that attacked Wad al-Noura. His sharp tongue made him a source of suspicion among militia leadership, and if not for his tribal weight, he would likely have been arrested and killed after voicing critical opinions following his withdrawal from Khartoum.

News of his escape — and the militia’s pursuit of him — caused a major stir among militia officers and soldiers, given his tribal influence and blood ties to high-ranking Chadian officials. Issa left Ed Daein accompanied by 11 Sudanese army officers who had been held captive and were released and taken along with him. Their fate remains unknown: is Issa planning to use them as bargaining chips? Are they part of a deal for his pardon? Or were they simply tools in his escape plan — to be disposed of later? All possibilities remain open, especially with someone like Issa Bashara, according to those who know him. Many believe he has been in contact with the Sudanese army for some time, having grown frustrated with shortages in supplies, ethnic favoritism in vehicle distribution, and evacuation arrangements.

Issa’s escape is not an isolated case. Recently, a number of militia vehicles left in two separate batches in Kordofan, raised white flags, and surrendered to the army. Meanwhile, local communities in areas such as Babanusa and West Kordofan have been actively urging their sons to quit fighting, especially after vast areas have lost most of their young men to the war — with those who returned bearing severe, often untreatable injuries.

Al-Nour Mohamed Hamad, from a village near al-Nahud and currently living in Omdurman, says:
“I left Bara when the militia stormed it and took control, leaving some of my family behind. Most of them have since fled and are now in northern Sudan near al-Dabba.”

He adds:
“Local communities were deceived by tribal leaders and chiefs who backed Hemetti early on, promoted him, and convinced young men that through the Rapid Support Forces he could fulfill their dreams. Indeed, the youth came back naïve and inexperienced but driving luxury militia vehicles, tempting others to join. But when the war escalated, it all turned into a chaotic arena dominated by thieves and killers — not only in Darfur and Kordofan but even from neighboring countries.”

He continues:
“Now every village has wounded and disabled fighters. Some have attempted suicide due to unbearable pain. Families cannot afford treatment, and the militia refuses to treat them, telling them that the ‘Fazaa fighters’ are not officially part of its structure — and that they have already taken their share through pillaging homes, cars, and public institutions.”

He explains:
“Most families have no idea what happened to their sons. They remain silent out of fear of the killing machine that now controls everything. Worse still, Abdelrahim Dagalo is reportedly relying on mercenaries from southern Libya, Chad, and Niger for his score-settling operations, with an assassination unit from South Sudan. This is likely what pushed Issa Bashara and others to consider fleeing, because even hinting at dissent now means death.”

He adds:
“Fighters have genuine fears, and we receive credible reports. But escape routes and mechanisms to defect to the army still need time and safe corridors. Some paid with their lives for trying, and some officers and soldiers are currently detained on charges of attempting to leave and join the army.”

He concludes:
“Despite my distrust of tribal structures, they are now the safest path for fighters wishing to escape and leave the militia — which, at some point, will rely exclusively on foreign mercenaries.”