{"id":55373,"date":"2025-10-07T00:13:17","date_gmt":"2025-10-06T21:13:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=55373"},"modified":"2025-10-07T00:13:17","modified_gmt":"2025-10-06T21:13:17","slug":"the-dissolution-of-the-armed-forces-would-be-a-grave-mistake","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/10\/07\/the-dissolution-of-the-armed-forces-would-be-a-grave-mistake\/","title":{"rendered":"The Dissolution of the Armed Forces Would Be a Grave Mistake"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Abdullah Ali Ibrahim<\/strong><\/p>\n

Summary<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

\u201cThe wise are cautioned by the rebuke of others.\u201d
\nIf what we have reviewed above is the record of the \u201cNo to War\u201d forces and their pattern of dissolving institutions that they grew to resent, then they must pause before calling for the dissolution of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Every institution they dismantled eventually returned\u2014sometimes more aggressive than before. But the army is a different kind of beast. To dissolve it, especially under current conditions with the Rapid Support Forces in existence, would unleash consequences no one can predict.<\/p>\n

A broad consensus has emerged among the \u201cNo to War\u201d groups \u2014 including \u201cSumood\u201d (Steadfastness) led by Abdullah Hamdok \u2014 calling for the dissolution of the Sudanese Armed Forces. In their Addis Ababa Declaration of January 2, 2024, signed jointly with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the army was described merely as one element in Sudan\u2019s \u201cplurality of armies,\u201d alongside the RSF and various Darfur rebel movements. The declaration called for dissolving all these forces and forming a single, professional, national army.<\/p>\n

Their rationale is well known: they see the army as a hotbed of coups that ushered in dictatorships, burdening the nation for most of its post-independence history. They blame it for protracted internal wars, for spawning the RSF to fight on its behalf when it failed to shoulder the military burden itself, for turning its guns on its own citizens and losing precious parts of the homeland such as Halayeb and Shalateen, and for its failure to protect civilians from RSF atrocities when called upon to defend their honor.<\/p>\n

Some advocated dissolving the army long before the current war, while others have only recently embraced the idea.
\nBefore the conflict, academic Dr. Haidar Ibrahim said in a \u201cKobayat Shai\u201d (Cup of Tea) talk hosted by Al-Tayar newspaper that, once peace is achieved, Sudan will have no need for an expensive army \u2014 not even to pay the pensions of its overpaid officers.
\nJournalist Rasha Awad, in her article \u201cDissolving the Army: The Long-Overdue National Duty,\u201d argued that the Sudanese Armed Forces are neither national nor professional, and that if the country had true founding fathers, their first act on January 1, 1956, would have been to dissolve an army \u201cdesigned to guard colonial power and suppress the people.\u201d<\/p>\n

But beyond such reasoning \u2014 much of which may contain elements of truth \u2014 one must ask:
\nIs this the first time these forces have demanded the dissolution of a state or civil institution that frustrated them?
\nIs their call to dissolve the army today the result of careful analysis, or merely another expression of a habitual political impulse \u2014 a reflex to abolish every institution that provokes their anger?
\nIn short, is this a policy or a pattern?<\/p>\n

Upon examining the record of the \u201cNo to War\u201d movement, one finds that their impulse to dissolve the armed forces stems from habit, not strategy.
\nThey have repeatedly dismantled institutions \u2014 both governmental and civic \u2014 out of resentment rather than statecraft. Each time, the institutions they thought buried forever returned to life, often stronger and more menacing than before.
\nTheir comeback reveals what those who dismantled them failed to grasp: that each had a logic and function essential to the fabric of state and society. Recognizing that logic is the hallmark of a statesman.<\/p>\n

The \u201cNo to War\u201d camp and its predecessors have dissolved several key institutions:
\nOmdurman Islamic University (1969), the University of Khartoum Students\u2019 Union (1969), the Native Administration (1971), and the National Security Service (1984).<\/p>\n

The Dissolution of Omdurman Islamic University (1969)<\/strong><\/p>\n

When President Nimeiri came to power in 1969, he was backed by the leftist forces that are today\u2019s political ancestors of Sumood and the Radical Bloc \u2014 particularly the Communist Party.
\nHis regime reduced Omdurman Islamic University to its earlier status as a \u201cScientific Institute,\u201d limiting its curriculum to religion and Arabic language.
\nThe university had long been politically hostile to the left. Its scholars had supported the government\u2019s 1965 dissolution of the Communist Party and the 1968 ruling by the Supreme Sharia Court that declared Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, founder of the Republican Brotherhood, an apostate.
\nBut by 1971, when the Communists broke with Nimeiri, the university was reinstated as before.<\/p>\n

What those who dismantled it failed to see was that it had matured into a vital institution.
\nIts students \u2014 largely from poor rural families \u2014 had for decades fought to upgrade their institute to university status, seeking the same career opportunities monopolized by graduates of Gordon Memorial College and the University of Khartoum.
\nFor them, an Islamic University was not merely a religious aspiration but a path to social mobility and dignity.<\/p>\n

The Dissolution of the Native Administration (1971)<\/strong><\/p>\n

The same leftist camp dissolved the Native Administration in 1971.
\nTheir resentment ran deep against this system, which had been restructured by the British colonial administration in the early 20th century.
\nModernist forces viewed tribal chiefs and Sufi leaders \u2014 the rural elites \u2014 as collaborators of the British and as obstacles to national progress.
\nThey despised their influence over rural constituencies, which empowered traditional parties and blocked leftist access to the countryside.<\/p>\n

But the decision to abolish the system was driven by spite, not policy.
\nOne minister who attended the cabinet session later recalled that the proposal was presented orally, without discussion, and that President Nimeiri had already approved it behind the scenes.
\nBy 1981, the Native Administration had been restored by law after the replacement structures collapsed \u2014 and it has remained, crooked but enduring, ever since.<\/p>\n

The Dissolution of the University of Khartoum Students\u2019 Union (1969)<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the same year, students aligned with the left \u2014 today\u2019s forerunners of the \u201cNo to War\u201d groups \u2014 dissolved the University of Khartoum Students\u2019 Union, aiming to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood, who had taken an anti-Nimeiri stance.
\nAt that time, left-leaning students dominated the campus under the banner of the Progressive Front Secretariat.
\nThe Union operated on a system of proportional representation, which guaranteed minority groups, including Islamists, a share of seats.
\nTo silence them, the left dissolved the Union altogether, vowing that \u201cthe university shall not be a reactionary island in a revolutionary sea.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet by 1973, the Union was restored \u2014 this time under a winner-takes-all system \u2014 which allowed a single bloc to sweep all 40 seats.
\nFrom then on, the Islamists dominated almost every election, to the point where one observer remarked that \u201celections at Khartoum University have ceased to be an event.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Dissolution of the National Security Service (1985)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Following the April 1985 Uprising, the new government dissolved President Nimeiri\u2019s National Security Service within 24 hours.
\nIronically, the officer tasked with securing its headquarters and files was none other than Major Omar al-Bashir, Sudan\u2019s future president.<\/p>\n

The opposition\u2019s hatred of the agency was understandable; its abuses were notorious, and its name had become synonymous with repression.
\nRumors that it was plotting a coup with a force of 5,000 men sealed its fate. In reality, it had only 3,100 personnel \u2014 barely 60 of them combat-trained.
\nIt had kept detailed surveillance files on 18,675 dissidents and had even facilitated the airlift of Ethiopian Jews (Falasha) to Israel, offending many Sudanese sensibilities.<\/p>\n

Yet the rush to dismantle it ignored its non-political intelligence functions.
\nSuddenly, Sudan lost networks of foreign and economic intelligence, and sleeper agents embedded in neighboring countries and within the SPLA.
\nThe institution was soon resurrected \u2014 fiercer than ever \u2014 under the Islamist regime of 1989, evolving into the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) with its infamous \u201cOperations Authority\u201d of 18,000 men and the torture chambers known as \u201cGhost Houses.\u201d<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe wise are cautioned by the rebuke of others.\u201d<\/p>\n

If this is the record of the \u201cNo to War\u201d movement \u2014 dismantling institutions out of anger only to see them return stronger \u2014 they should refrain from calling for the dissolution of the armed forces.
\nEvery institution they have destroyed has come back, often more brutal.
\nBut the army is unlike any other.
\nIts return after dissolution \u2014 especially under the current reality of the Rapid Support Forces \u2014 is a scenario too perilous for anyone to even imagine.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Abdullah Ali Ibrahim Summary \u201cThe wise are cautioned by the rebuke of others.\u201d If what we have reviewed above is the record of the \u201cNo to War\u201d forces and their pattern of dissolving institutions that they grew to resent, then they must pause before calling for the dissolution of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Every …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":13023,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55373","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55373","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=55373"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55373\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":55374,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55373\/revisions\/55374"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13023"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=55373"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=55373"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=55373"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}