{"id":38018,"date":"2024-12-07T03:02:49","date_gmt":"2024-12-07T00:02:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=38018"},"modified":"2024-12-07T03:02:49","modified_gmt":"2024-12-07T00:02:49","slug":"legitimacy-in-your-eyes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2024\/12\/07\/legitimacy-in-your-eyes\/","title":{"rendered":"“Legitimacy in Your Eyes”…!!!"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Haidar Al-Tom, Lawyer<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most prominent headline from the meetings of the leadership of the Taqaddum coordination is that \u201cthey have plans to strip the current government of its legitimacy\u201d or, as Hamdok said.<\/p>\n

By implication, this suggests that the current government enjoys some degree of legitimacy, which Taqaddum seeks to undermine.<\/p>\n

This scene\u2014attempting to delegitimize any sitting government\u2014is a typical feature of Sudanese political practice in \u201cnormal\u201d times.<\/p>\n

Even parliamentary governments, albeit rare in Sudan\u2019s history, were subjected to attempts at delegitimization by their political rivals.<\/p>\n

This implies that Taqaddum, like any political opposition, seeks to delegitimize the government to replace it and implement its own programs. But does Taqaddum have the legitimacy and authority to serve as an opposition? (The matter isn\u2019t as simple as it seems).<\/p>\n

In parliamentary governments, opposition forces with legitimate standing could confront the government by withdrawing confidence, opposing it in parliament, blocking government programs, and mobilizing their bases in the streets until the government fell. These were the traditional methods of delegitimization.<\/p>\n

So, what mechanisms will Hamdok employ?<\/p>\n

Certainly, those mechanisms will not include reliance on the UAE or the international community. (That\u2019s a sea they\u2019ve tried to swim in and ended up floundering in). Nor will they likely involve public demonstrations, as this requires popular support, which Taqaddum lacks. Or maybe their methods will include causing shortages of sugar, flour, and essential supplies\u2014creating crises for the government, as was done in the past. Such tactics are redundant in a country already plagued by war\u2014a war that is the \u201cmother of all crises.\u201d<\/p>\n

Regarding the ongoing war, which Hamdok ignores, it\u2019s worth noting that any war exhausts the people\u2014ordinary people\u2014making their primary concern the cessation of the conflict and the restoration of lost security and safety.<\/p>\n

Consequently, discussions of dreams and aspirations for civilian governance and freedoms are put on hold. Societies worn down by war focus on survival or resisting aggression, delaying societal debates\u2014the cornerstone of societal progress. Such discussions don\u2019t occur in foreign locations like Entebbe or elsewhere (if that\u2019s even how it\u2019s pronounced\u2014I\u2019m not sure, nor does it matter to most Sudanese people).<\/p>\n

What is legitimacy?<\/strong><\/p>\n

More importantly, what legitimacy or authority does Hamdok and his group have to act as the “police” of legitimacy? Sudan\u2019s experience shows that political rivals fight over legitimacy in parliament, with both sides possessing the necessary legitimacy and authority to engage in such struggles. So, we must ask: what is Hamdok\u2019s legitimacy in Taqaddum?<\/p>\n

Legitimacy, without delving into complex legal terms, in political science means “the right and acceptance of authority.” It implies that a ruler holds authority through either a legal right or popular will\u2014commonly expressed as \u201crevolutionary legitimacy.\u201d<\/p>\n

If we assume that Hamdok and his group still act based on revolutionary legitimacy (an assumption lacking evidence and logic), then Burhan and his government also have a share of that legitimacy. Moreover, they possess an additional justification: the acceptance and support enjoyed by the Sudanese army and its commander-in-chief, who is also the head of Sudan\u2019s Sovereign Council.<\/p>\n

This simplified definition of legitimacy isn\u2019t my invention; it\u2019s drawn from the British liberal philosopher John Locke, who stated: \u201cPolitical legitimacy derives from the explicit and implicit consent of the governed.\u201d Hamdok, being a liberal, would not object to such a definition. Similarly, the American sociologist Seymour Martin previously noted that legitimacy is \u201cmaintaining the belief that the existing political institutions are the most suitable for society.\u201d<\/p>\n

Thus, Hamdok is correct to assert that the Sudanese government has a degree of legitimacy. However, neither he nor his group can convince Sudanese people that they are more suitable than Burhan. Their inability to do so is rooted in their disgraceful stances towards the Sudanese people\u2014a stark truth.<\/p>\n

On suitability<\/strong><\/p>\n

Who knows what Hamdok and Taqaddum would do if they were in Burhan\u2019s position? Perhaps they would reinstate Hemedti (\u201cthe alpha male\u201d) to dismantle the state established in 1956. Or they might strike a deal with him: \u201cYou get the flesh, we\u2019ll keep the bones,\u201d tasking him with disciplining the Sudanese people (the remnants, the Islamists, etc.) \u201cbecause they didn\u2019t listen to us,\u201d as one Taqaddum leader suggested. Or maybe they\u2019d justify atrocities by claiming, \u201cThe Janjaweed came from the womb of the armed forces,\u201d revealing a logic that collapses under scrutiny.<\/p>\n

And who knows what else might occur if Hamdok and his ilk were deemed more suitable for governance during these times. These are people who have failed to support the nation but instead compounded our suffering by inviting foreign hostility against their own people. They are utterly unsuitable, and in reality, we can expect anything from them.<\/p>\n

The essential demand<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, all of this remains mere rhetoric. Legitimacy is not our current demand. The Sudanese people\u2019s demand is for Sudan itself. Only then can discussions of legitimacy and propriety follow.<\/p>\n

But who will tell these politicians in Taqaddum that we are facing a war aimed at destroying the people and their resources?<\/p>\n

A war characterized by ethnic cleansing, genocide, senseless killing, merciless displacement, and the replacement of our people with others. A war the entire world acknowledges as targeting the population, using rape as a weapon and looting as a means to force people from their homes and lands\u2014a war rife with all imaginable and unimaginable horrors.<\/p>\n

A war fueled by foreign involvement, with funding, weapons, and mercenaries.<\/p>\n

In the midst of this, Hamdok appears like a crying child (with his short arms, teary eyes, and incoherent speech) to lecture us about legitimacy!<\/p>\n

“Legitimacy in your eyes!”<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Haidar Al-Tom, Lawyer The most prominent headline from the meetings of the leadership of the Taqaddum coordination is that \u201cthey have plans to strip the current government of its legitimacy\u201d or, as Hamdok said. By implication, this suggests that the current government enjoys some degree of legitimacy, which Taqaddum seeks to undermine. This scene\u2014attempting …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":38015,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-38018","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38018","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=38018"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38018\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":38019,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38018\/revisions\/38019"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/38015"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=38018"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=38018"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=38018"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}