Sudan’s Economy in the Crosswinds of the Gulf War

As I See 

Adil El-Baz

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Yesterday, Finance Minister Dr. Jibril Ibrahim predicted negative repercussions for Sudan’s economy as a result of the Israeli–American war on Iran and the resulting disruption in supply flows to the country. What the minister said is entirely correct, but it should not stop at the level of prediction. We urgently need an emergency committee tasked with examining the potential ramifications of a Gulf war—not only to determine how to cope with them, but also how to transform some of these consequences into opportunities if we manage the current moment wisely.

Here, I will attempt to outline a number of ideas that may help guide crisis management with realistic policies.

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The heaviest burden will fall on petroleum derivatives, which are likely to experience a sharp and rapid surge in prices. Yesterday, Brent crude jumped to $85 per barrel. Considering that Sudan currently imports between two and three tankers per month to cover domestic consumption, the cost of three shipments before the war was about $195 million (roughly $65 million per tanker). That situation has now changed.

At $85 per barrel, the cost of a single tanker—carrying an average of 950,000 barrels—rises to approximately $80.75 million. This means that three tankers per month would cost around $242.25 million. On an annual basis, the bill would reach roughly $2.907 billion.

This implies that domestic fuel prices are almost certain to rise unless the state intervenes with exceptional measures.

But the issue does not end there. Some estimates, including those reported by Bloomberg, suggest that energy markets could see even sharper increases if oil facilities in the Gulf are targeted or if the Strait of Hormuz is closed. Some projections suggest the price of oil could climb to $150 per barrel.

If that happens, the cost of a single tanker (averaging 950,000 barrels) would reach about $142.5 million. Three tankers per month would therefore cost approximately $427.5 million, bringing the annual bill to around $5.13 billion.

This figure is roughly equivalent to Sudan’s entire export revenues for 2025, which amounted to about $4.5 billion. In other words, fuel alone could swallow the country’s entire export income.

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Faced with such a catastrophic scenario, there are three key steps the government should take—especially at this critical stage when the trajectory of developments remains uncertain.

The first step is for the government itself, through the Ministry of Energy, to assume responsibility for importing all petroleum derivatives—rather than leaving the task even to its affiliated companies. These companies are often no less greedy than the private oil cartels. The rationale is clear: to prevent profiteering in a strategic commodity during a time of crisis. Some companies earn profits exceeding $4 million per shipment during periods of scarcity. Such a situation is unacceptable under exceptional circumstances, as citizens simply cannot bear another wave of price increases.

The second step is to keep overall consumption at the lowest possible level by setting quotas for each state, closely monitoring distribution companies, tightening controls on internal smuggling, and preventing hoarding and speculative trading.

The third step is to direct the bulk of imported fuel toward productive sectors—whether agricultural or mining (especially gold). A rise in fuel prices must not be allowed to cripple the agricultural sector, as that would lead to a sharp increase in food prices and trigger a compounded economic crisis.

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At the same time, there is an opportunity to maximize the benefits of gold, even at current production levels. If Sudan produces approximately 70 tons annually—as government reports suggest—this would equal about 2,250,500 ounces. At a price of $5,300 per ounce, which is roughly the current level, the annual revenue would be calculated as follows:

2,250,500 × 5,300
= $11,927,650,000

In other words, if the state were able to capture the full revenues from the officially declared production (70 tons), the treasury could receive approximately $11.93 billion per year.

Yes, this is theoretically possible—and it would be enough to cover the annual fuel import bill even if oil prices reached $150 per barrel, in which case the import cost would not exceed about $5.13 billion.

This means that gold alone could cover all fuel import costs, leaving a surplus of more than $6 billion.

This is not impossible. Ghana, for example, generated about $20 billion in gold export revenues in 2025 from production of around 170 tons. The comparison makes it clear that Sudan’s gold problem lies in management. Achieving revenues of $11 billion is not unrealistic, but it requires the state to actually capture the proceeds of its confirmed production of 70 tons. That, in turn, requires decisive action against smuggling—particularly smuggling that occurs through state channels themselves or through desert routes into neighboring countries. Some studies estimate that between 30% and 50% of Sudan’s gold production leaves the country outside official channels.

Incidentally, Sudan exported 1.3 tons of gold to Egypt valued at $112 million—representing 40% of Sudan’s total exports to Egypt.

On the other hand, data from the Central Bank of Egypt indicate that Egypt exported 75 tons of gold to international markets, generating revenues of $7.6 billion.

Yet Egypt’s own gold production—according to the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum and global mining reports such as those from the World Gold Council and the U.S. Geological Survey—stands at only about 15–18 tons annually, most of it coming from the Sukari mine in the Eastern Desert.

The million-dollar question is this: where does Egypt obtain such large quantities of gold—75 tons—to export, while Sudan, which produces 70 tons, earns far less?

Last year (2025), Sudan earned only $1.8 billion from gold, while Egypt generated $7.6 billion.

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To help Sudan navigate this catastrophic phase in the global economy and build stronger reserves, I propose establishing a balancing fund linking gold and oil revenues.

Instead of directing gold revenues straight into the general budget, a special fund could be created that links oil and gold prices. Surpluses generated when gold prices rise would be deposited into the fund, which could then be used to offset increases in oil prices.

Such a mechanism could help achieve a degree of economic stability by:

• easing pressure on the exchange rate,
• maintaining relative stability in fuel prices,
• and building reserves to cushion global market fluctuations.

The key challenge, however, would lie in how such a fund is managed—who oversees it and how its independence is guaranteed. Ideally, it should be established through an agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Sudan, with full administrative independence and transparent oversight. Gold-backed treasury bonds could also be issued, and other potentially more effective proposals could be explored.

The Gulf war could become a catastrophe—or it could become an opportunity. The difference between the two will not lie in oil or gold prices, but in how the state manages its choices and how effectively it leverages its available resources.

Sudan is not a poor country. It is a country whose resources are managed with extreme poverty of vision.