All the Earth’s Bounty and the Nile Are There… And Yet

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

1

At a seminar hosted by the Shoumous Center in the city of Atbara, Professor Wagdi Mirghani presented a comprehensive economic vision aimed at increasing production and exports. His presentation, supported by statistics and comparative data, confronts us with a stark truth: our crisis is not one of resources, but of vision and management.

Professor Wagdi laid out compelling figures and comparisons that raise profound questions about our economic predicament. This paper had previously been submitted to the state, but as is often the case, the state suffers from chronic deafness — and when it does hear, it stands idle, incapable of implementation. Now, however, we have before us a persuasive economic blueprint for the country, grounded in hard data and worthy of serious national debate.

The figures presented left me unsettled. The paper attempted to answer key questions, but its responses were not sufficient.

The first question:

The Arab world imports food worth nearly $140 billion annually.
The products that Sudan is capable of producing are valued at no less than $104 billion.

So why do we not produce?
Why do we remain on the margins of such a vast market when we possess land, water, and the Nile?

Then we come to even more painful numbers.

In 2022:

• A feddan of cotton generated a return of $212.55.
• A feddan of sesame generated $27.12.
• A feddan of groundnuts generated $42.83.

The second question: Why the disparity?

Is it the global market?
Low productivity?
Poor cost management?

If cotton yields ten times the return of sesame and groundnuts, why insist on expanding low-yield crops?

More striking still is the third question:

A feddan of sorghum generated just $1.26.
A feddan of soybeans generated $500 — the highest return among export cash crops.

Five hundred dollars versus one dollar.

If the gap is this wide, why the insistence on sorghum at this scale?
Is it fear of change? Or a network of vested interests resisting transformation?

Then comes the productivity disaster — the question with no clear answer.

Average sesame productivity in Sudan is less than 100 kg per feddan.
The global average exceeds 250 kg.
In China, it reaches 400 kg.

Groundnut productivity is under 200 kg per feddan locally.
Globally, it reaches 900 kg.
In China, 1,500 kg per feddan.

Where is the problem?

In the land?
In the seeds?
In fertilization?
In technology?
Or in an administration that does not listen — and if it listens, does not act?

The problem, clearly, is not the land.
The problem is vision and management.

2

The Chaos of Return

Through a program hosted by journalist Rasha Oshi on Al-Balad TV, Vice President raised an idea worth serious consideration.

For years, we have called for taking the city to the countryside. Now, through the tragedy of war, that opportunity has unexpectedly arrived. The city — particularly the capital — has moved toward the rural areas. Industries have emerged, factories have been established, and agricultural production has increased.

So why the intense push now to drive people back specifically to the capital?

This is an idea worthy of dialogue.

Yes, people should return — but not exclusively to the capital. They should return to centers of production and investment. This is an opportunity to revive the countryside. It is not in the national interest to funnel people back into an already burdened capital, where they will either find no work or be absorbed into marginal employment, further straining services.

Return is necessary — yes.
But return to production, not congestion.
To rural areas and investment, not disguised unemployment.

Sending people back to the capital without a plan simply reproduces the same crisis:

• Pressure on services.
• Unemployment.
• Urban chaos.

In short, calls for a return specifically to the capital require foresight and deep reflection — not drum-beating without studying the consequences.

Return requires vision, not drums.

3

The Mafia… and a Businesswoman

Regarding the businesswoman recently rumored to have imported a shipment of petroleum products through favoritism and undue privilege, it has become clear that she operates legitimately in the sector. She owns a registered company and operates functioning fuel stations. The vessel she brought in was deducted from her allocated quota from the ministry, and she had in fact been asked by the ministry to expedite the shipment to prevent supply shortages.

I obtained this information while pursuing leads for an investigative report I am conducting on the petroleum mafia — and the corruption it has entrenched in this sector.

What I have uncovered so far suggests corruption beyond description. Companies monopolize everything, operating through countless front entities. Brokerage firms with no real connection to the sector reap millions of dollars without justification. State-owned companies practice corruption openly — and loot the state itself.

Imagine that.

As for the profits harvested by this mafia, they are beyond belief. More astonishing still: the state knows all of this — and is itself part of the corruption apparatus.

We shall see.