Sudan… the Forgotten Child of the Gathering: Avi Dichter and Then Eli Cohen

Abdel Latif Al-Bouni

To understand what is unfolding today in this region, a historical rewind is essential. In late 1884, European powers convened an international conference in Berlin that lasted into early 1885, aimed at organizing their race toward Africa in pursuit of imperial expansion. Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s foreign minister at the time, foresaw the risk of war among European states as a result of this scramble. Indeed, Africa’s map was carved up on paper among the European powers, then imposed on the ground without regard for the cultural, tribal, religious, and social realities that had governed African societies prior to this European scalpel.

Europeans ruled African peoples through iron and fire. Something similar occurred in the Arab world with the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916. In short, the Westphalian model of the state was exported beyond Europe—though that is a story of its own. After colonial powers withdrew around the mid-twentieth century, disputes erupted among African states, with dozens of border wars breaking out.

Against this backdrop, the Organization of African Unity intervened. At its second summit, held in Cairo in 1963, it adopted a binding principle for all African states: maintaining the borders inherited from colonialism without alteration. The aim was to end border conflicts. Yet a contradiction emerged: if the organization aspired to African unity, why cling so rigidly to narrow state sovereignty? Across the continent echoed Kwame Nkrumah’s famous refrain: “The United States of Africa is the solution—otherwise independence is meaningless.” Alas, Nkrumah.

As European dominance faded, the founding African generation departed with it. Global control then shifted to the United States, briefly shared with the Soviet Union before the latter collapsed, leaving Washington to lead the world alone. The U.S. adopted regional proxies, foremost among them Israel, owing to its influence over American decision-making. At Israel’s urging, a dangerous strategic decision was taken: to redraw the map of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, which is deeply intertwined with it, using the scalpel of fragmentation to produce the largest possible number of mini-states, thereby ensuring control over them.

A crucial point here, with far-reaching implications, is that this fragmentation policy was not rooted in American conviction; Israel took charge of its execution. This was laid out explicitly by Avi Dichter, Israel’s minister of internal security, in a lecture he delivered in 2008, in which he detailed Israel’s objectives in Sudan, while addressing other countries more generally.

For multiple reasons—chief among them chronic security fragility—the Horn of Africa proved especially receptive to this fragmentation plan. Its three largest states fractured: Ethiopia led the way with Eritrea’s independence in 1991; Sudan followed with the secession of South Sudan in 2011; and Somalia, the most afflicted of all, saw Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland) declare independence in 1991, while Puntland froze its integration with the central state, leaving it in a state of limbo.

Prolonged instability and political decay in Sudan tempted further dismemberment, culminating in the April 2025 war, which continues to this day. Even Ethiopia, which currently believes itself immune, would fragment in turn should what remains of Sudan disintegrate. As for Somalia, its fate appears nearly sealed, with fragmentation proceeding unabated.

Regions adjacent to the Horn of Africa, north and south, were not spared this policy. To the north, Libya fractured; to the south, Yemen became ripe for division.

Three major developments have recently triggered intense regional movement: first, the escalation of the Sudan war and Saudi Arabia’s assumption—alongside the United States—of responsibility for its file; second, the Saudi-Emirati rift over Yemen; and third, Israel’s announcement recognizing Somaliland’s independence. These developments alerted the region and the world that the wars raging across it are in fact the implementation of a single blueprint emanating from the same source.

Here comes Eli Cohen, tweeting brazenly: “We will not withdraw from Sirte, nor from El-Fasher, nor from Berbera, nor from Al-Mahra”—Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. This provoked an uproar and prompted unprecedented political movement by major regional powers—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. The visits by the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to these three countries signal that regional awareness of the Sudan war has shifted—if not fundamentally transformed.

Since the outbreak of the current Sudan war in April 2025, official Sudanese channels have sought to clarify that this war does not target Sudan alone, but the entire region—and that Sudan is merely one link in a long chain. Yet the world insisted on framing it as a power struggle, a war between two generals, an ideological conflict, and so on. This narrative was reinforced by divisions within Sudan’s domestic front and by misleading regional media coverage.

The pressing question is whether the region’s major states—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—with their entrenched institutions, intelligence services, research bodies, and strategic think tanks, failed to grasp that they themselves are the grand prizes of the fragmentation project—in other words, its ultimate targets. In my view, they are fully aware and are working to counter it using the same systematic approach by which it is being implemented. However, haste on the part of the executors—and their assumption that the wind was filling their sails—prompted them to seize the moment prematurely, thereby triggering the counter-movement. Take Sudan, for example: having split it in 2011, it would have been wiser to wait two or three decades for its bleeding wound to heal before applying the scalpel again.

At this moment, the fundamental shift for Sudan is that it is no longer alone, as it was at the outset of the war. This new alignment will undoubtedly have military, diplomatic, and political repercussions.

All possibilities are now open: escalation remains possible, as does de-escalation. Forces that have lost some of their leverage will not surrender easily; they will strive to recover what they have lost. When allies fall out, their disputes can be lethal, as they know one another’s vulnerabilities—but that is a subject for another time.

The key question for Sudan is this: what will it do with these new variables? How will it benefit from this new alignment—domestically, regionally, and internationally? The recent opening was not of Sudan’s making; it emerged from regional intersections—call them fortuitous if you will. But now that it exists, the challenge lies in how to exploit it. In short, what is required is proactive engagement—not passive observation while awaiting further breakthroughs engineered by others.