Trump’s Approach to Sudan: Between Short-Term Deals and Complex Regional Balances

Report – Sudan Events

Since the earliest months of Donald Trump’s return to the White House in his current term, Sudan has found itself at the center of a rapidly shifting and volatile regional landscape. Despite the administration’s public statements about “ending the war” and “supporting peace,” an analysis of Washington’s approach — as outlined by U.S. Sudan expert Cameron Hudson — suggests that what is unfolding is not a peace process but rather a management of regional power dynamics and an attempt to forge a short-term deal that aligns with Trump’s vision for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

This report brings together Hudson’s analysis and the broader regional and diplomatic context to present a comprehensive narrative of how the Trump administration views the war in Sudan — and what that might mean for the trajectory of the conflict and prospects for ending it.

1. Two Wars in Sudan… One of Them Unseen

Hudson argues that Sudan is experiencing two parallel wars:

1. A visible internal conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

2. A concealed, region-wide struggle between states competing for influence, resources, and Sudan’s geopolitical position.

This second war — where the interests of the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Chad, and Libya intersect — is, from an American perspective, the real battlefield. Washington does not view Sudan as an isolated case, but as a node within a wider reconfiguration of power across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, amid China’s rise, new Saudi–U.S. strategic arrangements, and the UAE’s bid to extend its military and commercial reach from the Horn to the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the administration’s priority is to contain competition among allies, not to resolve Sudan’s internal crises.

2. The Logic of “Deal-Making”: Trump’s Vision of Peace

Hudson explains that Trump does not think in terms of traditional peacebuilding — justice, institution-building, security reform, or civilian protection. Instead, he views the conflict through a different lens: securing a quick deal that can produce a politically marketable outcome at home.

In Trump’s view:
• Sudan does not require a complex peace process.
• A limited ceasefire or humanitarian arrangement — something that can be announced — is enough.
• The next step is to broker an understanding among major regional powers.

This approach ignores the deep structural roots of the conflict: ethnic cleansing, state collapse, the proliferation of militias, economic devastation, and the absence of a unified political base. Hence Hudson’s warning to Sudanese actors: “You may not want Trump personally stepping in and choosing winners and losers in Sudan.”

Any “quick deal,” he argues, will be built on regional power calculations — not Sudan’s political realities or the interests of its civil society.

3. Toward an Elite Settlement… Not a Sustainable Peace

Hudson notes that the current U.S. trajectory points toward an elite-driven arrangement — a reengineering of power through understandings brokered among:
• Washington
• Abu Dhabi
• Riyadh
• Cairo
• and a limited number of Sudanese actors willing to be incorporated into these frameworks

This model mirrors the 2019–2021 agreements that enabled the RSF to grow into an unchecked military force, ultimately setting the stage for the 2023 war.

Hudson warns that reproducing this model — now with even stronger regional involvement — will lead to:
• entrenching the influence of states backing armed factions,
• legitimizing a “new balance” that ignores root causes of the war,
• sidelining demands for justice and accountability,
• and keeping civilians out of the political equation.

4. U.S. Sanctions: Limited Tools Shaped by Regional Priorities

The Trump administration has imposed a set of “limited” sanctions against parties to the conflict. But Hudson stresses that these measures will not target regional allies — regardless of the level of their involvement in arming militias or financing military operations.

This restraint is driven by two major factors:

1. Strategic priorities — Washington sees Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt as indispensable partners on issues such as China, Red Sea security, normalization agreements, and supply-chain control.

2. Trump’s negotiation style — he prefers bargaining with allies rather than pressuring them, believing that partners — despite their missteps — are more valuable than any domestic file within Sudan.

Thus, sanctions will remain modest and directed primarily at Sudanese actors, not the states fueling the conflict.

5. Washington’s Broader Calculations: Sudan as a Secondary File

The Trump administration views the region through a lens far wider than Sudan:
• the geopolitical rivalry with China
• the redesign of strategic ties with Saudi Arabia
• containing Emirati ambitions
• limiting Iran’s influence
• securing Red Sea trade routes

Within these calculations:

Sudan becomes an issue to be managed — not a crisis to be resolved.

The goal is not comprehensive peace, but a deal that keeps regional power balances under control.

6. What This Means for Sudanese Actors

Given Hudson’s analysis and the surrounding political context:

No genuine peace process is on the horizon
Only a “deal” is being shaped — a top-down arrangement dominated by regional powers.

Civilians and civil society remain excluded
Because peace is not the center of U.S. strategy.

Justice and accountability are absent from the agenda
The focus is on political “damage control,” not institutional rebuilding.

Regional powers will gain more influence
As Washington avoids pressuring key partners like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Sudan’s future will be decided outside Sudan
Driven more by regional and international power dynamics than by Sudanese agency.

Conclusion

Cameron Hudson’s assessments — combined with Washington’s diplomatic behavior — indicate that the Trump administration views Sudan as a theater for regional balancing, not as a country on the brink of humanitarian and political collapse. The U.S. approach thus becomes one of crisis management, not crisis resolution — pursuing a short-term, politically marketable deal rather than a long-term peace or a genuine democratic transition.

Because this approach leaves the roots of the crisis unaddressed, Sudan may be heading toward a new phase of “false stability” — one that neither resolves the causes of war, nor delivers justice, nor rebuilds the state, but merely postpones the next, potentially more dangerous, collapse.