Al-Burhan’s Visit and the Red Sea Alliance
Zein al-Abidin Saleh Abdel Rahman
On March 13, 2023, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—then Vice President of Sudan’s Sovereign Council—visited Asmara and met with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. During that visit, Afwerki told Dagalo that the Sudanese Armed Forces constituted the solid backbone upon which Sudan’s unity and the integrity of its sovereignty rest. He added that although Sudan had become a “bazaar” for foreign agendas, Eritrea would stand only with whatever course the Sudanese army decided. When the war later broke out, Eritrea’s position had already been determined. Dagalo’s visit, in essence, sought to ascertain Eritrea’s stance should a change in power occur.
In late October 2025, President Isaias paid a five-day visit to Egypt—an unusually long stay that underscored the importance of the agenda discussed with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The talks focused on ending the war in Sudan and supporting the country’s official state institutions, foremost among them the armed forces. Egypt also reaffirmed its support for Eritrea’s security, territorial integrity, peace and cooperation in the Horn of Africa, Red Sea security, and developments in Somalia. In a televised interview, Isaias stressed that responsibility for securing the Red Sea rests solely with the littoral states, warning against non–Red Sea countries seeking military footholds in the area.
In late November 2025, President Isaias visited Sudan, raising the same issues with Sovereign Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The discussions emphasized the need for regional states to coordinate efforts to safeguard their security and to eliminate all forms of foreign presence, which was described as a key driver of instability. A week later, the Eritrean president traveled to Riyadh to meet Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman. During that visit, Isaias addressed the Red Sea file explicitly, voicing his rejection of any non–Red Sea state’s involvement—specifically referring to Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates, which seek oversight of several Red Sea ports. He called on Saudi Arabia to play a role commensurate with its leading regional status to strengthen security and peace for all Red Sea states.
Al-Burhan’s visit revolves around two interlinked issues: first, the war in Sudan and how to reach a political solution that preserves Sudan’s unity and the integrity of its national institutions; and second, the security and safety of the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia is not distant from the causes of the war that erupted on April 15, 2023. The Kingdom—represented by its ambassador to Sudan, Ali bin Hassan Jaafar—participated in all activities of the “Quad” (Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the UAE), both before and after the war. Moreover, a meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and former U.S. President Donald Trump—along with Trump’s statements—underscored Saudi Arabia’s leading regional role, qualifying it to act as an acceptable mediator.
During his visit to Saudi Arabia, the Chairman of the Sovereign Council carried with him the leadership’s vision previously conveyed to the U.S. administration through a Sudanese delegation headed by the foreign minister and including representatives of the armed forces, aimed at achieving a ceasefire. The president reiterated this vision in meetings with senior military officers, alongside the understandings reached through the Jeddah platform on May 11, 2023.
Upon his return, al-Burhan made no public statements beyond a post on the “X” platform thanking the Saudi leadership for the warm reception. This suggests that the Saudi leadership presented a vision it intends to submit to the Sovereign Council and the army leadership. It is also likely that Saudi Arabia has refrained from disclosing details of the talks to avoid disrupting the process. The mediator, it appears, is not seeking to impose a particular leadership; its primary concern is stopping the war first, followed by addressing the political question.
Another notable point is the speed with which the UAE announced the death of Abdul Rahim Dagalo, rather than allowing the announcement to come from his brother, Hemeti. To date, Hemeti’s own situation remains unclear. Another question arises as to why a group within the Sudanese Congress Party signed the political statement for the “Founding” declaration to join a political bloc, while the party simultaneously denied the signature. Does this imply that the UAE—said to have orchestrated the “Founding” initiative—asked those individuals to sign in the party’s name? Similarly, reports suggest that the UAE requested Youssef Ezzat to travel to Nyala to serve as an adviser to the head of “Founding.” After his arrest and the uncertainty surrounding his whereabouts, the same individuals were reportedly asked to sign the declaration to assume the role Ezzat was expected to play. The swift denial that the party had signed raises further questions: which faction issued the rejection? Notably, a month before the war, the Sudanese Congress Party began experiencing internal divisions, starting with the Nour al-Din Salah al-Din group, followed by further defections after the outbreak of the conflict. Today, Arabi and his group represent another split, and as the crisis deepens, additional fractures among political forces are likely.
In reality, the push to halt the war indicates that the paper submitted by the army leadership to the Quad and the U.S. State Department forms the basis of current discussions on a ceasefire. In such an environment, rumors will proliferate, and some actors will present their own proposals as the backbone of the talks in an attempt to obscure public awareness and create political confusion. What ultimately matters is a homeland free of militias, a comprehensive national dialogue involving all political forces, and the complete exclusion of foreign influence from the political process. We ask God for clarity of vision.
