Gulf Options Between Iranian Chaos and Israeli Dominance

As I See 

Adil Al-Baz

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The Gulf states today find themselves in an exceptionally complex position. They are caught between a strategic adversary that seeks to draw them into the confrontation—Israel—and a neighboring country that has effectively turned their territories into a battlefield without them being direct participants in the conflict.

At present, they are neither capable of halting the strategic plans aimed at reshaping the Middle East nor able to stop the attacks directed at them by Iran. At the same time, they are reluctant to enter the conflict directly despite Iranian aggression, fearing that such involvement could ignite a broader regional war and further inflame an already volatile situation.

Directly entering the war against Iran now would mean becoming part of the confrontation against Tehran in support of the United States and Israel. Such intervention would serve Israel’s interests directly, and the Gulf states are well aware that this war is, above all, Israel’s war.

The dilemma is that remaining silent and offering no response while their national security is being seriously compromised also carries grave risks. There are growing fears that their economic infrastructure—particularly the oil industry—could be targeted, potentially triggering an economic catastrophe by threatening the very resources on which their economies depend.

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If this reflects the current reality and its immediate dangers, the future options facing the Gulf states appear even more troubling. In major conflicts, gains and losses are not calculated solely based on present developments, but also on what may unfold in the future.

The Gulf states’ choices are essentially shaped by three possible scenarios.

The first scenario is that Iran emerges from the war as a “victor”—not in the sense of defeating the United States militarily, which is impossible given the current balance of power, but in the sense of remaining a unified and cohesive state under the same political system, albeit with weakened military capabilities.

In such a case, conditions would largely return to what they were before the war, though Iran would likely emerge somewhat weaker.

This scenario does not eliminate the Gulf states’ concerns. The Iranian security and military threat would continue to loom over them. However, it would prompt certain policy choices, such as establishing a joint defense system among the Gulf Cooperation Council states similar to NATO, or seeking broader international alliances outside the GCC framework—possibly with countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps even Egypt, which may come to view the Israeli threat as not far removed from its own security concerns.

Such a scenario would also likely trigger an intense regional arms race as Gulf states seek to safeguard their security.

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The second scenario is that the current war results in regime change in Iran, bringing to power a government effectively manufactured by the United States and Israel—one fully aligned with the Zionist agenda. In that case, Israel would gain a presence, possibly including military bases, along the strategic flank of the Gulf states, while exerting influence over a country as large and powerful as Iran.

This is a frightening scenario. One can easily imagine the scale of political pressure and blackmail that Israel could exert on the Gulf states, as well as the depth of the security penetration that could occur.

Compounding these concerns is the fact that a country already allied with Israel operates within the Gulf political sphere itself like a Trojan horse, embracing the concept of the new Abrahamic religion.

Should this scenario materialize, the Gulf states would likely need to expand their security arrangements beyond the GCC framework by forming broader alliances with countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Egypt, which may also perceive Israeli expansion as a direct strategic threat.

This scenario would likewise trigger a massive regional arms race aimed at protecting Gulf security.

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The third scenario can be described as the “chaos scenario,” in which a war of all against all erupts within Iran itself. Unfortunately, signs of this scenario are already beginning to emerge, with Kurdish militant groups mobilizing along Iran’s western borders.

Yesterday, Reuters reported that a Kurdish force of around one thousand fighters was preparing to launch attacks on areas in western Iran under full aerial cover from the Israeli–American alliance. Such a conflict could draw in other ethnic groups within Iran, sparking widespread unrest and instability.

These are precisely the kinds of developments Israel is believed to be seeking—turning Iran into a failed state consumed by internal chaos.

For this reason, the real question facing the Gulf states may not be how to bring down the Iranian regime, but rather how to prevent the collapse of the Iranian state itself.

If Iran were to disintegrate chaotically and descend into widespread disorder, the Gulf states would face a catastrophic situation. Millions of people could flee toward the Gulf region—given Iran’s population of roughly 93 million. There are few effective barriers that could prevent a massive influx of refugees across land and sea into Gulf countries.

At that point, no one would be able to predict the future of the entire Gulf region.

It may therefore be useful for the Gulf states to recognize that the conflict unfolding today is not merely a military confrontation between Iran and Israel. At its core, it is a struggle over the shape of the next regional order in the Middle East. Each side is seeking to redraw the balance of power in a way that secures strategic influence for decades to come.

In such historical moments, states that lack a clear strategic vision risk transforming themselves from active players into mere arenas for conflict.

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In my assessment, the least damaging outcome would be for the Gulf states to help facilitate a diplomatic exit through engagement with the United States—particularly with Donald Trump—to preserve the current Iranian regime in a weakened but stable condition. Such an arrangement would ensure that Iran remains unable for decades to threaten its neighbors militarily, while allowing the Gulf states to manage relations with Tehran through economic and political means.

This scenario would prevent Iran from descending into chaos while also preventing Israel from gaining control over power and influence within Iran through allied actors.

In moments like these, the real question is not who will win the war—but who will succeed in avoiding becoming one of its victims.