{"id":51769,"date":"2025-07-22T21:09:10","date_gmt":"2025-07-22T18:09:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=51769"},"modified":"2025-07-22T21:09:10","modified_gmt":"2025-07-22T18:09:10","slug":"sudans-dayton-a-roadmap-to-an-imposed-peace-2-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/07\/22\/sudans-dayton-a-roadmap-to-an-imposed-peace-2-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Sudan\u2019s Dayton: A Roadmap to an Imposed Peace? (2\/2)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>As I See<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Adil El-Baz<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1.<br \/>\nAt the end of the first part of this article, I said: \u201cThey are now trying to impose a modified \u2018Dayton model,\u2019 with various scenarios being drafted that resemble Dayton.\u201d<br \/>\nBut what is the Dayton model, and why is it being chosen?<\/p>\n<p>The Dayton Agreement (1995) was imposed by the United States following decisive military and diplomatic intervention. It brought the leaders of Bosnia\u2019s warring factions to a U.S. military base and forced an agreement under immense pressure\u2014an imposed, not negotiated, settlement. It ended the war by dividing power, deploying a peacekeeping force, and freezing the conflict based on realities of force.<\/p>\n<p>So why choose the Dayton model now?<\/p>\n<p>While the context of Yugoslavia differs, Sudan faces similar threats:<br \/>\nState disintegration, multiple armed factions, failure of various mediation efforts, and the transformation of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a dangerous and internationally-condemned militia committing genocide and ethnic cleansing\u2014much like the Serb militias in the 1990s. Recently, the RSF has also become a regional threat. The crisis deepened after their June 11, 2025 seizure of the border triangle between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, which Egypt saw as a direct national security threat. Then came the Central African Republic incident where the UN accused RSF of killing a Zambian peacekeeper (June 27), preceded by the drone attack on Port Sudan on May 4.<\/p>\n<p>All of this is happening at a moment when the Red Sea has gained major geopolitical importance, with Washington and its allies striving to curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region.<\/p>\n<p>2.<br \/>\nThe critical variable in this trajectory is the Trump-style intervention: \u201cDeals, not negotiations.\u201d<br \/>\nTrump dislikes long negotiations, preferring to impose final agreements swiftly and decisively\u2014just as he did with the Abraham Accords, the Taliban deal in Doha, and more recently in Congo and Rwanda.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, a likely approach by the Trump administration is a \u201cQuick Dayton\u201d: Bring the parties together, impose an agreement, and wield the carrot and stick through diplomatic coercion, monopolizing the negotiation process under U.S. leadership\u2014threatening sanctions or even military force\u2014while pushing through an agreement without concern for its long-term consequences.<\/p>\n<p>3.<br \/>\nThere\u2019s now a ready-made proposal for resolving Sudan\u2019s conflict: merge the Jeddah and \u201cQuad\u201d tracks (U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE)\u2014now expanded to include the UK and Qatar.<\/p>\n<p>The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has already proposed such a vision:<br \/>\nIntegrate the Jeddah and Quad tracks, form an executive secretariat in Jeddah to oversee the agreement, declare a UN-AU-monitored ceasefire, and convert the Jeddah Declaration into a binding political agreement under a UN Security Council resolution, with participation from civil society and minorities.<\/p>\n<p>4.<br \/>\nTo implement this plan, the six-party coalition must agree to a binding settlement under strict international supervision to enforce a ceasefire, backed by comprehensive sanctions (financial, military, political) and even threats of international trials\u2014again echoing the Bosnia model.<\/p>\n<p>Those who refuse would face the stick, while the carrot would be a reconstruction program with international guarantees, similar to the $5 billion Oslo pledge for Sudan&#8217;s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and promises of debt relief and strategic partnerships with the West and Gulf states.<\/p>\n<p>But here\u2019s the problem: the Saudi\/Egyptian\/Qatari stance doesn\u2019t fully align with the Emirati\/British\/American position.<br \/>\nThus, phase one must involve the U.S. brokering a unified plan among its allies\u2014based on the institute\u2019s proposal or otherwise\u2014which hasn\u2019t happened yet. This lack of consensus delayed the Quad\/Six-party meeting from July 20 to July 29, 2025.<\/p>\n<p>Once agreement is reached, a draft deal will be presented, accompanied by public pressure, aiming to impose a non-negotiable reality in true Trumpian fashion: an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, followed by talks based on the Jeddah framework, possibly incorporating the Manama conspiracy document, all under exclusive U.S. oversight\u2014Dayton style.<\/p>\n<p>5.<br \/>\nBut this scenario faces major hurdles\u2014chief among them: the basis of the ceasefire.<\/p>\n<p>Imposing a ceasefire based on current battlefield realities effectively saves the militia from defeat and grants it a legitimate negotiating position\u2014a step toward partitioning the country.<\/p>\n<p>How can the perpetrators of genocide be reintegrated at the top of the state after so much bloodshed and sacrifice?<br \/>\nThis is a delusion that neither the army nor the Dignity Alliance, currently fighting alongside it, will accept.<\/p>\n<p>Such a deal is impossible.<br \/>\nNo leader would dare sign an agreement that legitimizes the militia or its symbols. The Dignity Alliance would flatly reject any such plan.<\/p>\n<p>6.<br \/>\nThe government\u2019s stance is clear and has been publicly shared\u2014including at the UN and with all foreign visitors arriving in Port Sudan. This same position was declared in February 2025:<\/p>\n<p>No ceasefire unless the siege of El Fasher is lifted.<\/p>\n<p>A ceasefire must be followed by the RSF\u2019s immediate withdrawal from Khartoum, West Kordofan, and Darfur.<\/p>\n<p>RSF fighters must be gathered in designated camps outside cities, pending decisions on their future.<\/p>\n<p>The government might accept an initial ceasefire based on international guarantees\u2014but who will ensure the militia doesn\u2019t stall on lifting the El Fasher siege or withdrawing from Darfur and Kordofan?<br \/>\nCould they regroup and resume fighting?<\/p>\n<p>The RSF is fractured by regional and tribal lines, lacking field control over its forces\u2014so how can it possibly honor a ceasefire or stop its plundering, killing, and village attacks across Darfur and Kordofan?<\/p>\n<p>No one can guarantee that.<br \/>\nNot even thousands of peacekeepers could restrain such a criminal, lawless militia.<\/p>\n<p>Remember the notorious UNAMID experience\u2014billions spent, 22,000 troops deployed, yet the war continued and security worsened.<\/p>\n<p>So the war won\u2019t end with a ceasefire.<br \/>\nIt will only stop if RSF\u2019s regional sponsor is pressured to halt support and explicitly orders:<\/p>\n<p>All Janjaweed fighters out of cities and into camps.<\/p>\n<p>An end to RSF\u2019s future military and political role.<\/p>\n<p>A complete severance of ties.<\/p>\n<p>Otherwise, this \u201cTrumpian Dayton\u201d is nothing more than plowing saltwater\u2014a delusion.<\/p>\n<p>7.<br \/>\nAnother challenge facing this new Dayton is trust.<br \/>\nSudan has zero trust in the six-party coalition after decades of international deceit:<br \/>\nFrom Naivasha (2003), Oslo (2005), Paris (2021), Geneva (2024) to London (2025)\u2014all empty promises.<\/p>\n<p>International pressure is always swift and forceful, but their promises?<br \/>\nPure fiction.<\/p>\n<p>This time, Sudan must demand a real international reconstruction fund, with money deposited upfront before any comprehensive political deal\u2014one that excludes RSF completely.<\/p>\n<p>An agreement among Sudanese political actors only.<br \/>\nAnd before any pen is put to paper, the fund must be in place to rebuild what the UAE and RSF destroyed.<\/p>\n<p>Without this, we\u2019ll again be chasing wind.<br \/>\nIf the world wants to help, it should start with tangible action, not guardianship.<\/p>\n<p>The alternative?<br \/>\nLet the world leave us alone.<br \/>\nWe\u2019ll handle our own affairs\u2014reach our own solutions\u2014or not. That\u2019s our business.<\/p>\n<p>If the world truly sees this war as a threat to global security, then help us end it with real support for reconstruction and development, not hollow promises.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>As I See Adil El-Baz 1. At the end of the first part of this article, I said: \u201cThey are now trying to impose a modified \u2018Dayton model,\u2019 with various scenarios being drafted that resemble Dayton.\u201d But what is the Dayton model, and why is it being chosen? The Dayton Agreement (1995) was imposed by &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":8232,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-51769","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51769","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=51769"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51769\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":51770,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51769\/revisions\/51770"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8232"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=51769"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=51769"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=51769"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}