{"id":49970,"date":"2025-06-10T18:57:42","date_gmt":"2025-06-10T15:57:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=49970"},"modified":"2025-06-10T18:57:42","modified_gmt":"2025-06-10T15:57:42","slug":"hemedtis-latest-speech-a-bid-to-restore-authority-amid-political-and-military-fragmentation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/06\/10\/hemedtis-latest-speech-a-bid-to-restore-authority-amid-political-and-military-fragmentation\/","title":{"rendered":"Hemedti\u2019s Latest Speech: A Bid to Restore Authority Amid Political and Military Fragmentation"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Amjad Farid Al-Tayeb<\/strong><\/p>\n

On June 2, 2025, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as \u201cHemedti,\u201d leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Sudan, delivered a video speech broadcast via the militia\u2019s Telegram channels. Amid the ongoing armed conflict with the Sudanese army since April 2023, this address was far from a routine appearance\u2014it was an intensified attempt to restore stature and stabilize his forces\u2019 morale amidst mounting political and military challenges.<\/p>\n

Context and Shifting Field Dynamics<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti\u2019s speech comes amid critical military and political developments indicating a weakening RSF position and significant advances by the Sudanese army. Since early 2025, the army has steadily regained control over Gezira State and the capital Khartoum, in addition to large areas in White Nile, Sennar, and North Kordofan states. The army has also neared breaking the siege on the strategic city of El-Obeid through the \u201cAl-Sayyad\u201d military operation.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the legendary resilience of El-Fasher, besieged by RSF since April 2024, remains the defining battle in North Darfur. Despite the RSF\u2019s assault on the Zamzam IDP camp\u2014supported by the \u201cTasis\u201d alliance, which includes forces loyal to Abdelaziz al-Hilu, Tahir Hajar, and Al-Hadi Idris\u2014the army and its allied forces have consolidated their positions in the state. On May 18, 2025, the army captured the strategic area of Al-\u2018Atroun in North Darfur. In October 2024, it had already taken Bir Mazza base (28 km north of Kutum), cutting RSF supply lines from Libya and Chad and threatening to lift the siege on El-Fasher. This military pressure helps explain Hemedti\u2019s escalatory rhetoric, likely intended to ease pressure on RSF in Darfur by opening new fronts\u2014such as threats to attack El-Obeid and Northern State.<\/p>\n

Crisis of Legitimacy and Defensive Rhetoric<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti appeared in the June 2, 2025 speech as a leader grappling with a deep crisis of political and military legitimacy, trying to regain initiative amidst battlefield losses and growing international isolation. His tone and content revealed the fragility of his position. While he attempted to rally his militia with motivational slogans, he also exposed internal contradictions and a lack of strategic coherence.<\/p>\n

His political anxiety was evident in the adoption of a victimhood narrative, aiming to deflect attention from military setbacks and mounting human rights accusations. In doing so, he seemingly followed, intentionally or otherwise, Machiavelli\u2019s advice in The Prince\u2014to use accusations to distract from one\u2019s weaknesses.<\/p>\n

Hemedti accused the Sudanese army of using chemical weapons against civilians and targeting ethnic groups in Darfur and Kordofan, offering no credible evidence. Notably, this was the first time he made such claims following U.S. sanctions against the Sudanese army, announced weeks earlier, alleging chemical weapons use in 2024. Those U.S. sanctions lacked public documentation and were not submitted to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), nor was a formal investigation requested. The timing and nature of Hemedti\u2019s claims suggest political opportunism, especially in the wake of the UN’s July 2024 report labeling RSF actions in West Darfur as acts of genocide against the Masalit tribe and imposing personal sanctions on Hemedti. His sudden claim of possessing evidence now, a year after the alleged events, seems aimed at exploiting political leverage.<\/p>\n

Ethnic Rhetoric and Tribal Polarization<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti’s speech leaned heavily on ethnic and tribal rhetoric, a persistent trait of RSF propaganda. This was also evident in his October 2024 remarks about his “blood ties” to General Ibrahim Jaber, whom he criticized for siding with the Sudanese government. Such appeals to tribal and ethnic identity highlight not only Hemedti’s personal worldview but also a structural flaw in the RSF project, which has failed to transcend tribal loyalties in favor of a unified national legitimacy.<\/p>\n

Instead of advancing a new social contract to unite Sudanese society under a cohesive political authority, this rhetoric perpetuates the very divisions that have historically contributed to the state\u2019s collapse. In a volatile context like Darfur and Kordofan\u2014marked by ethnic tensions and local conflicts\u2014Hemedti\u2019s approach heightens the risk of civil war and undermines efforts to build a national consensus.<\/p>\n

Strategic Contradictions and Limited Options: Ignoring \u201cTasis\u201d and Pressuring \u201cSomod\u201d<\/p>\n

A striking feature of the speech was Hemedti\u2019s complete omission of the \u201cTasis\u201d alliance, formed in March 2025 to provide political cover for the RSF. This silence reflects a deeper strategic crisis, as \u201cTasis\u201d has failed to form a parallel government due to internal disputes over positions. Rising secessionist rhetoric among RSF supporters, particularly in western Sudan, signals political despair over achieving national victory or a political solution\u2014limiting the alliance\u2019s ability to forge broader coalitions.<\/p>\n

Conversely, Hemedti directed an implicit message to the rival \u201cSomod\u201d alliance, demanding they choose a side: \u201cYou\u2019re either with us or against us.\u201d Both \u201cSomod\u201d and \u201cTasis\u201d emerged from the fragmentation of the \u201cTaqaddum\u201d alliance led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. While they share anti-Islamist stances and similar ties to regional and international actors, RSF’s worsening military position has deepened polarization, reducing the political spectrum to a binary \u201cfriend-or-foe\u201d scenario.<\/p>\n

Rejection of the Jeddah Platform and Regional Tensions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti\u2019s rejection of a return to the Jeddah peace talks reveals a rigid stance rooted more in his fragile negotiating position than in any principled resistance. This contradicts previous statements about humanitarian commitments and pledges made by his delegations during the 2024 Switzerland talks. Such inconsistencies reflect a pattern within RSF leadership\u2014making flexible political promises to appease international mediators, without clear intent to implement them.<\/p>\n

Viewed through John Rawls\u2019 theory of justice\u2014which requires negotiators to make decisions behind a \u201cveil of ignorance,\u201d detached from personal interests\u2014Hemedti\u2019s rhetoric falls short. His emotionally charged, polarizing tone is not aimed at building consensus, but rather at buying time and bolstering his camp\u2019s morale at the expense of peace prospects.<\/p>\n

He also accused Egypt and Eritrea of supporting the Sudanese army, again without evidence\u2014attempting to mobilize supporters and explain battlefield defeats. Meanwhile, UN reports since January 2024 have documented UAE arms shipments to RSF via Chad, making Hemedti\u2019s claims appear as part of a broader propaganda effort to distract from his own foreign backing.<\/p>\n

Sudanese Leadership\u2019s Diplomatic Engagement<\/strong><\/p>\n

In contrast, Sudanese leadership has pursued an increasingly active regional diplomacy aimed at breaking the international isolation caused by the war. In May and June 2025, Port Sudan hosted high-level delegations from the Central African Republic and Ethiopia, carrying messages of political and security support. On May 28, CAR Foreign Minister Sylvie Baipo-Temon delivered a letter from President Faustin-Archange Touad\u00e9ra to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan\u2019s Sovereign Council. In early June, a senior Ethiopian delegation\u2014led by Intelligence Chief Redwan Hussein and PM Abiy Ahmed\u2019s East Africa Advisor, Getachew Reda\u2014visited Port Sudan, reaffirming Addis Ababa\u2019s support for Sudanese unity. It was Ethiopia\u2019s second such visit in six months.<\/p>\n

These efforts go beyond bilateral ties, signaling improved relations with regional organizations. Both the African Union and IGAD welcomed the appointment of Dr. Kamal Idris as Prime Minister, viewing it as a step toward restoring civilian governance. Altogether, these developments suggest growing international political capital for Sudan\u2019s government, strengthening its negotiating position and contrasting starkly with Hemedti\u2019s isolation.<\/p>\n

Linguistic Signals and Military Threats<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti\u2019s speech employed a blend of populism and escalation, using emotional terms like \u201cblatant aggression\u201d and \u201ckilling the people\u201d to cast RSF as the people\u2019s defenders against tyranny. This victimhood narrative is a common populist tool to rally support and assert legitimacy. His phrase, \u201cno room for grey stances,\u201d echoed a binary logic aimed at consolidating political control.<\/p>\n

His omission of any mention of the \u201cTasis\u201d alliance reflected an effort to conceal or downplay its political failures, while his focus on military threats emphasized \u201cpower\u201d over politics.<\/p>\n

Threats of War Expansion<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti issued direct threats to attack El-Obeid and Northern State, referencing RSF encirclement of El-Obeid from three directions (Al-Khuwai, Hamrat Al-Sheikh, and Al-Hamadi), and the retaking of positions like Al-Khuwai and Dilling. His warning for civilians to remain in their homes signals a dangerous escalation, recalling RSF atrocities during the invasions of El-Geneina, Khartoum, and Gezira.<\/p>\n

If acted upon, these threats suggest an RSF effort to regain military initiative after losses in Darfur and Kordofan. El-Obeid is a strategic hub for controlling North Kordofan, while Northern State serves as a rear base for the army. Such threats raise displacement risks\u201413 million people had been displaced by May 2025, per UN reports\u2014and worsen an already dire humanitarian crisis marked by hunger and ethnic violence.<\/p>\n

Hemedti\u2019s latest speech portrays a leader in crisis, relying on populism and polarization to compensate for political, military, and ideological weakness. It was a performance aimed at reconstructing his image amid deepening fragility. Yet, it offered no inclusive national vision. The resilience of El-Fasher, the army\u2019s advances, the appointment of a civilian prime minister, and Sudan\u2019s diplomatic outreach have all strengthened the government’s hand. Hemedti\u2019s threats and divisive rhetoric only deepen the conflict. The lingering question remains: how long can a leader maintain power through a rhetoric of crisis and escalation, in the face of battlefield losses and an absence of legitimacy?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Amjad Farid Al-Tayeb On June 2, 2025, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as \u201cHemedti,\u201d leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Sudan, delivered a video speech broadcast via the militia\u2019s Telegram channels. Amid the ongoing armed conflict with the Sudanese army since April 2023, this address was far from a routine appearance\u2014it was …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1621,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-49970","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49970","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49970"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49970\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":49971,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49970\/revisions\/49971"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1621"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49970"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49970"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49970"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}