{"id":46071,"date":"2025-04-08T13:58:57","date_gmt":"2025-04-08T10:58:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=46071"},"modified":"2025-04-08T13:58:57","modified_gmt":"2025-04-08T10:58:57","slug":"questioning-the-assumptions-of-conflict-resolution-between-khartoum-damascus-and-gaza","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/04\/08\/questioning-the-assumptions-of-conflict-resolution-between-khartoum-damascus-and-gaza\/","title":{"rendered":"Questioning the Assumptions of Conflict Resolution between Khartoum, Damascus, and Gaza"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Abdel Wahab El-Affendi<\/strong><\/p>\n

The outbreak of the war waged by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia\u2014and its local and foreign supporters\u2014against the Sudanese army has sparked sharp polarization among observers and regional and international organizations about how to end the conflict. Eventually, this debate evolved into a dispute between two perspectives. The first is the traditional view of conflict resolution, which involves working within the prevailing balance of power and luring the parties into a compromise that tempts them to accept a ceasefire, leading gradually to a peace deal in which each side gains some of its objectives.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, a different view emerged: that Sudan\u2019s war was not a confrontation between two military parties, but a war primarily waged against Sudanese civilians by a heavily armed militia\u2014RSF\u2014while the Sudanese army was a third party defending itself and the civilians. From this standpoint, any ceasefire or deal between the army and the militia would come at the expense of civilians.<\/p>\n

The Sudanese army\u2019s success\u2014along with waves of civilian volunteers supporting it\u2014in restoring security paved the way for swiftly resolving the humanitarian crisis.<\/p>\n

This second position was supported by the voices of civilians in Khartoum, who repeatedly cried out during each declared humanitarian truce, saying such ceasefires only enabled the militia to raid homes and commit extortion, looting, and murder, leading to negative humanitarian outcomes. The author found himself engaged early in this debate, through his writings in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, and through discussions with African, international, and European diplomats in informal meetings that started in the war\u2019s early days. These were led by a former African president and held under an African mandate.<\/p>\n

The attendees included European envoys to Sudan or the region, senior U.S. diplomats, and Sudanese figures\u2014some from the ousted transitional government. The author took a stance supporting the second view, arguing that the proposed humanitarian ceasefire (at international request) could not truly be humanitarian unless it ensured an end to home invasions, and the militia\u2019s blockade of aid and civilian movement, including those fleeing attacks. He insisted that any ceasefire must include protection of homes, hospitals, and public infrastructure, and secure the roads.<\/p>\n

Only a handful of Sudanese participants supported the author\u2019s proposal. However, the meeting\u2019s chair adopted the position and tasked a group of experts with drafting what became known as the \u201cHumanitarian Affairs Protocol.\u201d This protocol found its way to the mediators of the Jeddah process (Saudi Arabia) shortly before that summit, becoming the foundation of the \u201cJeddah Agreement\u201d signed on May 11, 2023, by the two Sudanese negotiating delegations.<\/p>\n

Yet none of its provisions were implemented. The militia stalled and imposed conditions while continuing to commit atrocities and violations, escalating its inhumanity even as the international parties, paradoxically, kept raising the banner of \u201chumanitarianism\u201d to justify more incentives for the militia\u2019s behavior\u2014without restraint or accountability.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, in Gaza, the logic of brute force has obliterated any semblance of humanity in dealing with an utterly barbaric situation.<\/p>\n

Our expectations have plummeted so far that in our meetings with international envoys and diplomats, we now simply ask that pressure be placed on the militia to stop its violations\u2014without even calling for accountability. The author repeatedly urged European and American envoys to send a clear message: the RSF will never gain political legitimacy unless it halts its abuses. These are internationally banned acts\u2014during war or peace\u2014and should not be up for negotiation, let alone reward.<\/p>\n

The author was shocked by the evasive and weak responses. In a discussion with a UN diplomat from an African country who was assigned a significant role, the diplomat asked: \u201cIsn\u2019t the situation the same in army-controlled areas?\u201d The author nearly ended the conversation but calmly explained that army-controlled areas are where millions fled for safety from militia-held zones\u2014and that the diplomat had a duty to investigate such matters before assuming his post.<\/p>\n

In another meeting with an envoy from a major European country, the envoy cited an Arab country\u2019s role in the crisis and said they could not pressure it because the U.S. and Israel need its support in the Gaza war. The author was stunned. What the envoy essentially admitted was a kind of reciprocity in supporting violations: \u201cYou support our crimes in Gaza, and we\u2019ll support yours in Sudan.\u201d<\/p>\n

Looking at the entire issue now, the author sees it from another angle\u2014not just because of the questionable roles of so-called peacemakers, but also because the changing realities on the ground have demonstrated the effectiveness of a “direct solution” to crises like this\u2014by imposing the rule of law on a rogue armed force that cannot be reasoned with. While international and regional powers failed or refused to apply pressure, the victims had\u2014and still have\u2014the right and duty to defend themselves.<\/p>\n

In a conversation with Western diplomats, the author once joked\u2014though he was dead serious\u2014that the best humanitarian aid for Sudanese at that moment was supplying the army with more drones. There was no use in sending external aid through militia-controlled areas where food was being stolen from the homes of the poor. Deterring the militia from stealing food already in-country would be far more cost-effective than shipping tons of aid and relief workers. Khartoum\u2019s markets were full of food of all kinds\u2014it was insecurity that separated people from their meals, with many dying on their way to buy bread or vegetables.<\/p>\n

What truly matters is that the success of the Sudanese resistance\u2014represented by the army and the volunteers\u2014has restored security to most parts of eastern, central, and mid-western Sudan, including the capital. This paved the way to solving the humanitarian crisis swiftly. Stability now supports agricultural production and market recovery, while helping the affected will cost far less. It also facilitates relief for millions at a fraction of the cost of cross-border operations. Most importantly, using local capacities (with modest support from friendly, non-exploitative countries) sets an important regional precedent for people\u2019s protection and strengthening state authority with popular backing.<\/p>\n

Had the RSF criminals accepted the Jeddah initiative or others, they might have preserved most of their forces, weapons, and territory.<\/p>\n

When we add to this stunningly swift and total victory in Sudan the recent collapse in Syria of a deeply entrenched, externally supported regime\u2014within days\u2014compared to the utter failure of even humanitarian appeals in Gaza, it is time to reconsider the prevailing “conflict resolution” doctrine. This doctrine often assumes that power trumps justice and that peace must mean the weak yielding to the strong\u2014with a superficial polish to an ugly reality.<\/p>\n

Instead, we must rethink the true strength and potential of people\u2014not as slogans but as actual forces that can impose their will amid darkness and false “middle-ground” solutions. In both Sudan and Syria, the forces of oppression inadvertently paved the way for their own downfall. Had Assad accepted the Astana or Geneva proposals, or the Arab initiative, he might have remained in power. Had the RSF accepted the Jeddah initiative, they could have preserved their military and political presence\u2014backed by local and foreign supporters.<\/p>\n

But God willed otherwise, lifting the suffering from peoples who might have endured far worse. In contrast, in Gaza, the logic of brute force has obliterated all traces of humanity in dealing with a savage situation. Perhaps this is a lesson for peacemaking efforts and their champions: that making peace doesn\u2019t mean submitting the weak to the strong\u2014or being trapped by limited options and unimaginative, routine solutions that refuse to think outside the box.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Abdel Wahab El-Affendi The outbreak of the war waged by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia\u2014and its local and foreign supporters\u2014against the Sudanese army has sparked sharp polarization among observers and regional and international organizations about how to end the conflict. Eventually, this debate evolved into a dispute between two perspectives. The first is …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":36732,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-46071","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46071","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=46071"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46071\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":46072,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46071\/revisions\/46072"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/36732"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=46071"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=46071"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=46071"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}