The Truce: President al-Burhan’s Options

As I See

Adel El-Baz

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The statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday, December 19, sparked widespread attention. Rubio said that Washington’s immediate goal regarding Sudan is to halt hostilities before the end of the year, allowing humanitarian organizations to deliver aid. The source of confusion, however, lies in the absence of any clear indicators suggesting that such a development could materialize within the remaining days of the year—no more than ten days from the date of the statement.

Yet President al-Burhan’s recent movements—to Saudi Arabia, his meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, his encounter with Massad Boulos, and his visit to Egypt prior to Rubio’s remarks—suggest that something is unfolding behind the scenes. It can be said with some confidence that these were not routine or ceremonial visits, but rather part of a scenario under preparation, one that will likely be announced once the parties involved are convinced that their efforts will be productive, publicly acceptable, and capable of achieving their intended objectives.

Until the trajectory and outcomes of these movements become clearer, it is worth examining President al-Burhan’s options should these efforts align with the U.S. Secretary of State’s stated goal—particularly in light of mounting Saudi pressure on the UAE (including the mobilization of 20,000 troops on Yemen’s border and developments related to Hadramout), and Egypt’s pressure on the militia following the “red lines” it announced in a recent statement. That statement carried a clear message to the militia and its backers.

This was followed by remarks from President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who stated: “Egypt has never issued threats against Ethiopia.” While this may be formally correct, the statement paradoxically reinforces what had previously been denied. These remarks also came in the aftermath of reports about camps established by the UAE and weapons shipments sent to Ethiopia’s Benishangul region.

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The first option is to accept the truce as proposed in the Quartet’s statement last September. This would amount to drinking a cup of poison, given the mobilization campaign led by President al-Burhan himself in recent weeks, during which he repeatedly rejected any truce absent the fulfillment of necessary conditions. Public opinion has been firmly mobilized against any ceasefire that does not meet the declared prerequisite of the militia’s withdrawal from cities.

Within this context, it is virtually impossible for the leadership—and President al-Burhan personally—to execute a 180-degree reversal and announce acceptance of a truce.

Such a move would expose the president to three immediate risks. The first is the fragmentation of the war coalition, composed of the army, joint forces, and mobilized volunteers. In his most recent meeting with military leaders, al-Burhan reaffirmed his conditions for a truce, making it clear that the army would not accept, under the cover of a ceasefire, the reintegration of the militia into military life.

He also cannot bypass the joint forces, which now field thousands of fighters on active fronts; they will not accept leaving their families in Darfur and Kordofan at the mercy of a criminal militia. Nor would the mobilized volunteers accept a return of the militia to dominance, regardless of the pressure exerted. In this scenario, the truce would become an instrument of internal fragmentation, weakening the home front and potentially triggering deep divisions that could dramatically alter the entire course of the war.

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The second option is for the president to accept the truce only after securing credible guarantees—not merely for himself, but for his partners in the coalition—and after obtaining their approval. Such a truce would need to be accompanied by international guarantees and must clearly achieve the declared objectives.

If this were to occur, the coalition could avoid fragmentation, and public opinion might accept the truce, albeit with lingering fears rooted in past experiences with the militia and previous ceasefires. Absent these conditions, the president would be risking his popularity, alienating public opinion, and pushing his allies toward unpredictable positions.

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The third option is for President al-Burhan to adhere to his stance, his conditions, and the roadmap he submitted to the United Nations, rejecting all ceasefire proposals. This would lead to intensified international pressure, particularly if the opposing party signals its acceptance of a truce.

In this case, the president would be left with a single path: continuing the war until the military balance shifts decisively in favor of the Sudanese government on the ground—that is, breaking the militia’s power and arrogance and forcing it to submit to the government’s roadmap. The Saudi position would carry significant weight, as would the Egyptian stance, but the decisive factor would ultimately be the position of the Sudanese people and the coalition fighting the war.

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It is important to note that any path toward a truce—whether driven by international pressure or regional understandings—will not be a transient measure. Rather, it will represent a turning point in the nature, tempo, and internal equations of the war. Sudan’s current landscape is no longer isolated from a web of emerging regional balances, ranging from shifting Gulf alliances, to deeper U.S. engagement, to the recalibration of influence across East Africa and the Red Sea.

Accordingly, President al-Burhan’s choices are no longer merely tactical. They have become foundational decisions that will determine the future of the Sudanese state: Will Sudan move toward a settlement that rebuilds the state on new foundations, or toward a harsher phase of fighting aimed at resolving the balance of power by force?

What is certain is that any forthcoming step will be judged not only by its political and military outcomes, but by its ability to preserve internal cohesion, maintain public trust, and create conditions conducive to a just settlement—one that neither rewards the militia nor leaves Sudan hostage to regional and international blackmail.