{"id":36535,"date":"2024-11-19T03:24:16","date_gmt":"2024-11-19T00:24:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=36535"},"modified":"2024-11-19T03:24:16","modified_gmt":"2024-11-19T00:24:16","slug":"the-al-mirghani-garang-agreement-separating-the-south-1-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2024\/11\/19\/the-al-mirghani-garang-agreement-separating-the-south-1-2\/","title":{"rendered":"The Al-Mirghani-Garang Agreement: Separating the South (1-2)"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"m#msg-a:r5862086160362338905\" class=\"mail-message expanded\">\n<div class=\"mail-message-header spacer\"><strong>By Ali Askouri<\/strong><\/div>\n<div id=\"m#msg-a:r5862086160362338905-content\" class=\"mail-message-content collapsible zoom-normal mail-show-images \">\n<div class=\"clear\">\n<div dir=\"auto\">\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">These articles shed light on a critical historical period, one whose witnesses are still alive. We write so that new generations can understand the background of the conflicts and the facts that led to the current situation in our country. The roots of these issues are tied directly to the 1986 elections and subsequent events, which altered the course of Sudan&#8217;s history and led to the separation of the South. The rejection of the Al-Mirghani-Garang Agreement by the National Umma Party and the Islamic Front (at the time) was a pivotal moment, as this article will explain.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">We also aim to refresh the memory of those who lived through that era, helping them contextualize the current stance of the National Umma Party and its alliance with militias. History is not merely a series of transient events; it is a continuum of interconnected social and political episodes. Every decision at the state level sets off a chain of interactions and outcomes, creating new realities and conflicts. Like other societies, we are subject to the same laws and patterns of life.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">On November 16, 1988, Mr. Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, and the late Dr. John Garang signed a peace agreement. Among its key stipulations were ending the war and organizing a constitutional conference. Even if this agreement were Al-Mirghani\u2019s sole political achievement, it would suffice to cement his legacy as a man of peace with foresight who recognized the nation\u2019s looming dangers and sought to prevent its disintegration.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">Although the agreement was not implemented for reasons this article explores, Al-Mirghani remains the most prominent peace advocate in Sudan\u2019s modern history. Supported by his political weight, party, and millions of citizens from both the North and South, he sought to end the bloodshed and achieve peace. However, self-serving political forces with short-term interests rejected the agreement, plunging the country into chaos that continues to unfold today.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">When the agreement was signed, the civil war had lasted five and a half years (from May 16, 1983, to November 16, 1988), with military operations still limited in scope. During the democratic period, under Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi\u2019s leadership, the war\u2019s continuation over two and a half years marked a missed opportunity. Despite meeting with Garang, Al-Mahdi never initiated a peace proposal, even as his government was overthrown in a coup by the Islamic Front.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">The Al-Mirghani-Garang Agreement marked a turning point in Sudanese history. Today\u2019s killings and destruction stem from the rejection and derailment of that agreement.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">We write as witnesses to those events, aiming to inform younger generations\u2014those not yet born or too young to comprehend the unfolding crises\u2014about the individuals and decisions that led our nation into ruin. The events of that era have left the nation\u2019s political future in disarray.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">In the 1986 parliamentary elections, 301 members were elected. The National Umma Party won 101 seats, the Democratic Unionist Party secured 63, and the Islamic Front took 51 seats (including 23 from the controversial &#8220;graduates&#8217; constituencies&#8221; that violated democratic principles like one man, one vote). For instance, Ali Tamim Fartak won a seat with just 45 votes. This tactic exemplified the Islamists&#8217; manipulative methods to gain power. (For more details, see my book, Tales of Deception.) Smaller Southern parties, independents, and others won 45 seats combined.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">The war prevented elections in 41 Southern constituencies, roughly 14% of the parliament\u2019s seats. The constitution still mandated that a parliamentary majority required 151 votes out of 301\u2014not the reduced 131 needed from the 260 contested seats. Thus, the Umma Party lacked the majority to govern alone, making claims of being the &#8220;majority party&#8221; unsubstantiated.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">Prime Minister Al-Mahdi should have prioritized peace to allow elections in the 41 unrepresented constituencies, legitimizing parliament and government institutions. However, completing elections in those constituencies risked Al-Mahdi\u2019s premiership, as the likely beneficiaries would be the SPLM and its ally, the Democratic Unionist Party. Together, they could gain more seats than the Umma Party, tipping the balance of power.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">If peace had been achieved and partial elections held in the 41 constituencies, the SPLM and the Democratic Unionist Party could have formed a majority coalition. This would have likely made John Garang Prime Minister. The rejection of the Al-Mirghani-Garang Agreement preserved Al-Mahdi\u2019s premiership but at a devastating national cost.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">Prominent Islamic Front leaders, such as the late Hassan Al-Turabi, failed to win voter trust in the 1986 elections. Despite his significant political influence, Al-Turabi lost both elections he contested against Democratic Unionist Party candidates. His deputy, Dr. Ali Al-Haj, also lost in Darfur, while Ibrahim Al-Sanousi avoided direct competition by running in a &#8220;graduates&#8217; constituency,&#8221; a controversial move showing little confidence in grassroots support.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">The Islamic Front\u2019s narrow electoral victories reflected its limited appeal. Of its 28 seats, 13 were in Khartoum, where it received fewer votes (186,000) than the Democratic Unionist Party (192,387).<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">Al-Mirghani\u2019s peace initiative cornered the Prime Minister. Accepting it would have jeopardized his political survival, while continuing the war allowed him to remain in power. Al-Turabi later revealed in a statement that the coup was discussed as the &#8220;best option&#8221; with Al-Mahdi. The delay in approving the peace agreement allowed time to prepare for the Islamic Front&#8217;s coup, ensuring the war\u2019s continuation and plunging the nation deeper into conflict.<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">To be continued&#8230;<\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\"><\/div>\n<div dir=\"auto\">(This Land is Ours)<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Ali Askouri These articles shed light on a critical historical period, one whose witnesses are still alive. We write so that new generations can understand the background of the conflicts and the facts that led to the current situation in our country. The roots of these issues are tied directly to the 1986 elections &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":20790,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-36535","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36535","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36535"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36535\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":36536,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36535\/revisions\/36536"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/20790"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36535"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36535"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36535"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}