Ethiopia… Turning Words into Deeds

By Othman Mirghani

In international relations, rhetoric — however reassuring — is never enough; the true measure lies in what is translated into policy. When Ethiopian Prime Minister stated this week that his country harbors no “expansionist intentions,” seeks partnership rather than confrontation, and will not develop the Nile at the expense of its neighbors, the language sounded calm and carefully calibrated. Its wording was measured. Its timing — on the eve of Ramadan — was deliberate. It was the rhetoric of de-escalation.

Yet in geopolitics — particularly in a combustible region such as the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea — rhetoric carries little weight unless embodied in verifiable political shifts.

For Sudan and Egypt, the Nile is not a development project but a matter of survival. The construction and operation of the (GERD) has fundamentally altered the basin’s hydrological balance. Addis Ababa maintains that the dam is a sovereign development project that will not harm downstream states. However, successive unilateral filling stages, carried out without a binding trilateral agreement, have deepened suspicions that Ethiopia prioritizes leverage over consensus.

If Abiy Ahmed’s assurances are sincere, the requirements are clear: a legally binding agreement governing filling and operating rules, including dispute-resolution mechanisms, real-time data sharing, and drought-management protocols. Egypt seeks guarantees for its water security, particularly during drought periods, while Sudan requires reliable information flows to prevent hydrological shocks that could threaten its dams and farmlands. Transparency here is not a concession; it is the foundation of trust.

Ethiopia itself would be the greatest beneficiary of a binding agreement, as investment in hydropower requires a stable environment, not perpetual tension.

The difficulty is that Abiy Ahmed’s speech contained notable contradictions. On one hand, he described the river as a “shared divine gift” that should be managed through cooperation; on the other, he framed Ethiopia’s investment in its water resources as a “legitimate sovereign right.”

He asserted that Ethiopia does not seek to impose unilateral realities, yet it disregarded the demands of Sudan and Egypt and proceeded with construction and filling through unilateral steps and rigid negotiating positions.

His claim that Ethiopia harbors no territorial ambitions is contradicted by developments in Al-Fashqa. Likewise, his statement that any move to secure maritime access would remain governed by respect for state sovereignty contrasts sharply with previous threats and hints by his government at the possible use of force.

Further undermining his verbal reassurances are reports that Ethiopia has established training camps for elements of the . For the Sudanese government, this is not a marginal issue; it is existential. The continuation of conflict, and the support and training of armed groups operating outside the authority of the central state and national army, constitutes exhaustion of Sudan, destruction of its capabilities, and a violation of its sovereignty.

The roadmap is clear if Ethiopia seeks Sudan’s trust. First, it could allow an independent investigation, through international monitors, to demonstrate that its territory is not being used to train or arm actors destabilizing Sudan. Second, Addis Ababa should explicitly affirm its support for Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity and align its diplomacy with the principle of non-interference.

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan in Al-Fashqa remains another source of concern, further highlighting the gap between words and actions.

Then there is the question of maritime access to the Red Sea. Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly described access to the Red Sea as a “vital existential necessity,” at times accompanying such remarks with suggestions of force. When Ethiopian discourse hints at reclaiming historical access to the Red Sea, or when proposals appear to impinge upon the sovereignty of and , alarm bells ring not only in Asmara and Mogadishu, but across the region.

The Red Sea is not merely a coastline; it is a geostrategic artery of immense importance. Any destabilization would pose a direct threat to regional and international security. is not distant from this landscape; it operates within it, both covertly and overtly.

The roadmap here requires clarity of means. If Ethiopia seeks maritime access, it must pursue it exclusively through consensual contractual economic partnerships — not through historical narratives or coercive signaling.

Finally, regional security must be addressed holistically. The management of the Nile, the war in Sudan, the sovereignty of Eritrea and Somalia, the security of navigation in the Red Sea, and counterterrorism are all interconnected.

Trust in international relations is not built on eloquence, however refined, but on what is signed and honored. The issue is not the language Abiy Ahmed uses, but the gap between discourse and reality. Ethiopia can reassure its neighbors with balanced rhetoric, but genuine reassurance can only rest on binding agreements, transparent mechanisms, and measurable de-escalation. In a region burdened by crises, either actions precede words and trust accumulates — or suspicion remains the rule and stability the exception.