Incomplete Independence and the Absent Vision: How Tactical Alliances Squandered the Opportunity to Build the Sudanese State

Dr Ismail Satti

Introduction

Did Sudan truly gain its independence in 1956?
This question may sound provocative, yet it is essential to understanding the predicament of the modern Sudanese state.
If Sudan attained its formal independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium more than seven decades ago, was declaring independence from within parliament and raising the flag atop the Republican Palace sufficient to realise independence in its deeper sense? Or did genuine independence require liberation from the dominance of traditional elites, from the mentality of power-sharing as entitlement, and from the illusion that the state is a spoil to be passed between victors?
How, then, can we aspire to a greater independence—by building a strong, dignified state among nations—if we have yet to complete the lesser independence?
The Problem of Tactical Alliances in Sudanese Political History
From the very moment of independence, the Sudanese state has been burdened by a profound structural crisis, one of whose most prominent manifestations has been the persistent resort to short-lived, tactical alliances, constructed around a single objective: toppling an opponent, without agreement on what comes afterwards.
These alliances were not founded on inclusive national covenants or clear state-building programmes, but on temporary arrangements driven by a mentality of immediate tactics rather than a long-term national project. This has caused the failures of the early independence leaders to be reproduced in different forms across the decades.
Anyone who reviews Sudan’s political history since the 1950s will observe a recurring pattern:
A temporary consensus among tactically aligned but ideologically divergent forces, which collapses as soon as the immediate objective is achieved.
The alliance of ideologically contradictory political forces between 1953 and 1955 to secure independence from the Condominium, without agreement on what would follow.
A short-lived civilian alliance in October 1964 to overthrow the Abboud regime.
The reproduction of the same model in April 1985 to topple the Nimeiri regime.
Then the 2019 alliance, in which marginal and newly emergent civilian forces united to overthrow the Inqaz regime—not to build a state—ending in internal conflict, deep division, and ultimately comprehensive collapse.
At all these junctures, the objective was clear: the removal of the existing regime.
But the question that was never answered was: What comes next?
Did these tactical alliances produce a state, or merely replace one failed system with an even worse one?
These alliances failed to:
Unite the political community.
Entrench the concept of collective national action.
Consolidate national security and build institutions of the state.
They succeeded only in achieving their tactical aims, then gave rise to weaker, more fragile, and more divided regimes—once again opening the door either to military coups or to severe societal polarisation.
Today, yet another tactical alliance is taking shape, supported by national forces of diverse backgrounds and ideologies, united—despite their differences—around a single objective: supporting the army, defeating the Janjaweed and their political allies (QHAT, Somoud, Ta’sis), and ending the war.
There is near-consensus that the “post-war phase” will be resolved through rapid elections, viewed almost as Moses’ staff that will miraculously restore peace and stability in one stroke.
Yet the fundamental question remains:
If tactical alliances have repeatedly failed since independence, why do we believe they will succeed this time?
Analysing the Causes of Repeated Failure
Among the key reasons are:
1. The mentality of a “common enemy” instead of a “shared future”
Sudanese politics is often conducted around the logic of whom we remove, not what we build.
Alliances are forged on shared animosity rather than shared vision.
Once the enemy disappears, deferred contradictions erupt.
2. The absence of a consensual democratic culture
Power is understood as a prize, not a responsibility.
Partnership is seen as a temporary necessity, not a lasting choice.
As a result, ordinary disagreements escalate into existential conflicts.
3. Centralised decision-making and personalised politics
Political parties and forces are run according to the mentality of the historic leader or a narrow inner circle, not institutions and programmes.
This makes alliances hostage to personal moods rather than binding commitments.
4. A distorted civil–military relationship
Time and again, civilian alliances generate political and security vacuums without a clear vision for governing the state, prompting the army—or pushing it—to return as an emergency option.
5. Regional and international interference
The absence of a unified national vision leaves political forces vulnerable to external polarisation, turning alliances into instruments for settling non-Sudanese conflicts.
6. The lack of a unifying constitutional and institutional framework
Without agreed rules of the game, politics becomes a zero-sum struggle, incapable of sustaining peaceful competition or orderly transfers of power.
Practical Solutions: How Do We Break the Vicious Circle?
We propose several solutions for national forces seeking to escape this dilemma that threatens the very existence of the state:
1. From a “Regime-Overthrow Charter” to a “State-Building Charter”
No alliance without a binding document defining:
The identity of the state.
The system of governance.
Centre–region relations.
Economic policy.
Foreign policy.
Reform of the military institution.
2. Reforming the party system
Through a political parties’ law that enforces:
Internal democracy.
Transparency.
Leadership renewal and rotation.
Constitutional commitment.
3. A National Council for Permanent Dialogue
An institutional platform to prevent disputes from accumulating and to manage them before they explode.
4. A clear civil–military covenant
Guaranteeing:
The non-politicisation of the army.
And the prevention of state capture by failed civilian elites.
5. An electoral system that promotes consensus rather than exclusion
A proportional or mixed system that reduces the “winner-takes-all” mentality.
6. Empowering genuine civil society
As institutions of oversight and mediation, not as disguised political fronts.
Conclusion: The Greater Independence
True independence is not measured by a flag raised or an old banner restored,
but by the independence of the national will from political selfishness and short-sighted, opportunistic alliances.
Sudan does not suffer from a shortage of revolutions or alliances, but from a deficit of strategic vision and moral courage to acknowledge past mistakes.
The question is no longer:
Will these tactical alliances succeed?
The real question is:
Do we possess the will to build enduring strategic alliances that lead us to the greater independence—independence of will, vision, and a shared future?