A Besieged Nation and a Distracted People
As I See
Adel El-Baz
1
Has the war ended? No.
Have we won? No.
Have our enemies abandoned their plans to seize our resources and plunder our wealth? Certainly not.
So why this indifference, this retreat from the battlefield in favor of scrambling for spoils and competing for positions? Do you realize that today’s apathy is tomorrow’s surrender?
What is striking is that no one disputes the fact that an existential threat to our country still persists. Yet if you ask how this threat can be confronted while people drift away from the army—and while the army itself has abandoned its most powerful weapon, the people—you are met with silence, leaving only the ashes of unanswered questions.
The reactions to my recent column, “Will We Leave the Army to Fight Alone?”, made me exclaim: My God, when will the Day of Judgment come? It seems the only solution to what we suffer from—lack of reason and disregard for the historic moment facing the nation. Those reactions have only strengthened my resolve to keep hammering this idea, in the hope that these drums may awaken the sleeping.
I urge you to focus carefully, so that the gates of misguidance do not reopen and distort hard truths when major questions arise. What follows is a heavy truth.
2
Just 20 kilometers from our eastern border with Ethiopia, mercenary and militia camps have been established—housing up to 10,000 fighters across an area of 10,000 acres. These camps are heavily armed with various weapons delivered daily by aircraft from different airports in Abu Dhabi.
An investigation by Reuters, published on February 10, 2026, revealed that Ethiopia hosts a secret camp in the Benishangul-Gumuz region near the Sudanese border, where fighters are trained for the Rapid Support Forces. Satellite imagery showed the site expanding. An Ethiopian security memo cited in the report indicated that 4,300 fighters were undergoing training there in early January, with the camp’s capacity potentially reaching 10,000. The report also documented construction activity at Assosa Airport, including what a military expert described as a ground control station for drones and a satellite communications antenna.
Most significantly, Reuters confirmed that the camp’s construction, logistics, and military support are financed by the United Arab Emirates, according to sources, an internal memo, and a diplomatic leak. Other reports indicate that weapons and equipment were withdrawn from a base in Bosaso, Somalia, and transferred to the Assosa camp.
In the east, therefore, thousands of fighters equipped with advanced weaponry and modern drones—reportedly sold by Turkey to the UAE—are stationed under Ethiopian protection and Emirati funding. Our eastern border is completely exposed, fragile, and easily penetrated.
It is also widely known that intelligence officers from Israel oversee training in these camps. The fall of Kurmuk to militia forces and mercenaries allied with Joseph Tuka was not a surprise—neither to the government nor to observers. What is regrettable is that it did not provoke public outrage, and the government treated it with indifference.
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This is the situation in the east. What about the west?
Abdel Rahim Dagalo continues to move across villages, mobilizing young men for ongoing battles. The government is fully aware that, at this very moment, thousands are being mobilized toward Tina, while others are being directed toward El-Obeid. Weapons are flowing in from the Libyan and Chadian borders, alongside dozens of aircraft landing weekly at Nyala Airport carrying advanced arms, equipment, and technical personnel. These developments are well documented by international media.
A report by Le Monde on March 22, 2026, points to a “reengineering of supply lines,” linking Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and Libya into a single network. It states that Abu Dhabi has reorganized supply routes to the Rapid Support Forces through Ethiopia and the Central African Republic. The report also highlights repeated cargo flights by two A300 aircraft registered in the Central African Republic, flying from Fujairah to Addis Ababa, alongside other routes that are difficult to track due to intermittent signal shutdowns. According to security and diplomatic sources, weapons shipments passed through Bangui and then Birao before the fall of El-Fasher. Libya—particularly Kufra and eastern regions under the influence of Khalifa Haftar—remains a key corridor for arming the militia. The report also cites Radio France Internationale, noting approximately 600 flights linked to Abu Dhabi to Kufra airbase in 2025 before continuing toward militia strongholds in El-Fasher and Nyala.
What stands out in these reports is not only the flow of weapons, but also information from Nyala indicating that these aircraft return to the UAE carrying dozens—if not hundreds—of fighters from the Mahariya tribe, with their total number reportedly exceeding 12,000 so far. Why? That is a separate story to be addressed later.
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Also in the west, Chad has increasingly violated our borders under the pretext of pursuing militias. In reality, it is engaged alongside them—facilitating their movements, supporting their attempts to seize Tina, and potentially preparing to enter the war openly from within our territory. From the very beginning, it allowed militia camps on its soil and enabled the passage of weapons and mercenaries. The Chadian army appears ready to deploy forces in support of these groups.
5
Along the Libyan border, camps remain active in Kufra and beyond, gathering mercenaries from various regions. Reports suggest that these fighters are no longer limited to Africans and Colombians, but now include Syrians as well.
Kufra is no longer merely a border town—it has become a major logistical hub for the Rapid Support Forces. According to Reuters, it is “the node that reshaped the war,” with dozens of flights, assembly points, and camps used to regroup and rearm fighters before deploying them into Darfur. This is not a single camp, but an entire operational zone functioning as a logistical bridge into Sudan’s interior. Estimates place more than 7,000 fighters in one camp and 10,000 in another, with weapons flowing in by land, sea, and air.
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In the Uweinat region, we are not dealing with an ordinary border area but with an open artery of war. This tri-border zone between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt has become a major corridor for smuggling weapons, fuel, and mercenaries, as well as a staging ground for militia forces. Control over Uweinat was not incidental—it was a strategic move to open a new front deep in the desert, where no state exercises full control and supply networks operate with relative freedom. Nearby, fighters are being mobilized, targeting the town of Ad-Dabba from multiple directions.
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What we are witnessing is not merely a border conflict, but a fully documented siege of our country—from the east with heavily funded mercenary camps, to the west with supply networks reshaping the war through Libya and Chad. This is an existential threat backed by regional and international actors. Reports by Reuters and Le Monde are not just journalistic accounts; they are testimony that the country has been thrust into a full-scale proxy war on multiple fronts.
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Amid this severe external siege lies the greater tragedy: the “dual disengagement” we have spoken of—the people turning away from their decisive battle, and the army abandoning its greatest support, the people.
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What is required now is not merely a call to rally morale, but a call for army leaders to return to the frontlines, and for the people to return to mobilization in support of them. This is the only way to prevent preemptive surrender.
How and why?
To be continued.
