The War of Intellectual Currents and the Sudan of the Future

Zein Al-Abidin Saleh Abdelrahman

One of the great paradoxes in Sudan’s political conflict and in the mapping of possible solutions emerged clearly before me while I was writing a book on “The Political Crisis and the Search for Solutions.” I sought to trace what party leaders have presented, and how they conceptualize the crisis from the revolution to the war. Out of the book’s chapters, only three focused on figures who deal with the crisis through intellectual labor and thought production.

The chapters I concentrated on—“The Dilemma of Political Parties in Sudan,” “How to Reform Political Parties in Sudan,” and “Solutions and Democracy”—revealed, through readings of research papers and articles published in Sudanese newspapers and research centers, that most writings have been confined to ideological currents on the right and the left, particularly Marxist leftists and Islamists. With the exception of Ibrahim El-Badawi, who presented a thesis on what he termed “democratic economics” as a pathway to economic renaissance, intellectual efforts have remained largely trapped within these two currents. This suggests that they alone hold the “key” to intellectual illumination.

Yet even within the left, some writings have failed to break free from the cocoon of partisanship and hostility, unable to take the path of objectivity—a condition shaped by other constraints, including fear of campaigns of character assassination or ideological excommunication.

Most other political parties, meanwhile, suffer from severe intellectual poverty. This is the core challenge facing Sudanese elites. The nature of the conflict that has persisted since the October 1964 Revolution until today (2025) remains at the heart of Sudan’s crisis—and it will persist even if the war ends. Initially, the conflict unfolded between the National Unionist Party and the Communist Party from the early 1950s until October 1964. After that date, the Islamic Movement emerged in its new form under the leadership of Dr. Hassan Abdullah Al-Turabi, shifting the struggle into a confrontation between two blocs: the Communist Party and the Islamic Movement.

Regrettably, this confrontation adopted a zero-sum logic, producing no political literature capable of enriching the public sphere. It was during this phase that the arena was stripped of enlightened knowledge production. Enlightenment plays a vital role in nourishing democratic culture, yet what was produced instead was an authoritarian culture that constrained dialogue among intellectual currents. This authoritarian mindset came to dominate political practice—both among political forces and within party institutions themselves—rendering them intellectually sterile.

Notably, those who wrote in their individual capacities rather than as party representatives—whose political leanings can be discerned through the intellectual references embedded in their analyses—demonstrate that parties themselves are entirely absent from presenting coherent political projects for resolving the crisis. Some parties have contented themselves with issuing statements or slogans, symbolic gestures that reflect intellectual barrenness. Nevertheless, there are diligent individuals who continue to write, offering visions and solutions that should, in principle, spark dialogue and open windows for discussion to ease the prevailing political polarization.

The ideological struggle between the two currents—Communist and Islamist—requires political forces capable of playing a mediating role to reduce tensions, acting like “cork between glass tools.” This is not what some parties are doing today; instead, they fuel polarization for personal rather than public gain.

Historically, the Unionists once played this balancing role. However, after 1985 and the growing dominance of sectarian influence within the party, their capacity to create political equilibrium weakened. This task requires active forces that listen to all sides and offer conciliatory proposals capable of transforming the conflict from a zero-sum, exclusionary struggle into one where each side accepts dialogue with the other. This, fundamentally, is the crux of Sudanese politics.

As for other parties, many are functional entities operating on the margins of the conflict, unable to make meaningful intellectual contributions toward resolving the crisis. From their inception, they relied on slogans rather than substantive thought, offering no intellectual output that demonstrates an ability to play a leading role in Sudan’s future. In their current struggles, they have leaned on external influence as a shortcut to power, in exchange for implementing foreign agendas.

The National Umma Party, meanwhile, is grappling with a structural and intellectual crisis following the passing of the Imam. The war has further compounded its predicament, placing it in a position where it is unable to adopt a decisive stance, particularly as the conflict has spread into its traditional areas of influence under divergent agendas that have left the party itself disoriented.

I find no more fitting conclusion than the statement made by Dr. Al-Shafi’ Khidir at a seminar at Al-Zaeem Al-Azhari University in the early days of the revolution: “There must be a historic compromise between Islamists and Communists.” Only such a compromise can pave the way for national dialogue and enable the country to break free from its recurring crises.

Sudan is in urgent need of a historical methodology that restores thought to its rightful role in shaping stability and societal development. Yet all sides have moved toward freezing the role of reason through calls for exclusion and zero-sum conflict—contexts that are lethal to the intellect, preventing it from thinking creatively about possible solutions and from breaking free of the cocoon in which political forces have trapped it.

May God grant us clarity of insight.