Sudan After the April War: From the Risks of Partition to State Fragmentation

Al-Wathiq Kameir

Introduction

Since the secession of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan has faced a decisive historical juncture in which the structure of the state has become more fragile than ever. In early 2013—amid escalating political tensions, a suffocating economic crisis, and the marked expansion of conflicts in the peripheries—I published an analytical paper examining the future of the Sudanese state through three main scenarios: (1) the continuation of the status quo with cosmetic reforms; (2) a gradual slide toward state fragmentation; or (3) the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement that would reconstitute legitimacy and avert collapse (Al-Wathiq Kameir, “The Ball Is in the President’s Court: The Fragmentation of the Sudanese State… the Most Likely Scenario!”, Sudanile, February 11, 2013).

That paper was not an attempt at prediction so much as a reading of the structure of the crisis and its internal logic. It argued that ignoring the requirements of a historic settlement—understood as the sole gateway to addressing the root causes of conflict—would make fragmentation the most probable outcome.

With the outbreak of war in April 2023 and the radical transformation in the nature of the conflict, there is a renewed need to reconnect the present moment with the scenarios outlined in 2013—not merely for historical comparison, but to draw practical lessons that could help halt the war and chart a new course for rebuilding the state.

State Fragmentation: The Most Likely Scenario

The April 2023 war was not simply another escalation in Sudan’s conflicts; it marked a qualitative turning point. The emergence of a new actor on the scene—the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—its military and political alliance with local and regional actors, and its control over the entire Darfur region and parts of West, South, and North Kordofan and South Blue Nile, alongside the declaration of a government and a state constitution, have rendered the political and geographic reality far more complex. While a peaceful secession—unlike what occurred in South Sudan—may not be feasible, the scenario of state fragmentation remains the most likely.

Three key factors reinforce this assessment:

1. Regional intervention and conflicting interests

Chad, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan—backed by the United Arab Emirates—on one side, and Egypt and Eritrea on the other, are involved in the conflict directly or indirectly. This involvement has intensified, particularly after the RSF took control of oil fields in the Heglig area, the withdrawal of a Sudanese army division, and the entry of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army, which has coordinated with the RSF to protect vital facilities. Such regional entanglements make managing the internal crisis without fragmenting the state exceedingly difficult.

2. The potential eruption of new local conflicts

Assuming the RSF consolidates control over all of Darfur and parts of Kordofan—and even if it were to pursue secession—the absence of popular and political consensus around self-determination, unlike the case of South Sudan, opens the door to a new “civil” war among Darfur’s African-origin communities (including the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, Berti, Dajo, Tunjur, Tama, Meidob, Fulani, Guraan, and others) and the RSF’s social bases among Arab-origin groups. In addition, armed movements hold divergent political positions on the war and Darfur’s future, suggesting a protracted conflict. This internal confrontation heightens the risk of fragmentation and underscores the state’s fragility.

3. Fractures within military and political alliances

There are growing prospects of rifts within the governing alliance between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the movements comprising the “Joint Force,” as well as other armed groups fighting alongside the army in the east, center, and north of the country, amid competition over shares of power and wealth. Similarly, fractures could emerge within the RSF’s military alliance with the SPLM-North and splinter Darfur movements that joined the “Founding” alliance. Such developments would signal fragmentation at both the military and political levels, complicating efforts to control the entire national territory and restore legitimacy. Conflicting loyalties and interests would weaken the state’s capacity for unified and effective governance.

In light of these factors, Sudan after April appears not merely on the brink of partition, but on a perilous path toward state fragmentation—the very scenario I outlined in 2013—which remains the most likely outcome following the April war, as evidenced by realities unfolding on the ground.

Conclusion

What the war has revealed is not a passing crisis, but a stark warning that the unity of the Sudanese state is under unprecedented threat. More than a decade after the 2013 analytical paper outlined the fragmentation scenario, it is now closer than ever—reinforced by complex regional interventions, acute internal conflicts among social and political components, and fractures within military alliances.

Today, the situation cannot be addressed through cosmetic measures or partial solutions. The growing likelihood of state fragmentation compels political leaders and decision-makers to think seriously about pathways toward a comprehensive peaceful settlement—one that reconstitutes legitimacy and lays the foundations for a sustainable transition capable of protecting Sudan from total collapse.

Absent the adoption of an inclusive political settlement that integrates all parties and restores the state anew, risks will persist and alternatives will remain limited, while the Sudanese people continue to bear the consequences of conflict, dispersed authority, and institutional breakdown. It is a true test of the Sudanese state’s ability to overcome the gravest crisis it has faced since independence.