{"id":45647,"date":"2025-04-01T12:39:53","date_gmt":"2025-04-01T09:39:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=45647"},"modified":"2025-04-01T12:39:53","modified_gmt":"2025-04-01T09:39:53","slug":"the-uks-investment-in-distrust-londons-ministerial-meeting-on-sudan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/04\/01\/the-uks-investment-in-distrust-londons-ministerial-meeting-on-sudan\/","title":{"rendered":"The UK\u2019s Investment in Distrust: London\u2019s Ministerial Meeting on Sudan"},"content":{"rendered":"

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb<\/strong>
\nThe United Kingdom has announced its intention to hold a ministerial meeting to discuss the Sudanese crisis at the level of foreign ministers on April 15, 2025, marking the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudanese war.
\nSince the election of the UK\u2019s new Labour government under Keir Starmer, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy has shown notable interest in Sudan. This was demonstrated by his visit to Sudanese refugee camps in Chad, his personal endeavor in raising Sudan at the UN Security Council, and announcement of increased humanitarian aid amid Sudan\u2019s famine. These efforts culminate in the upcoming ministerial conference, reinforcing this pattern.
\nWhile Lammy seems eager to lead efforts to end Sudan\u2019s war, British policy remains stuck in the lingering legacy of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) under the previous government. Whether by design or miscalculation, this approach has distorted reality and created a crisis of distrust between Sudan and Britain. The result has not only been complicating peace efforts but also an increasingly obstructive environment for humanitarian relief, as persistent and growing suspicions cast doubt on the true intentions behind international aid.
\nUK\u2019s blind eye\u2014or deliberate disregard\u2014to the role played by regional actors, most notably the UAE, in exploiting humanitarian cover to channel arms and support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has only deepened this distrust. UN reports, along with numerous independent journalistic investigations, have exposed the UAE\u2019s direct involvement in fueling the war in Sudan under the guise of humanitarian operations. From near-certain incriminating satellite imagery analyzed by the Sudan Conflict Observatory – a U.S. government-funded research entity- to Reuters\u2019 reporting of over 86 flights from UAE and Amdjarass base between April 2023 to mid-2024\u2014three-quarters operated by arms smuggling networks\u2014down to the UAE-built drone launch base for the RSF, under the cover of UAE Red Crescent operation near the Sudan-Chad border, and to the U.S. lawmakers\u2019 January announcement, citing official briefing, that the UAE continues to arm the RSF\u2014UAE\u2019s role in fueling Sudan\u2019s war is undeniable\u2014res ipsa loquitur.
\nFormer UK Ambassador to Sudan Giles Lever played a key role in breeding this distrust. It was not limited to support, funding and backing to the creation of factional alliances like the Taqaddum coalition, which from its inception included open RSF supporters\u2014some later joined the RSF\u2019s newly formed political coalition to establish a parallel government, a move widely condemned, including by the UK itself, while others, as RSF defectors publicly revealed, had long been embedded in the militia\u2019s political operations. Realities about both were plain to any informed observer of Sudanese politics, let alone the ambassador of Great Britain. Lever\u2019s partisanship went as far as harassing and intimidating political activists and civil society actors who disagreed with these directions, via emails propagating RSF-aligned narratives that sought to smear political contrarians by ascribing them to the deposed Islamist regime of 2019.
\nThis clear breach of diplomatic norms severely damaged trust in UK policy on Sudan\u2019s war. The fallout crippled the UK efforts to engage meaningfully in Sudan\u2019s peace efforts. Furthermore, given Britain\u2019s role as the “UN penholder” on Sudan and its global leadership in humanitarian sector\u2014by virtue of heading the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)\u2014this trust deficit extended to the International Community at large and hampered Sudan\u2019s engagement with the broader international humanitarian system during its worst humanitarian catastrophe.
\nOne of the most damaging aspects of UK policy under Lever was the effort to propagate a false equivalence between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. While both institutions have problematic histories, and Sudanese people hold different grievances against both, this equivalence disregards the lived realities of Sudanese civilians, who overwhelmingly flee RSF-controlled areas due to rampant lawlessness, mass atrocities, and systematic crimes such as murder, looting, and systematic sexual violence to the areas controlled by the Sudanese government which are -in contrast- widely referred to as “safe areas.” Moreover, spreading and reinforcing the claims that the Sudanese army is controlled by the ousted Islamist regime\u2014a justification that RSF and its UAE-backed allies use for war\u2014further distorts reality. Volunteers from the heart of the revolution are within the ranks of SAF. They have taken up arms to defend their country and people against the atrocities committed by a foreign-backed militia that recruits mercenaries from across the world. However, this narrative has only provided Islamists and remnants of the former regime with means to rebrand themselves and reassert their presence, despite their downfall in a massive popular revolution.
\nThe falseness of this equivalence is not merely a Sudanese perception; it is substantiated by internationally reputable reports. The RSF is widely implicated with committing genocide and looting humanitarian aid. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reported that in 2024, the RSF was responsible for 1,300 documented incidents of violence against civilians, compared to 200 attributed to the SAF\u2014approximately 80% of documented attacks on civilians were RSF-perpetrated. The UK\u2019s failure to acknowledge these realities has only fueled distrust and skepticism about its motivations in Sudan.
\nThe crisis of distrust extends beyond British governmental institutions to affiliated think tanks like Chatham House and the British Council, both actively reshaping Sudan\u2019s civilian political landscape in favor of RSF-aligned or sympathetic actors. Chatham House promoted RSF-alligned narratives, providing platforms for amplifying military-driven proposals under the guise of civilian protection, such as imposing no-fly zones. Meanwhile, the British Council is currently funding a research project aimed at studying – or perhaps subtly shaping- a theoretical framework for the RSF\u2019s political program\u2014as if RSF\u2019s extensive record of atrocities, economic predation, and war crimes did not expose its fascist nature yet. In addition to the continued funding for the Taqaddum coalition, even after signing its public understanding with the RSF in January 2024. London has also served as the primary hub for RSF advocacy, hosting secret meetings between RSF leadership\u2014including the youngest of the Dagalos brothers, Al-Quni Hamdan Dagalo, who is under U.S. sanctions for arms trafficking\u2014and pro-RSF civilian figures that have been documented in video evidence, further eroding trust in the UK\u2019s neutrality.
\nBritish and Western diplomats, tend to bristle when confronted with this criticism, treating it as political rhetoric. In essence, it is exactly that\u2014and it fulfills a legitimate function by presenting substantive facts that are relevant and should not be dismissed, as they have tangible consequences that prolong the war in Sudan. Overlooking them is feeding widespread suspicion and apprehension toward the UK among large segments of the Sudanese population. These are the very communities that have borne the brunt of the RSF\u2019s crimes\u2014witnessing firsthand the devastation it has wrought.
\nThis has led many Sudanese to question the UK\u2019s credibility in its proclaimed commitment to good governance, human rights, and civilian rule. How can such claims be taken seriously when the UK\u2014and, by extension, the broader international community\u2014continues to engage with those complicit in the Masalit genocide, orchestrators of systematic plunder, perpetrators of mass sexual violence, and architects of the forced displacement of nearly 24 million Sudanese?
\nWhile British diplomat Richard Crowder\u2014who assumed the role UK\u2019s envoy to Sudan in September 2024\u2014seems aware to the deep trust deficit and attempts to address it, as seen in his December 2024 visit to Port Sudan, his efforts have yet to yield tangible shifts in UK policy. Crowder brings extensive diplomatic experience, having served in key capitals like Moscow and Brussels, led the FCDO\u2019s Great Lakes Africa Office, and undertaken a pivotal secondment at the EU\u2019s policy unit before Brexit. His intellectual grasp of post-colonial challenges and the impact of global and regional power struggles on fragile states is seen in his 2015 book Aftermath: The Makers of the Postwar World. His second book, D\u00e9tente: The Chance to End the Cold War (2020), touches on the consequences of proxy wars in Africa\u2014 all insights directly relevant to Sudan\u2019s ongoing conflict.
\nHowever, this contextual awareness has yet to translate into a meaningful shift in British policy on Sudan\u2019s war. The upcoming London ministerial meeting, marking the war\u2019s second anniversary may serve as a litmus test for the trajectory of UK\u2019s approach. The British government\u2019s decision to exclude Sudanese parties\u2014while perhaps defensible\u2014remains fundamentally flawed. It reflects a persistent dilemma: whether to invite Sudan\u2019s government while excluding the RSF, revealing an ongoing adherence to the misguided notion of political equivalence between the two. Yet the miscalculation goes further. The UK invited the UAE, portraying it as a neutral regional actor despite overwhelming and irrefutable evidence of its role as the RSF\u2019s primary sponsor\u2014supplying arms, logistics, and political cover. In effect, the RSF remains at the table, at least by proxy.
\nThis comes just weeks after Sudan formally filed a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over its support for the RSF\u2019s genocide. The ICJ has scheduled its opening hearing for April 10, only five days before London\u2019s meeting. Expecting Sudan to engage constructively with outcome of this meeting is entirely unreasonable. For most Sudanese\u2014aside from the UK-backed elites\u2014the London meeting is widely seen as another exercise of \u201chumanitarian diplomacy,\u201d crafted to launder the UAE\u2019s criminal role in Sudan\u2019s war and rebrand it as a humanitarian donor and neutral mediator. Particularly in the light of the UK past attempts to actively suppress criticism of the UAE for arming the RSF amid the ongoing war.
\nThis trust deficit is no accident; it has been actively cultivated and now stands as a major obstacle to meaningful engagement. Without a fundamental reset, foreign interventions\u2014political or humanitarian\u2014will continue to fail. This crisis of distrust cannot be resolved by doubling down on policies that have already proven counterproductive. Britain has no strategic interest in prolonging Sudan\u2019s war, nor in imposing externally driven solutions rooted in regional agendas that Sudanese categorically reject\u2014whether by tacitly endorsing partition or attempting to enforce a power-sharing arrangement with a militia through sheer violence.
\nIf Britain genuinely seeks to support peace and security for Sudanese civilians, it must reassess its stance with an unfiltered view of the war\u2019s realities, rather than through the lens of its regional allies. A Britain that\u2014rightly\u2014provides arms and political support to Ukrainians defending their land cannot, should not, and must not deny Sudanese the same right to resist a foreign-backed militia that recruits mercenaries from Chad, Mali, and as far afield as Colombia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb The United Kingdom has announced its intention to hold a ministerial meeting to discuss the Sudanese crisis at the level of foreign ministers on April 15, 2025, marking the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudanese war. Since the election of the UK\u2019s new Labour government under Keir Starmer, British Foreign …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1621,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-45647","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45647","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=45647"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45647\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45648,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45647\/revisions\/45648"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1621"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=45647"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=45647"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=45647"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}