Behind Saudi Arabia’s Recent Moves

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1.
How can Saudi Arabia’s recent moves be understood, and what new developments have pushed it to decisively distance itself from the Emirati line? This question is central to understanding the rapidly shifting reality of the Sudanese crisis.

2.
These moves must first be read in light of the recent changes in the Sudan file. Foremost among them is the exposure of the Emirati role in the aggression against Sudan, a role that since the early days of the war had been obscured and misrepresented by Western diplomacy, which sacrificed its humanitarian conscience in favor of interests tied to the UAE and its multibillion-dollar investments in European Union countries. Added to this were the positions of African organizations and many states that sought to conceal the Emirati role through silence, justifying the militia’s crimes and equating it with the Sudanese army.

The aggressive role played by the UAE in the war in Sudan has now been laid bare, and it is no longer possible to cover it up with vague statements and hollow positions. Coverage by major Western media institutions helped strip away the fig leaf that failed to conceal the steady flow of Emirati support from neighboring countries to fuel the war. This forced the UAE to move from outright denial to crude justification of its unlimited support for the militia, then further from silence over the militia’s crimes to openly condemning them, in an attempt to distance itself from those crimes and improve its global image, while leaping into the role of a “benevolent” mediator seeking peace. The Emirati maneuvers have been fully exposed, and any diplomatic or humanitarian cover has been removed.

3.
A second development is the exposure of the criminal nature of the militia itself, which became evident early on with the genocide of the Masalit in El Geneina. Despite international condemnations, it was clear that there were attempts to obscure these crimes. However, after the fall of El Fasher and the massacres committed there, it became impossible to conceal the nature of these aggressive, fascistic forces that kill without reason and are restrained by no conscience, ethics, or law.

Condemnations and statements escalated, with positions emerging from the European and Australian parliaments, as well as from members of the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament. Extensive coverage in Western media and on social platforms exposed the brutality and horror of the militia’s crimes, leaving no room for argument about its criminality, not even from its sponsor.

4.
A third development is the activism of Sudanese communities abroad. Through its vitality and intensity, this movement drew global attention to the Sudanese cause and prompted diplomatic circles in Western institutions to listen to another voice: the voice of the victims, long ignored and met with silence.

5.
A fourth development is the resilience of the army, backed by the people. Despite abandonment by brothers and neighbors, hardship, and scarce resources, the army has remained steadfast on two core issues.

The first is its rejection of any Emirati role in settling the war in Sudan, and consequently its rejection of unjust settlement proposals put forward by the Quartet and others.
The second is its refusal to allow the militia to return to any political or military role, and its adherence to the declared roadmap it submitted to the United Nations more than a year ago.

6.
The fifth development is growing concern over the spread of the war to neighboring countries, especially after the militia’s advances in several areas of West Kordofan and its seizure of El Fasher. The greatest fear is that the flames could reach the Red Sea, through which 40% of Saudi trade and 13% of global trade pass, amid Emirati efforts to turn the Red Sea, through control of ports, into an exclusively Emirati waterway. This would place Saudi Arabia within immediate proximity to the danger, particularly given that its largest investments are in the NEOM region, less than 1,200 kilometers from Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

7.
A sixth external development lies in the UAE’s attempts to expand its influence in Yemen by instigating military movements by the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council to seize the entirety of Hadramout Governorate. Observers viewed this as a response to Saudi Arabia’s attempt to monopolize the handling of the Sudanese issue away from the Quartet framework.

8.
Amid these developments came the meeting between Mohammed bin Salman and President Trump, during which the Crown Prince placed the Sudan file, in full detail, on the table. This marked a qualitative shift in diplomatic engagement over the war in Sudan. Saudi moves can be understood in this context, as Riyadh began providing diplomatic support to Sudan’s legitimate government, starting with the Trump meeting, followed by statements affirming support for Sudanese state institutions, then the meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Al-Burhan, and most notably the convening of Trump’s envoy Massad Boulos with President Al-Burhan in Riyadh.

This indicates that the Quartet has been effectively buried, replaced by a trilateral Sudanese-Saudi-American platform. Excluding the UAE from its deceptive mediator role was a key Sudanese demand, and with the Quartet’s demise, this obstacle has been removed. One remaining hurdle stands between the current situation and a new phase: activating the Jeddah Declaration, which the militia signed and which was witnessed by the international community, including Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Clear changes in the Saudi position have been reflected in Saudi television channels and media policy more broadly, particularly among newspaper editors and social media influencers. Following the Trump meeting, Saudi Arabia also extended tangible support to Sudan across multiple fields.

9.
Saudi Arabia is now moving to resolve its differences with Iran through Chinese mediation, which is expected to lead to the closure of the Yemen front after an agreement with the Houthis. This would allow Riyadh to focus on the Sudan file, which appears to have been returned to Saudi hands by the United States. Continued war and the UAE’s insistence on enforcing its agenda would thus place it in direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, a confrontation the UAE cannot sustain, especially as the Gulf as a whole would stand with Saudi Arabia against Emirati imperial ambitions, as became evident at the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting at the end of last month.

This strengthens the Saudi role and its acceptance by regional and international actors, particularly by Trump, and by the Sudanese army and people, opening expectations and hopes that the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman could deliver different results by overcoming the constraints of the Quartet and Emirati machinations.

10.
Taken together, these developments place Saudi Arabia’s moves within the framework of a broad strategic transformation that goes beyond the Sudan file itself. Saudi Arabia, having reshaped its regional position following reconciliation with Iran, Red Sea arrangements, and the expansion of NEOM investments, now sees the continuation of chaos in Sudan not merely as a humanitarian or political crisis, but as a direct threat to its economic infrastructure and national security. The exposure of the Emirati role on multiple fronts has further reinforced Riyadh’s conviction that it must take the initiative itself.

With wide regional and international acceptance of the Saudi role, and with a new U.S. administration more aligned with the Crown Prince’s priorities, Riyadh appears poised to open a new chapter that could redraw regional balances and place Sudan on a path fundamentally different from the one it experienced during the so-called “Quartet” phase.