From Yemen to Sudan: How Are the Region’s Conflicts Managed?
Al-Wathiq Kameer
Regional Intersections
The Middle East and North Africa are witnessing an unprecedented level of overlap and entanglement among conflicts. Local wars are no longer confined within national borders; instead, their repercussions now extend into international and regional alliances whose security and economic interests intersect and often collide. From the intractable war in Yemen, which has produced complex alliances, to the ongoing conflict in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a clear picture emerges of an era of multidimensional conflicts—managed through perspectives that transcend the traditional boundaries of the nation-state.
In recent weeks, a widely circulated narrative has suggested that the region stands on the brink of a major regional explosion, driven by a potential confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in light of developments in Yemen: direct Saudi military intervention, the decline of the Southern Transitional Council’s influence, and the absence of its leader, Aidarus al-Zubaidi. According to this prevailing view, any sharp escalation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could redraw the regional balance of power, place Saudi Arabia in a leading regional role, and pave the way for a new alliance including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Eritrea—ultimately serving to end the war in Sudan in favor of the Sudanese army.
Within this framework, a significant segment of politicians and opinion leaders is betting that Saudi–Emirati tensions could turn into a direct pressure tool on Abu Dhabi to halt its support for the RSF, widely seen as a key factor prolonging the war. This wager is built on the assumption that any clash or escalation between the two Gulf powers would force the UAE to recalculate its position in Sudan, creating a genuine opportunity to end the conflict. Yet despite its popularity, this reading collides with a different regional reality. Competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, however sharp it may appear, is not managed through direct military confrontation, but through the regulation of political disagreements within frameworks designed to prevent a slide into open conflict—allowing each side to preserve its interests and influence without bearing the costs of direct war.
The Regional Context of Intersecting Conflicts
In Yemen, regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Iran have entered a maze of influence and competing interests, rendering the conflict more complex and far more prolonged than initially anticipated. With each escalation, the landscape shifts and international attention expands. Sudan has not been an exception. The war between the army and the RSF, now extending beyond two years, is not merely an internal conflict; it has become an extension of regional and international intersections with clear political and military implications.
Despite Saudi Arabia’s military strikes on the port of Mukalla and the entry of forces supporting legitimacy into Aden, Riyadh was not seeking a comprehensive military victory. Rather, its objectives centered on border protection, threat containment, and an exit from a prolonged war of attrition. The de-escalation with the Houthis, and their use more as a bargaining chip than a target for decisive defeat, reflects this shift. By contrast, the UAE has focused on expanding its influence through ports and coastal areas and by supporting local actors without direct confrontation—a pattern repeated in Sudan through its backing of the RSF as an instrument of influence rather than a purely military or ideological choice.
Although Abu Dhabi often justifies its interventions under the banner of combating Islamists, realities on the ground undermine much of this narrative. The UAE withdrew from direct fighting against the Houthis, there are suspicions of indirect communication with them via Oman, and it previously requested troop contributions from Omar al-Bashir’s regime to the Yemen coalition. All this underscores that strategic interest and indirect influence—not ideology—are the primary drivers of these policies.
Egypt, meanwhile, views Sudan through a fundamentally different lens. For Cairo, Sudan represents an immediate strategic depth, and any fragmentation of the state or dominance by an armed actor outside state institutions constitutes a direct threat to Egyptian national security. Hence the Egyptian presidency’s references to “red lines” in Sudan do not imply war or expansionist ambition, but rather support for preserving Sudan as a unified state and maintaining the army as a central national institution.
Regionally, Turkey plays a visible role within the anticipated alignment with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Eritrea in an effort to counterbalance Emirati influence. Ankara views Sudan as a potential sphere of influence through economic, political, and strategic investment tools, without seeking direct confrontation with Gulf actors. This approach reflects Turkey’s pursuit of a sustainable regional presence based on balance rather than confrontation, within flexible alliance networks that enhance stability while safeguarding its interests.
Within this context, Somalia emerges as another arena of indirect confrontation in East Africa and the Red Sea. The situation grew more complex following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, a move that deepened regional competition between Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia on one side, and Ethiopia and the UAE on the other. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which has cultivated close ties with Somaliland, most influential regional actors—including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—continue to support the Federal Government of Somalia as the legitimate authority. Mogadishu’s decision to cancel any security agreement with the UAE reflects escalating tensions and confirms that Somalia has become an integral part of the web of intersecting conflicts stretching from Yemen to Sudan.
Beyond this, the roles of Iran, Oman, Israel, and Ethiopia also intersect. Iran uses the Houthis as a regional bargaining card, Oman plays the role of mediator, while Israel focuses on Red Sea security and preventing permanent threats to maritime navigation. Ethiopia, backed by Emirati and Israeli support, is not only seeking access to the sea but is also operating within a broader conflict intersecting with its sharp disputes with Egypt and Eritrea—particularly over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and regional security arrangements in the Horn of Africa. This dimension makes Ethiopia’s role more complex and gives it an indirect impact on Sudan as a contact zone for these overlapping balances. At the same time, Russia and China seek to protect their strategic interests in the Red Sea and Sudan without direct involvement, reinforcing a logic of crisis management rather than decisive resolution.
In parallel, Pakistan’s role stands out as a calculated balancing act. Islamabad does not seek escalation or regional military resolution, yet it remains engaged in expanding its military and political influence. Through close defense ties with Saudi Arabia and readiness to pursue military cooperation agreements with Sudan, Pakistan aims to enhance its standing as a reliable security actor without fueling conflict. This reflects an effort to combine restraint in regional competition with the consolidation of Pakistan’s role as an influential player in regional security equations—without acting as a driver of outright military confrontation.
Before turning to Libya’s role, it is essential to pause at Chad, one of the oldest regional actors influencing the conflict and one directly affected by the war in Sudan due to proximity, tribal links, and porous borders. Chad moves with extreme caution: it fears the spillover of chaos into its territory, while simultaneously finding itself embedded in a network of regional balances involving Libya, the UAE, and France. This position inclines N’Djamena toward containing the conflict rather than resolving it, and toward overlooking certain cross-border movements—contributing, albeit indirectly, to the prolongation of Sudan’s crisis under a logic of regional conflict management rather than resolution.
South Sudan’s role also cannot be overlooked. Sharing long borders and a history of tribal and political intertwinement with Sudan, South Sudan’s internal conflicts, refugee movements, and the historical role of the SPLA directly affect regions such as the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas adjacent to Ethiopia. This places South Sudan squarely within the regional equation and heightens the need to manage internal and external influence carefully to avoid exacerbating cross-border crises.
Likewise, the Libyan experience and the role of General Khalifa Haftar offer a clear model of interventions based on supporting local military or political actors to expand influence without direct confrontation—particularly by the UAE. The mixed success and failure of this model impose careful calculations on Egypt, Turkey, and Russia when approaching the Sudanese file, further complicating the scene and underscoring that replicating scenarios does not guarantee decisive outcomes.
The Impact of Overlapping Influence on Sudan
Amid these interactions, Sudan has become a focal point of regional and international interests. No actor seeks a decisive victory for the other side, and none is willing to bear the costs of such an outcome. As a result, the war in Sudan has turned into a managed crisis—contained within certain limits, not treated as a conflict to be resolved swiftly or radically, but as one to be controlled, with each player focused on protecting its interests and achieving strategic objectives at the lowest possible cost.
This presents Sudanese actors with a fundamental dilemma: how to navigate this volume of intervention without falling into the trap of overreliance on external forces. The evidence suggests that a realistic approach does not lie in waiting for a regional clash or a sweeping military resolution, but rather in a different path: managing internal political differences in a way that preserves state stability; engaging regional powers through the language of interests; rejecting Sudan’s transformation into a proxy battleground; building a pragmatic and organized civilian voice; and recognizing that reliance on external actors to weaken domestic rivals only prolongs the war.
Conclusion
What is unfolding in Yemen—and what it reflects in Sudan—reveals a fundamental truth: conflicts in the region are no longer decided by war alone. Influential states today are not seeking rapid military victories, but rather managing their influence at the lowest possible cost, even if crises drag on. Accordingly, waiting for a regional explosion or a sudden shift in major powers’ positions to end the war in Sudan is an unrealistic bet. Contemporary regional politics are based on settlements and the management of differences, not direct confrontation. Major powers prefer keeping crises under control rather than risking open wars, while weak and fragile states find themselves trapped between war and peace—as is the case with Sudan. Even military alliances and arms deals, in prevailing practice, rarely signal imminent resolution; more often, they are tools for managing conflict rather than ending it.
In this reality, the greatest responsibility rests with Sudanese themselves. The country’s future will not be shaped in foreign capitals or through external wagers, but through inclusive dialogue without exclusion, the development of a shared vision, and a broad national agreement that places state interests above factional disputes—reducing opportunities for foreign intervention and opening a realistic path toward ending the war. Without this, Sudan will remain an open arena for others’ conflicts, rather than a state capable of determining its own destiny.
