{"id":54584,"date":"2025-09-21T02:53:56","date_gmt":"2025-09-20T23:53:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=54584"},"modified":"2025-09-21T02:53:56","modified_gmt":"2025-09-20T23:53:56","slug":"the-independent-fact-finding-mission-on-sudan-2023-a-critical-reading-of-its-recommendations-and-prospects","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/09\/21\/the-independent-fact-finding-mission-on-sudan-2023-a-critical-reading-of-its-recommendations-and-prospects\/","title":{"rendered":"The Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan (2023): A Critical Reading of its Recommendations and Prospects"},"content":{"rendered":"<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>By Ambassador Dr. Moawia El-Bukhari<\/strong><\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Introduction<br \/>\nMore than two years into the war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023 following the rebellion of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva adopted Resolution A\/HRC\/RES\/54\/2 on October 12, 2023, establishing an Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan. The mission\u2019s final report (A\/HRC\/57\/23), released in July 2024, presented grave findings of violations that may amount to international crimes and offered a set of recommendations directed at the Sudanese state, the warring parties, and the international community.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">While the report is significant in documenting atrocities, it raises pressing questions regarding its consistency with international law, its credibility, its sources, and its reflection of Sudan\u2019s political and humanitarian reality\u2014especially given Khartoum\u2019s early rejection of the mission and refusal to cooperate. Another issue concerns the feasibility of implementing the recommendations on the ground amid the ongoing war, its devastating legacy, and the turbulent international and regional context.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">This paper offers a critical reading of the report by analyzing its key recommendations, assessing their feasibility, and comparing them with similar regional experiences, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of UN mechanisms in addressing complex crises often mired in politicization.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">I. Key Recommendations of the Report<br \/>\nThe mission\u2019s recommendations were structured across several areas, including:<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">1. An immediate and sustained ceasefire as the primary step to protect civilians and halt violations.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">2. An arms embargo on all parties, expanding the UN Security Council\u2019s existing Darfur embargo to cover all of Sudan.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">3. Strengthening accountability through extending the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) across Sudan, and recommending the establishment of a new international judicial mechanism.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">4. Empowering women and youth in peacebuilding, in line with UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000).<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">5. Recognizing sexual violence and child recruitment as war crimes and crimes against humanity, and demanding their immediate cessation.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">6. Ensuring the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers, with unhindered access to aid.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">7. Supporting host communities of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), while commending their humanitarian response.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">8. Advancing a comprehensive transitional justice process rooted in national dialogue and community consultations<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">II. Critical Analysis and Feasibility<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">1. Lack of Political Will and Structural Complexity of the Conflict<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Implementation of key recommendations, particularly the ceasefire, has been undermined by political deadlock and the absence of an enforcement mechanism. The failure of the Jeddah Declaration in May 2024, despite government willingness, reflects the RSF\u2019s continued reliance on military escalation to impose outcomes on the battlefield.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">2. Recommendations Without Enforcement Tools<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">While humanitarian in nature, the report falls short by not proposing mechanisms for monitoring or follow-up, nor an institutional framework for implementation, leaving many recommendations as moral appeals rather than actionable steps.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">3. Weak Transitional Justice Approach in the Sudanese Context<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The suggestion to establish an independent judicial mechanism alongside ICC jurisdiction neglects sensitivities around national sovereignty, the Sudanese Armed Forces\u2019 legitimacy in countering an armed rebellion, and the ICC\u2019s challenges in comparable cases such as Libya and Syria.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">4. Ignoring Regional and International Drivers of the War<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The report omits direct mention of states supplying arms and logistical support to the belligerents, despite international media coverage, NGO reports, and even statements by U.S. lawmakers. This gap undermines the inclusivity of accountability and weakens the report\u2019s credibility.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">III. Comparisons with Regional Experiences<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Libya (2020): The UN Fact-Finding Mission documented serious violations, but political divisions and parallel governments prevented implementation\u2014paralleling Sudan\u2019s current trajectory.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Syria: Despite accurate documentation, Security Council vetoes blocked ICC referral, a likely outcome in Sudan\u2019s case.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Myanmar: Reports exposed crimes against the Rohingya but yielded little political traction, reinforcing the lesson that strong reports without enforcement mechanisms remain ineffective.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">IV. Alternative Recommendations and Practical Proposals<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">1. Integrate the mission\u2019s recommendations into a national and African Union\u2013led regional initiative prioritizing civilian protection, ending the war, and holding perpetrators accountable.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">2. Establish a Sudanese-led independent transitional justice commission, engaging with regional or international partners and ensuring victims\u2019 participation.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">3. Create a neutral monitoring mechanism on arms flows into Sudan, under joint regional and international supervision, with sanctions on violators.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">4. Recognize and strengthen Sudanese civil society\u2019s central role in justice and democratic transition.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">5. Expand accountability to include external actors financing or arming the RSF, through sanctions and boycotts.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">V. Developments at the Human Rights Council\u2019s 60th Session<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">At the Council\u2019s 60th session, UN experts reported deliberate targeting of civilians by the \u201cconflicting parties,\u201d alongside widespread violations including war crimes and destruction of infrastructure. A separate expert panel visiting Port Sudan expressed concern over worsening rights conditions.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Sudan\u2019s Attorney General, Intisar Ahmed Abdel-Aal\u2014also chair of the national investigative committee on war crimes\u2014briefed the Council on domestic prosecutions and ongoing cases. She urged condemnation of the UAE\u2019s support for the RSF, citing evidence of arms supplies and mercenary recruitment, and demanded an end to such assistance. She also called for terminating the UN Fact-Finding Mission\u2019s mandate, describing it as politicized and biased, while affirming Sudan\u2019s judiciary is capable of ensuring accountability.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Conclusion<br \/>\nThe Fact-Finding Mission\u2019s report aspires to be a landmark document in legal and human rights terms, yet it is not free from political bias, lacks a concrete implementation plan, and overlooks the complex political and regional realities underpinning Sudan\u2019s conflict. Its true value lies in preserving a rights-based historical record and opening the door to broader debate on justice and accountability.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">However, meaningful impact depends on intersecting national, regional, and international willpower\u2014particularly in condemning and penalizing those who fueled the war\u2014and on enabling Sudanese people to determine their future in peace and justice, in accordance with their traditions, values, and sovereignty. International support remains essential in providing technical assistance, capacity-building, and training to strengthen Sudan\u2019s human rights framework, despite the grave legacy of atrocities committed by the RSF with external backing.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Ambassador Dr. Moawia El-Bukhari Introduction More than two years into the war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023 following the rebellion of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva adopted Resolution A\/HRC\/RES\/54\/2 on October 12, 2023, establishing an Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan. The mission\u2019s final &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":51305,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-54584","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/54584","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=54584"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/54584\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":54585,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/54584\/revisions\/54585"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/51305"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=54584"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=54584"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=54584"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}