Political Shift in Sudan
By Suleiman Al-Aqeeli
The declaration by the Ansar Entity — the historic religious and social organization of Mahdist followers — of its full support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, represents a striking strategic shift in Sudan’s political and religious landscape. This development comes amid deep political fragmentation and security collapse produced by the civil war ongoing since April 2023.
On January 22, 2026, the group’s leader, Ahmed al-Mahdi, formally delivered a document titled “Covenant and Charter,” affirming the Ansar’s alignment with the army in what he termed the “War of Dignity” against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). He praised the army’s military gains, which he said had facilitated the return of civilians to their earia, and asserted that Sudan would remain “a homeland resilient to conspiracies.”
This position signals an attempt by the Ansar Entity to reclaim its national role and consolidate its social and political base behind the army—particularly in light of the internal divisions afflicting the historically Ansar-linked National Umma Party. Ahmed al-Mahdi’s current stands in contrast to earlier leadership figures, notably Sadiq al-Mahdi, who died in Abu Dhabi and whose political legacy was shaped in that context. His approach was closer to neutrality and was at times accused of offering implicit support to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti), allegedly based on regional ties with the United Arab Emirates.
This shift strengthens the army’s political position, granting it broader popular, religious, and symbolic legitimacy, at a time when the RSF’s standing is declining due to its dependence on external backing and limited local support networks.
The development coincides with growing regional support for the Sudanese army from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are working to curb Emirati supply routes to the RSF through Lybia. This effort includes pressure on Khalifa Haftar and the signaling of potential economic and military alternatives for Khartoum. The regional movement reflects a broader strategic vision aimed at safeguarding border stability and preventing the disintegration of the Sudanese state—extending beyond purely military calculations to wider political and security considerations.
Conversely, the RSF faces a marked erosion of both domestic and international legitimacy. A report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission in September 2025 described its conduct as involving “widespread war crimes” and “crimes against humanity,” including genocide, rape, and starvation campaigns in El-Fasher and Darfur. This was followed by U.S. and European sanctions that deepened its regional and international isolation and intensified internal fractures, particularly in eastern and northern regions.
While the Ansar’s endorsement of the army may accelerate the formation of a new national alignment strengthening central state authority in northern and eastern Sudan, its overall impact may remain limited. This raises the risk of a prolonged war unless accompanied by firm international pressure to halt the flow of Emirati weapons to RSF militias. Under current conditions, 2026 appears likely to witness the continuation of conflict, with the danger of Sudan sliding into a chronic war system in which armed loyalties intersect with regional power calculations—far removed from comprehensive political solutions.
This trajectory may only change if the Sudanese army receives sufficient support to preserve national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while simultaneously launching an inclusive political initiative capable of laying the foundations for a sustainable settlement.
