A Reckoning for Business Leaders… and the Nests of Corruption

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

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Through this column, I seek to join the family of Elaf Economic Newspaper — which has returned strongly to enrich Sudan’s economic discourse with the specialized focus our press has long lacked.

In what I hope will become a weekly contribution, I will track economic developments by highlighting major news stories, offering commentary, proposing ideas and solutions, and shedding light on the hidden angles within economic narratives.

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Business Leaders: Why the Slow Return?

About three months ago, during my most recent visit to Egypt, I met with a broad group of Sudanese business leaders. They were unanimous on one point: the best place for them to work and invest is Sudan.

Despite all its challenges, the country remains a land of immense opportunity. The problems are well known, and these businessmen understand better than anyone how to solve them — given their long experience navigating bureaucratic complexities and their extensive networks that enable them to overcome obstacles. Moreover, the profit margins achievable in Sudan are difficult to replicate elsewhere.

During that meeting, I recalled remarks by young researcher Ahmed Babiker of the University of Oxford at the recent London economic conference. He noted that when risk-adjusted returns on investment in Egypt were analyzed, they averaged around 20 percent. Applying the same analysis to Sudan yielded returns of approximately 40 percent — potentially reaching 50 percent.

If this is accurate, the logical question becomes:
Why are business leaders not accelerating their return to Sudan?
Why is the pace so slow, while conditions are improving day by day?

Security conditions in Khartoum have become fully stable, and the capital needs the return of factories and companies more than ever. Families cannot return to the city without reliable sources of income. The return of business leaders, therefore, is not merely an investment decision — it is a direct contribution to stability and a strong signal of broader economic recovery.

When an investor returns, they do not simply restart a factory; they reactivate an entire chain — transportation, labor, markets, suppliers, services, and even social security. A slow return of business activity effectively means a slow recovery for Khartoum itself.

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The Nests of Corruption

Sudan’s economy does not suffer from a lack of resources as much as it suffers from entrenched nodes of corruption. These can be summarized in three main gateways: the banking system, petroleum imports, and gold smuggling.

The Banking System: Financing and Concentration of Wealth

An economic expert once told me that about a decade ago he conducted a study of Sudanese banks and found that just twenty families controlled nearly 80 percent of total bank financing. Even more troubling, many of the guarantees backing these loans were inflated many times above their true value.

The core problem of corruption in the banking sector, then and now, lies in how financing is allocated, how guarantees are assessed, and who qualifies — revealing a system designed more to concentrate wealth than merely to waste it.

The war has since weakened, impoverished, and in some cases destroyed many banks. They no longer possess the trillions required for large-scale financing, and bank managers’ ability to favor select clients has become limited. Yet reforming corruption in the banking sector remains possible through clear policies and strict oversight mechanisms — if the political will exists.

Petroleum Imports: Transparency Is the Key

As for petroleum imports, the doors to corruption are not impossible to close. The solution lies in transparency: transparency in qualifying companies, transparency in tender announcements, transparency in bid evaluation, transparency in financing, and direct oversight by the central bank over commercial banks handling import operations.

At its core, the issue requires nothing more than tight controls and an effective regulatory system.

Gold Smuggling: The Most Dangerous Gateway

The most dangerous channel of corruption in Sudan, however, is gold smuggling. Despite a multitude of policies, decisions, and often contradictory measures, the state has yet to close what remains the largest gateway of economic loss — estimated at no less than $4 billion annually.

According to the official report of the , annual gold production stands at approximately 70 tons. At average global prices, this equates to roughly $5.2 billion. Yet actual foreign currency proceeds transferred through official channels do not exceed $1.8 billion.

This enormous gap underscores the reality that a significant portion of Sudanese gold moves outside official channels, fueling the war economy and smuggling networks.

Meanwhile, a report by indicated that Sudan had been producing around 90 tons of gold annually in recent years — a figure that further reveals the discrepancy between actual production and officially declared exports. It reinforces the conclusion that a large share of Sudan’s gold circulates outside state oversight.

Gold smuggling is no longer merely illicit economic activity; it has evolved into an integrated system with its financiers, protectors, and transit brokers. It has become an artery feeding markets, weapons, and politics simultaneously.

Even if we rely solely on official figures, the question remains:

If annual production exceeds $5 billion, where does the money go? And why have all policies and procedures failed to curb corruption in the country’s most important economic sector?

The answer, unfortunately, is not far away. It lies with:
miners, smugglers, gold traders, and the government. These are the intersecting interests within the corruption network.

In the next article, we will dissect the role of each of these actors within the gold-smuggling system to address the defining question for Sudan’s economic future:

Is gold being smuggled despite the state… or through the state?