The Opposition in South Sudan at the Moment of Transition Toward an Alternative Political Project

Mohannad Awad Mahmoud

The conflict in South Sudan can no longer be reduced to the simplistic binary of government versus opposition that has dominated political and media discourse for years. It has entered a far more complex and sensitive phase, where a structural crisis of governance intersects with state fragmentation, a blocked transitional horizon, and the emergence of a new opposition that is more organized, broader in scope, and increasingly capable of threatening the survival of the existing regime. What we are witnessing today is not a reproduction of the divisions of 2013 or 2016, but rather a transition of the South Sudanese opposition from a phase of protest and fragmentation to one of an alternative political project—at a moment that coincides with unprecedented weakness within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the erosion of its political and popular legitimacy.

In its previous form, the opposition was captive to fragile peace agreements, constrained by international ceilings that prevented decisive outcomes, and heavily reliant on military mobilization and tribal alignments. Today, however, these forces have reorganized themselves on a new political–organizational basis that does not reduce the conflict to tribe or region, but frames it as a comprehensive crisis of governance. This transformation crystallized clearly with the official announcement of the Political Charter of the United People’s Alliance (UPA), adopted and signed on 1 November 2025, as a foundational and unifying document for the opposition rather than a fleeting political statement.

The Charter begins with a direct diagnosis of South Sudan’s crisis as that of a state hijacked by a narrow elite in Juba—an elite that has used violence, effectively suspended the constitution, stripped peace agreements of their substance, instrumentalized ethnicity as a tool of rule, and turned national resources into spoils. Notably, the Charter goes beyond critique to explicitly affirm the people’s right to resist and overthrow any authority that obstructs the peaceful transfer of power or suppresses the popular will. This position directly challenges the legitimacy of Salva Kiir’s rule, especially in light of his declared and practical refusal to hold elections, fully aware that any genuine electoral process would not return him to power.

The Charter advances a comprehensive project centered on radical, irreversible systemic change. It begins with the establishment of a new transitional authority and culminates in a democratic federal state founded on free elections, separation of powers, the reconstruction of the army and security services on professional and non-tribal bases, and the fight against corruption as a system of governance rather than merely individual abuses. It also places significant emphasis on external legitimacy through adherence to international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, and openness to pragmatic regional and international relations—reflecting a clear understanding that the battle to overthrow or politically isolate the regime will be diplomatic and political as much as it is internal.

The Charter’s strategic significance lies not only in its content, but also in the identity of its signatories. For the first time, it brought together a broad alignment of top-tier political and military leaders from diverse regions and tribes, including influential figures from the Dinka community itself, which has historically formed the backbone of the ruling SPLM’s legitimacy. Among the most prominent signatories are: General Pagan Amum Okiech, President of the SPLM–Real (R-SPLM) and one of the movement’s historic leaders; General Paul Malong Awan, Chairman and Commander of the South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A), one of the most powerful Dinka military figures who moved from the heart of the ruling establishment to become its most formidable adversary; General Mario Loku Thomas, Commander of the National Salvation Front (NAS-RCC) and representative of Equatorian military weight; General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, Commander of the South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A); Dr. Mator Gorgok Gak, President of the National People’s Movement (NPM) and representative of the civilian political wing; General Henry Oyay Nyago, Commander of the Upper Nile People’s Liberation Front (UNPLF); and General Nyal Deng Nyal, Commander of the South Sudan Salvation Movement (SSSM).

This broad alignment—bringing together leaders from the Dinka, Equatoria, Upper Nile, and beyond under a single political document and unified program—has moved the opposition from chronic fragmentation to organized cohesion. It has also shattered the narrative long employed by the SPLM to delegitimize its rivals as an anti-majoritarian project. As a result, the regime has entered a genuine crisis of legitimacy, no longer able to credibly claim to represent the revolution, the majority, or the state.

By contrast, the ruling SPLM is suffering from evident structural exhaustion. It is no longer a party of the state, but rather a network of security–economic interests governing with a logic of survival rather than popular mandate. Divisions within the leadership, declining discipline within the army, weakened mobilization capacity, and the collapse of trust between state and society have all turned elections into an existential threat to the regime rather than a delayed entitlement. Consequently, Salva Kiir is betting on prolonging the transitional period and obstructing any electoral path, while simultaneously adopting tactics of containment and partial reconciliation—reintegrating certain figures into government or opening back channels to defuse opposition pressure without altering the core power equation.

Regionally, these shifts add another layer of complexity. Kenya has emerged as the most prominent political hub for the South Sudanese opposition, providing it with space for movement and international engagement without direct military support, while playing a strategic role in reshaping the political balance. Uganda, despite President Museveni’s personal ties with some opposition leaders, continues to lean toward supporting—or at least not toppling—the status quo for now, while keeping open channels with the opposition as a contingency option, fully aware that Salva Kiir is no longer the strong partner he once was.

From a security perspective, this equation means that South Sudan is entering a phase of high political fluidity, with direct repercussions for the wider region—particularly Sudan—along the extensive border from Upper Nile to Kordofan, West Kordofan, and South Darfur, where social intermingling, pastoral routes, informal markets, and arms flows intersect. These developments require Khartoum to undertake a precise and in-depth reading of the South Sudanese landscape, grounded in a full understanding of internal power balances and political–military trajectories, while maintaining a posture of informed observation that preserves all tools of influence without deploying them overtly.

In conclusion, South Sudan today stands at a critical juncture. Unlike in previous phases, the opposition now possesses a charter, leadership, cross-tribal penetration, a coherent political program, and sufficient regional momentum to threaten the survival of Salva Kiir’s rule—even without overthrowing it militarily. The regime, for its part, is wagering on time, containment, and limited external support to postpone the moment of reckoning. Yet the prevailing trajectory clearly indicates that the old governing formula is no longer sustainable, and that the question is no longer whether change is coming, but how, when, and at what political and security cost to South Sudan and the region as a whole.