The Talk of Initiatives: Trump’s Initiative (1)

By Amin Hassan Omar

The word “initiative” has become worn out in Sudanese politics. It has lost its flavor, substance, and meaning, to the point of becoming an empty term. One does not deserve to be called an initiator unless one truly introduces a new idea, concept, or proposal. Yet the initiatives we see today are merely repetitions of familiar and recycled ideas, offering nothing new in addressing problems or crises.

What has been called the “Quartet Initiative,” or more recently the “Saudi-American Initiative,” regardless of its name, presents no new thinking to any serious analyst. In fact, it presents no sound idea at all. All these initiatives are built on the assumption of a power struggle between two parties who are portrayed as roughly equal. The core premise is that of resolving a dispute between two comparable sides.

The world now knows—or has nearly come to know—that this premise is fundamentally flawed. What is taking place is not merely a rebellion against a legitimate government accepted by the people and recognized by international organizations; it is a rebellion against the very foundations of the state. It is an open attempt to destroy the country, displace its population, and replace them with foreign tribesmen arriving from all directions.

They know this. And even if they once lacked certainty, today they know it beyond doubt. How could they not, when the entire world has witnessed massacres claiming tens of thousands of lives, seen armed groups flooding into Sudan in convoys, and watched mercenaries arriving from near and far to profit from the war—looting the people’s wealth, killing their men, and enslaving their women?

Anyone who still speaks of a “conflict between two sides” falls into one of two categories: either they do not know—and do not wish to know—or they know the truth but find it inconvenient. Those who merely recycle a tired narrative should not be listened to, because anyone who does not understand or acknowledge the real problem cannot, or does not wish to, solve it.

So what is new?

What is new is that, following the horrific crimes committed by the Janjaweed, some actors have begun to realize that their threat extends beyond the disintegration of Sudan to the spread of chaos across the entire region, endangering neighboring states. This growing awareness has gained a powerful ally in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has come to recognize the danger of instability spreading along its western maritime borders, at a time when its largest development projects are concentrated along its other coastline.

Saudi Arabia, through its declared strategy, prioritizes development and security and has grown increasingly sensitive to projects that seek to export chaos in its vicinity, in any direction.

This is why the campaign to confront Janjaweed-driven chaos has secured a strong ally, in addition to Egypt and Eritrea, which recognized the danger from the very beginning. Saudi Arabia today holds immense geopolitical importance for the two competing global poles: China and the United States, both of which are seeking closer ties with the Kingdom for multiple reasons.

Chief among these reasons is Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role in the global trade conflict. While China is expanding its global commerce through the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States is attempting to push China out of the Middle East and Africa—two regions that have seen massive growth in trade with Beijing. Trade between China and the Gulf states reached approximately $316 billion, increasing by 140 percent between 2015 and 2022, making China Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner.

The Gulf states went even further by proposing that part of their oil trade be priced in yuan on the Shanghai Energy Exchange. This was followed by Saudi Arabia hosting major economic summits with China during President Biden’s term—moves that set off alarm bells in Washington. The subsequent accession of the UAE and Egypt to BRICS, a bloc that is considering the creation of its own currency for trade cooperation, represented a potentially devastating blow to the US dollar, particularly at a time when American debt has reached record levels.

China’s partnerships with the Gulf have expanded beyond economics into technology and military manufacturing. For this reason, Donald Trump—whose near-war confrontations in Africa (notably Nigeria) and Latin America (Venezuela) are driven primarily by oil and the dollar—will spare no effort to keep Saudi Arabia away from BRICS and China.

Trump, who has threatened South Africa for steering BRICS toward closer alignment with China, is unlikely to overlook the rapid rise in Africa–China trade, which grew from $11 billion in 2001 to nearly $250 billion by 2024. This growth has been driven by Africa’s largest economies, including Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria.

Nigeria’s trade volume with China has reached approximately $22.6 billion, accompanied by nearly $20 billion in announced investment commitments. Nigeria is seriously considering joining BRICS, as is Algeria. This context helps explain Trump’s aggressive rhetoric toward Nigeria and Venezuela. If he were to win either a military or political battle in those countries, he could secure nearly one trillion dollars annually and push China out of South America.

Against this backdrop, the motivations behind Trump’s movements in the Middle East and Africa become clearer. In the next part, we will attempt to understand Trump’s approach to the Sudanese crisis in light of these considerations—if the negligence of Sudan’s own people allows Sudan to become yet another bargaining chip in his many deals in this strategically vital region of the world.