The Third Berlin Conference: The Answer Lies in Its Title

By Mahmoud Hussein Serry

Germany has announced that it will host a conference on April 15 to mobilize emergency aid for Sudan, according to a statement issued by the German Foreign Ministry in January 2026. The conference follows earlier gatherings in Paris in 2024 and London in 2025, both aimed at highlighting what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis—one that has pushed millions of civilians into poverty and claimed tens of thousands of lives.

Berlin says it is exerting every possible effort—politically and humanitarianly—to assist people on the ground and bring an end to the fighting. So far, however, international calls for a ceasefire have failed to halt the conflict between the Sudanese government, which backs the army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group with roots in the Janjaweed militia accused of committing genocide in Darfur two decades ago.

Yet since the Paris conference in 2024, the political, security, regional, and international landscape has shifted significantly. These changes have made the third edition of the Berlin Conference a source of concern for many Sudanese, a matter of anticipation for the government, and a point of unease among certain political forces. Regional and international actors are also approaching the event with heightened caution, amid growing debate over the nature of international involvement in managing the Sudanese crisis.

On the ground, the conference comes as the Sudanese army faces mounting challenges. The fall of Bara—a strategic city in North Kordofan—the siege of El-Obeid, and the opening of an eastern front in Blue Nile State following the capture of Al-Kurmuk and Qaisan all underscore the widening scope of the conflict. The army is now contending with an expanded battlefield stretching from east to west, compounded by regional support from South Sudan, Uganda, Chad, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, the Central African Republic, and Ethiopia, which have allowed logistical support and mercenaries to cross into Sudan.

Further complicating matters is a report by African Intelligence indicating that Saudi Arabia has frozen an arms deal intended—via Pakistan—to supply the Sudanese Armed Forces. This development could shift the balance of military support in a conflict that has persisted since April 2023, even as international and regional calls for a ceasefire and renewed political process intensify.

Politically, the scene has grown more complex. In the wake of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the region’s focus has shifted toward escalating tensions involving Iran, the United States, and Israel. Countries such as Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are increasingly preoccupied with the Iranian issue, stalling the efforts of the so-called “Quartet” and giving rise to a new “Quintet” composed of the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union, IGAD, and the United Nations.

This emerging bloc, whose mandate remains vague and undocumented in any formal framework outlining its authority, mechanisms, or objectives, has evolved from a coordinating body into what some view as direct interference in Sudanese affairs. Critics argue that it is imposing political agendas, organizing international conferences without clearly defined goals or participant selection criteria, and bypassing coordination with Sudan’s official institutions, including its government and diplomatic missions.

The Berlin Conference also marks the first major international political meeting on Sudan since the United States designated Sudan’s Islamic Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood—along with their affiliated parties and organizations—as terrorist entities. This move effectively sidelines a current that remains influential on the ground, regardless of public disagreement over it.

Regionally and internationally, the conference appears to have become a platform for competing national interests. The United States, initially invited as a participant, has emerged as a leading force shaping the conference and chairing its sessions. Reports indicate that Massad Boulos, an adviser to President Donald Trump, met with German Ambassador to Washington Jens Hanefeld to discuss arrangements. Talks reportedly focused on participant roles, conference priorities, and—most notably—ensuring U.S. interests.

These interests, according to observers, center on amplifying the humanitarian file as a gateway to securing a humanitarian truce that could pave the way for political negotiations. Such negotiations might ultimately restore power-sharing arrangements involving the Sudanese Armed Forces, the RSF, and the civilian democratic coalition “Somoud,” led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Meanwhile, countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway are also seeking to leverage the conference to advance their interests. British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper has called for intensified diplomatic efforts to end the war, describing Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe as the worst of the 21st century. She warned that continued fighting threatens regional security and heightens risks of extremism and migration.

London has also pressed for greater international intervention, citing what it describes as the “catastrophic failure” of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF to protect civilians. It pointed to widespread atrocities, including ethnically motivated mass killings, rape, and the use of starvation as a weapon. Cooper emphasized that testimonies from civilians and emergency responders—some of whom have received European awards—serve as eyewitness accounts of ongoing human rights violations.

British officials have further revealed that Washington is working on a ceasefire framework, following talks in the U.S. capital aimed at advancing diplomatic efforts. As such, the Berlin Conference has evolved beyond a routine humanitarian or political gathering into a broad international coalition led by Germany, with participation from the European Union, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the African Union, Canada, and more than 25 foreign ministers from influential countries.

However, Sudan’s National Forces Coordination has announced its refusal to participate in the conference, as well as its boycott of a preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa. The group argues that international diplomatic efforts have complicated the domestic landscape rather than bringing Sudanese factions closer together, accusing external actors of attempting to repackage previous agreements or impose new political arrangements lacking broad national consensus.

Critics also note that the conference has shifted from a humanitarian initiative to a political platform, with invitations extended to around 40 Sudanese figures—many of whom oppose the army, some facing legal judgments in Sudan for alleged cooperation with the RSF, and others closely aligned with the international community. These figures, they argue, reject any political process rooted within Sudan with genuine participation from diverse national forces.

Proponents of the conference, including some Arab and regional media outlets and Sudanese political groups, dismiss such criticism as misinformation. They argue that opposition to the conference is driven by platforms linked to the Islamic Movement and pro-army factions in Port Sudan, portraying detractors as anti-peace actors seeking to prolong the war. They also maintain that the conference represents a balanced international coalition and includes a broad spectrum of Sudanese civilian representation.

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that the international community is moving toward imposing its vision for resolving the Sudanese crisis—without adequately engaging the Sudanese government, which it views as having failed to achieve a decisive military outcome or effectively promote its peace initiative on the global stage.

The conference is expected to produce one of the largest international coalitions to address the Sudan crisis, potentially restoring confidence in both the Quartet and Quintet frameworks while expanding the role of the United States—reportedly supported by the United Arab Emirates—in shaping the outcome. This may come at the expense of other regional players such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Russia.

Moreover, the conference is likely to rely heavily on reports, data, and allegations from international organizations to pressure both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF into negotiations leading to a humanitarian truce. The U.S. designation of the Muslim Brotherhood may also result in tighter restrictions on Sudanese diplomatic missions and officials, as well as increased scrutiny of diaspora groups opposing the conference.

In the coming period, Sudan’s armed forces and government will need to recognize the scale of international alignments and pressures. The current situation—neither full-scale war nor genuine peace—is untenable. Authorities are under growing pressure to alleviate civilian suffering by opening humanitarian corridors and cooperating with relief organizations, thereby preventing the politicization of humanitarian issues.

At the same time, the government must work to revive and promote its neglected peace initiative, counterbalance the influence of external blocs, and engage more effectively with regional allies, international partners, media platforms, and diaspora communities. Only through such efforts can Sudan hope to achieve a political settlement that preserves its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.