The Sovereignty Debate and Functional Geography: Has the Mogadishu Earthquake Redrawn the Rules of the Game?

Dr. Mohamed Hasab Al-Rasoul

In a bold geostrategic decision, the Somali government announced on January 11 the cancellation of all its security and economic agreements with the United Arab Emirates. Mogadishu’s move was not merely a reactive response to security violations; rather, it constituted a strategic strike within a broader struggle over the shape of the regional order in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin.

This decision stemmed from two main factors: Abu Dhabi’s violation of Somali national sovereignty through the smuggling operation involving Aidarous al-Zubaidi, head of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council; and the exploitation of certain maritime and air ports in service of “Tel Aviv” during Israel’s war on Gaza. This was compounded by the Emirati role in facilitating Israeli recognition of Somaliland.

Functional Geography: A Mechanism for Breaching Sovereignty

Prior to Mogadishu’s latest decision, the Emirati role in Somaliland had already become entrenched through the deployment of what can be described as “functional geography.” This approach fragmented Somali sovereignty by exploiting ports, straits, and military bases in Bosaso, Kismayo, Berbera, and elsewhere, transforming them into tools serving a regional influence that bypassed the central state and its authority.

Such influence effectively divided Somali sovereign decision-making between a legitimate authority recognized nationally, regionally, and internationally, and local actors linked to external powers seeking a quid pro quo arrangement—trading national unity and sovereignty for control over fragments of Somali territory.

Yet Mogadishu wielded its national and international legitimacy as a sharp instrument against what may be termed “geopolitical thuggery,” succeeding in dismantling the Emirati-Israeli project and disrupting an entire regional influence network in a single blow, despite the imbalance in material power.

The Tripartite Partnership and the Project of Controlling Strategic Chokepoints

The UAE-US strategic partnership was reinforced in mid-2024, ushering in a new phase that effectively transformed Abu Dhabi into Washington’s “security proxy” across the Arab and African spheres in general, and in the Red Sea basin in particular.

This followed earlier Emirati-Israeli-American cooperation under the Abraham Accords framework in 2020. Under this strategic partnership, Washington delegated major and risky roles to Abu Dhabi, including security and military coordination with “Tel Aviv” to support Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023, capitalizing on Emirati presence and influence in southern Yemen and northern Somalia.

This tripartite linkage reflects a shift in Israeli military doctrine toward prioritizing control over maritime chokepoints and shipping lanes, in an effort to break the blockade imposed by Sana’a in support of Gaza. As a result, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become arenas of proxy conflict between Israel and the UAE on one side, and the region’s legitimate national systems on the other.

The Ports Game: Dismantling States Through Emirati Influence

The UAE has pursued an expansionist strategy built on a network of strategic maritime and air ports across Yemen and Africa, supported by alliances with political actors and local militias in several countries. This model is evident in its backing of Khalifa Haftar in Libya, the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, and its management of relations with separatist entities in Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland in Somalia.

This strategy pursues two interlinked objectives: dominating states through internal nodes of influence, or dismantling them when unified control proves unattainable. It operates within the framework of the tripartite partnership with the United States and “Israel,” which has elevated Abu Dhabi into an advanced military, logistical, and financial partner.

Repercussions: The Counter-Alliance

Activating this Emirati role in Yemen and later Somalia has triggered profound geopolitical repercussions, most notably:

• The breach of Gulf cohesion: The Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council’s takeover of Yemen’s Hadramawt province was viewed by Saudi Arabia as a direct threat to its national security, strategic depth, Vision 2030 stability, and major Red Sea projects—including NEOM—prompting Riyadh’s military intervention to halt this expansion.
• The consolidation of counter-alliances: The Emirati role in Somalia and its facilitation of Israeli recognition of Somaliland heightened regional anxieties in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, as well as within the central government in Mogadishu, which saw the move as a blatant violation of sovereignty and a threat to territorial unity. This dynamic produced an emerging four-party cooperation framework (Saudi-Somali-Egyptian-Turkish), backed by Qatar and endorsed by Oman, aimed at confronting the risks posed by Emirati-Israeli influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, and defending the concept of the centralized national state as a guarantor of stability against fragmentation-driven remapping projects.

Thus, the regional landscape increasingly reflects a collision between two models: one based on dismantlement through functional separatist entities, and another seeking to consolidate the national state, reinforce legitimacy, and safeguard sovereignty as the foundation of stability. This confrontation encapsulates the essence of the broader struggle over the future regional order and its sources of influence.

A Geopolitical Earthquake

Somalia’s decision, supported by Saudi Arabia and regional allies, has led to a dramatic retreat of Emirati-Israeli influence on three interconnected fronts, triggering a chain of major geopolitical reactions.

First, in Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council has found itself isolated after losing the territorial gains it had achieved and the logistical depth provided by Abu Dhabi’s presence in Yemen and the anticipated extension into Somaliland—weakening its maneuverability in Aden, Socotra, and Hadramawt.

Second, in the Horn of Africa, the cancellation of Somali-Emirati port agreements and security coordination constituted a strategic loss for Abu Dhabi and “Tel Aviv,” disrupted coordination with Addis Ababa, and fully restored maritime sovereignty to Mogadishu in alliance with Riyadh, Ankara, and Cairo.

Third, in Sudan, the loss of Somali ports will directly affect the trajectory of the war, as the UAE had relied on these ports to supply the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and mercenaries. This shift is reinforced by the advancing Saudi and Egyptian roles at the expense of Emirati influence in the political arena.

Such a retreat is unlikely to pass without risks. It may provoke a “desperate backlash” from Abu Dhabi and “Tel Aviv,” potentially manifesting in attempts to open new fronts within Somalia between the three federal states—Somaliland, Jubaland, and Puntland—and the central government; and to ignite a new front in eastern Sudan via Ethiopia, where the UAE has reportedly established a camp with a capacity of 10,000 trainees to train mercenaries recruited from Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Sahel, and even Colombia. Such moves would exacerbate military, political, and humanitarian crises and pose the gravest threat to Sudanese national security.

Sovereignty on the Scale: A Historic Test of Dignity

Mogadishu’s historic decision was not merely about annulling cooperation agreements; it amounted to a strategic earthquake that reshaped geopolitical equations in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf system. The region now faces an existential test between two paths: one defending the national state—its sovereignty, cohesion, territorial unity, and regional stability—and another pushing toward domination, fragmentation, and chaos in service of “neo-colonial” projects.

The Somali experience offers two decisive lessons. First, that the legitimacy of the national state—however materially weak—remains a potent geopolitical weapon capable of overturning balances. Second, that fragmentation strategies based on empowering functional entities inevitably generate strong counter-alliances that restore regional equilibrium and positively affect domestic cohesion, even when great powers like the United States operate from behind regional and local proxies.

These lessons confront regional leaders with a fateful choice: either engage in defensive alliances to protect national sovereignty, unity, and regional stability, or acquiesce to new realities that entrench external domination and destructive chaos.

Accordingly, Mogadishu’s resilience and its regional alliances will not yield a fleeting tactical victory; they will constitute a historic benchmark defining the nature of the coming regional order: an order of sovereignty and stability, or one of hegemony and chaos. The answer lies in today’s decisions—and in the lesson Mogadishu has learned and imparted: legitimacy is a weapon, unity is a shield, sovereignty is the clearest expression of dignity, and the struggle for sovereignty and dignity admits neither neutrality, complacency, nor delay.