{"id":50119,"date":"2025-06-14T22:00:28","date_gmt":"2025-06-14T19:00:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=50119"},"modified":"2025-06-14T22:00:28","modified_gmt":"2025-06-14T19:00:28","slug":"attack-on-the-army-and-the-risks-facing-sudan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/06\/14\/attack-on-the-army-and-the-risks-facing-sudan\/","title":{"rendered":"Attack on the Army and the Risks Facing Sudan"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Othman Mirghani<\/strong><\/p>\n

At a time when Sudan is facing a fierce internal war\u2014one with clear external dimensions and interventions, the latest being the events in the triangle bordering Sudan, Libya, and adjacent to Egypt\u2014some parties continue their campaign to weaken the Sudanese army. Some wish for its defeat, others call for its dismantling, and some hide their agendas behind the vague slogan of \u201crestructuring.\u201d<\/p>\n

A central tactic in this campaign is the repeated accusation that the army is merely a \u201cKizan army\u201d (a term referring to supporters of the former Islamist regime), or that it is a partisan militia rather than a national military institution.<\/p>\n

Even if there are \u201cKizan\u201d within the army, there is a wide segment of Sudanese within its ranks who belong to other political movements or who have no political affiliations at all. A vast number of those currently fighting alongside the army\u2014including joint forces and mobilized battalions\u2014belong to this broader group. In fact, some of them are youth from the December Revolution and others who long opposed the previous regime. No one can rightly label them as \u201cKizan.\u201d<\/p>\n

Many international and regional actors\u2014despite their differing positions\u2014agree on the necessity of preserving Sudan\u2019s state institutions, foremost among them the armed forces. The collapse of the army wouldn\u2019t simply mean the defeat of one party in a military conflict, but the collapse of the state itself and its descent into chaos and fragmentation. This isn\u2019t an emotional stance, but rather a pragmatic reading of real-world precedents.<\/p>\n

Modern history offers tragic examples of states that became arenas of bloody conflict as soon as their national armies collapsed. Iraq, after the 2003 invasion, is a stark reminder. The decision by U.S. administrator Paul Bremer to dissolve the Iraqi army created a massive security vacuum quickly filled by armed groups\u2014from al-Qaeda to ISIS. Iraqi cities turned into battlefields, state institutions collapsed, and the country was plunged into sectarian violence.<\/p>\n

In Libya, the ouster of Gaddafi without a plan to build a unified army led to the rise of competing militias and a devastating war marked by multiple foreign interventions. Somalia disintegrated after the fall of Siad Barre\u2019s regime, turning into fragmented zones ruled by warlords. This triggered a brutal civil war and the collapse of state institutions for nearly two decades, eventually giving rise to extremist groups like al-Shabaab.<\/p>\n

These weren\u2019t exceptions. In Africa, similar disasters have unfolded in various forms. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko\u2019s army led to the First and Second Congo Wars, which involved the armies of nine African countries and cost millions of lives. In Liberia, the disintegration of the army triggered a civil war that killed around a quarter of a million people.<\/p>\n

The shared lesson in all these examples is that the national army is the \u201ccentral pillar\u201d of the state. Once it collapses, the entire structure of the state crumbles. For Sudan, if the army collapses or is dismantled\u2014whether due to internal conflict, external pressure, or misguided political decisions\u2014the country will face catastrophic scenarios:<\/p>\n

\u2013 Security and police services will cease, leading to widespread chaos and crime.
\n\u2013 The resulting power vacuum will enable militias to rise and battle over power and resources, leading to dangerous tribal and regional conflicts and renewed calls for secession\u2014especially amid the exploitation of the marginalized regions issue.
\n\u2013 Cross-border conflicts could erupt as militias and armed groups seek safe havens or resources.
\n\u2013 Terrorist groups will exploit the security void, finding fertile ground for their activities, especially given their rising presence in the Sahel region\u2014not far from Sudan\u2019s borders.
\n\u2013 Instability will pose a threat to neighboring countries and regional security.
\n\u2013 All of this will trigger unprecedented humanitarian disasters, escalating hunger crises and waves of displacement.
\n\u2013 Sudan will be opened wide to foreign intervention.<\/p>\n

In summary: The Sudanese army is the \u201clast line of defense\u201d against total collapse. Historical experience shows that dismantling national armies does not necessarily lead to democracy\u2014but often leads to chaos, particularly in an unstable environment marked by rising regional and global conflicts.<\/p>\n

Reforming the army is necessary\u2014just like many other Sudanese state institutions that require reform. Army leaders themselves acknowledge the importance of reform, especially in light of the war and the need to integrate armed movements that signed the peace agreement and to end the phenomenon of multiple armed groups and parallel armies. The goal must be to ensure that weapons remain solely in the hands of the state. But reform should never mean dismantling the army or restructuring it in a way that weakens it.<\/p>\n

Today, more than ever, Sudan needs a strong national army\u2014one that defends it from conspiracies and external ambitions. A capable, apolitical army focused on its essential duty: protecting a homeland that is clearly under threat.<\/p>\n

Source: Asharq Al-Awsat<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Othman Mirghani At a time when Sudan is facing a fierce internal war\u2014one with clear external dimensions and interventions, the latest being the events in the triangle bordering Sudan, Libya, and adjacent to Egypt\u2014some parties continue their campaign to weaken the Sudanese army. Some wish for its defeat, others call for its dismantling, and …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":24347,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-50119","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50119","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=50119"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50119\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":50120,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50119\/revisions\/50120"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24347"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50119"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=50119"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=50119"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}