From Asosa to Yabus… Addis Ababa Renews Its Historic Support for Rebels Against Khartoum

Report – Sudan Events

There has been growing talk recently of opening a new combat front against the Sudanese army in eastern Sudan, specifically in the Beni Shangul area, where Ethiopia has acknowledged the presence of military camps belonging to its army. Media reports have also indicated an increase in the movement of weapons from inside Ethiopia to the Yabus airstrip—an area controlled by the Abdelaziz al-Hilu movement.

The ICAD platform said satellite imagery it analyzed confirmed that cargo trucks traveled from inside Ethiopia to the Yabus area, where an airstrip has been established and is believed to be used for launching drones from Yabus village toward other regions. According to the platform, some of the drones that recently targeted the army and urban infrastructure are likely to have been launched from there.

ICAD noted that Ethiopia’s Asosa Airport is only 30 kilometers from the airstrip, and pointed out that the airport itself is undergoing unusual upgrade works, including expansion and the construction of hangars. The platform believes these developments go beyond civilian use and suggests a possible military role.

Tracking air traffic, ICAD said three aircraft—larger than those the airport typically receives—arrived recently. Further scrutiny showed they were cargo planes capable of transporting vehicles and military equipment. The platform also reported that, during the Ethiopian conflict, the airport had previously received drones of the Mohajer-6, TB2, and Bayraktar types.

The platform highlighted a particularly important point: the existence of a road linking Yabus to Ethiopia’s Asosa, approximately 35 kilometers long, which could provide an easy and direct route for the entry of weapons, personnel, combat vehicles, and drones. ICAD added that Ethiopia has established a militia camp capable of accommodating thousands of fighters, though it has not yet been inaugurated. Weapons reportedly arrive at Asosa Airport from the ports of Berbera in Somaliland and Mombasa in Kenya.

Dr. Ahmed Saad, a specialist in Horn of Africa affairs, said he rules out direct Ethiopian intervention in the war, as such a move would harm Ethiopia’s own security and create major complications that decision-makers in Addis Ababa fully understand. “Such a step would also directly risk the spread of fighting into Ethiopian territory,” he said, adding that Ethiopia, in its current situation, cannot afford either open hostility with Sudan or the spillover of conflict onto its soil. “In all cases, Ethiopia needs Khartoum’s support—or at least its neutrality—on many issues.”

However, Saad did not dismiss the possibility that Ethiopia could provide safe havens for the Rapid Support Forces. “History shows that the Ethiopian state has long supported and provided logistical backing to Sudanese opposition groups,” he said. “But based on what we know, al-Hilu is heavily supported by South Sudan, for example. South Sudan can receive shipments and smuggle them to al-Hilu’s camps, as it has always done. Why would al-Hilu need to receive shipments via Yabus when there are airports in South Sudan that support him and through which he can deliver equipment to the militia?”

He continued: “Unless the objective here is to move the fighting eastward. In that case, Asosa and Yabus could indeed serve as platforms for directing operations there—transforming the area not just into a transit zone but into an operational theater. I believe this would first and foremost harm Ethiopia, because the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is located in Beni Shangul. Any transfer of fighting to that area would make it an easy target for fighter jets and drones. These are calculations I believe decision-makers in Addis Ababa understand well.”

Saad also pointed to the nature of relations between Cairo and Khartoum and how they have evolved amid recent tensions between Addis Ababa and Khartoum. He noted the significance of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Sudan—the first by a head of state—and said such developments may heighten Ethiopia’s sense of risk. “All of this makes Ethiopia more cautious in dealing with the Sudanese issue and its complexities,” he said, adding that Egypt’s recent message, its talk of a joint defense agreement, and its direct involvement in fighting all lead him to believe that Ethiopia will not become embroiled in such an overt manner.

Military expert Yasser Saad al-Din, by contrast, said Ethiopia’s complicity and its interest in prolonging the war in Sudan are clear. He believes the government and the army must act decisively to expel al-Hilu’s militias from the Yabus area, destroy the platforms there, and prevent any Ethiopian interference before the situation explodes.

“When has Ethiopia historically stopped undermining Sudan’s national security?” he asked. “Ethiopia has long served as a staging ground against Sudan’s national security, providing support and backing to all armed movements that fought the Sudanese army. It still believes that those fighting the Sudanese army—for whatever reason—are entitled to support, because that enables Ethiopia to control Sudanese territory and extend its influence inside our borders.”

Al-Din concluded by saying he does not rule out—and indeed expects—that Ethiopia will attempt to assist the militia in opening a combat front in eastern Sudan, threatening civilians, cities, and the port.