Sudan’s Political Process Between Structural Disarray and the Absence of a Comprehensive Vision (2019–2026)

Omiya Yousif Hassan Abufidaya

Since the collapse of the ruling regime in 2019, Sudan’s political process has failed to settle on a clear national vision or a coherent pathway toward a stable political transition. Instead, the period has been marked by fragmented and intersecting phases, driven more by reactive measures than by strategic planning, and dominated by temporary political compromises rather than sustainable, structural solutions.

This structural dysfunction has left political documents—most notably the Constitutional Declaration—vulnerable to partial or complete abrogation by the very forces that participated in drafting and signing them.

A salient example is the provision stipulating the formation of a legislative council within three months of signing the Constitutional Declaration. This clause was effectively ignored, stripping the document of one of its most critical pillars of oversight and legislation, and resulting in an excessive concentration of executive power in the absence of institutional balance. This failure was not incidental; rather, it reflected a lack of political will and the absence of genuine consensus over the nature and mandate of the transitional state.

Today, the issue of the legislative council is being raised once again, but within a far more complex and volatile political, security, and social context. Discussions now take place amid the presence of armed movements imposing their political claims through the logic of power-sharing and force, grounded in the 2020 Peace Agreement. Prominent figures such as Jibril Ibrahim, Minni Arko Minnawi, Al-Hadi Idris, and Al-Tahir Hajar have emerged in this context. The paradox, however, lies in the fact that most of these leaders originate from nearly the same social milieu, despite Darfur being home to dozens of tribes and diverse communities. Moreover, nearly half of the leadership of these movements later aligned themselves with armed rebellion against the state.

More troubling still is that some of these movements continue to maintain their armed forces and even operate recruitment camps, in stark contradiction to repeated rhetoric about a single national army and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. This contrast becomes particularly evident when compared with the actions taken by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (Malik Agar faction), which undertook tangible steps toward integration, unlike other practices that deepen military fragmentation and weaken the state.

Any political process that is incomplete, contradictory, or not governed by a comprehensive plan with clear timelines will not lead to the desired stability. On the contrary, it will produce the opposite outcome, opening the door to the absorption of power-seekers who offer no real value to governance. These are politically impaired elites, recycled under abnormal conditions and selected on the basis of prior participation or personal connections, rather than competence, integrity, or popular legitimacy.

Against this backdrop, it becomes imperative to redefine the priorities of the current phase through concrete and clearly defined steps, most notably:

First: The formation of a limited-size legislative council based on national competence, as part of an integrated transitional process with clearly defined mandates, including preparation for general elections and the establishment of independent commissions, for a period not exceeding one year.

Second: The implementation of a serious program for the integration and demobilization of all auxiliary forces, and the exclusive control of weapons by the armed forces.

Third: The repeal of the Constitutional Declaration, whose inadequacy has been demonstrated, and its replacement with a simplified and practical transitional constitutional framework.

Fourth: The dissolution of the Sovereignty Council in its current form, and the adoption of a realistic executive arrangement: General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as President, General Shams al-Din Kabbashi as Vice President, General Yasser al-Atta as Chief of Staff, and General Ibrahim Jaber as Prime Minister.

Fifth: The establishment of independent commissions for transitional justice, anti-corruption, judicial reform, and elections.

Sudan’s stability will not be achieved through fragile settlements, but through decisive political will, rigorous institution-building, and a firm closure of the door to manipulation carried out in the name of partnership or peace.

May God grant the people of Sudan righteous leadership.