{"id":55511,"date":"2025-10-10T02:07:01","date_gmt":"2025-10-09T23:07:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=55511"},"modified":"2025-10-10T02:07:01","modified_gmt":"2025-10-09T23:07:01","slug":"sumood-al-hilu-tasis-establishment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/10\/10\/sumood-al-hilu-tasis-establishment\/","title":{"rendered":"Sumood + Al-Hilu = Ta\u2019sis (Establishment)"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Mohamed Wadaa<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is difficult to understand how the Sudan People\u2019s Liberation Movement\u2013North (SPLM\u2013N) under Abdelaziz al-Hilu can be accepted as a participant in the Sudanese\u2013Sudanese dialogue, given that he serves as Hemedti\u2019s deputy in the Ta\u2019sis (Establishment) alliance\u2014whose military forces include the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as the troops of Al-Hadi Idris, Al-Tahir Hajar, and Al-Hilu himself. The alliance has issued multiple joint military statements under the name Ta\u2019sis, yet participation is denied to Ta\u2019sis or any of its other member groups. Politically and militarily, there is no substantial difference between the forces of Al-Hilu, Al-Hadi Idris, Al-Tahir Hajar, or the RSF, given their shared record in what can be described as an aggression against the Sudanese people\u2014marked by looting, displacement, sexual violence, and the deliberate destruction of infrastructure and the national economy. All of them bear responsibility for these acts.<\/p>\n

Perhaps this was one of the rare instances in which journalist Ahmed Taha of Al Jazeera Mubasher appeared balanced in his exchange with Dr. Mohamed Zakaria, the spokesperson for the Democratic Bloc\u2014or perhaps Zakaria was constrained in what he could say, which seems more likely. Either way, the outcome weakened the prevailing war narrative. This came as columnist Attaf Mohamed Mukhtar published a post stating that \u201cthere have been numerous communications and meetings between members of the Sovereignty Council and leaders within Ta\u2019sis and Sumood.\u201d Without delving into the credibility or implications of this statement, there appears to be a hidden link between Mukhtar\u2019s post and Zakaria\u2019s remarks.<\/p>\n

These developments followed the failure of the African Union\u2013sponsored Sudanese dialogue, after several invited groups withdrew their participation. One of the main objections was the AU Commission\u2019s decision to invite Ta\u2019sis to attend the meeting\u2014an invitation reportedly opposed by both the Arab League and the United Nations, according to leaks.<\/p>\n

Such efforts came on the heels of the \u201cQuartet\u201d statement, which placed the militia (RSF) and the army on equal footing, proposing either their joint inclusion in the political process or their simultaneous exclusion. This approach disregards the extensive documentation of RSF crimes, its recruitment of mercenaries, and its widespread atrocities.<\/p>\n

These shifting scenarios and evolving positions appear aimed at merging the military and political tracks, or at least constructing a new narrative that would normalize the inclusion of part of the Ta\u2019sis alliance under Al-Hilu\u2019s leadership. So far, however, all such attempts\u2014including that of Mr. Pauls, adviser to former U.S. President Donald Trump\u2014have failed. Many observers interpret the Sudanese government\u2019s silence regarding Pauls\u2019 remarks about rapprochement with the militia as a deliberate decision to avoid falling into a trap. Any effort to \u201crebrand\u201d Al-Hilu after his alliance with the RSF is bound to fail.<\/p>\n

Sudanese people still have the opportunity to conduct an inclusive national dialogue free from foreign interference. That, perhaps, remains the only viable path for political and civil forces to play a meaningful role in ending the war.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Mohamed Wadaa It is difficult to understand how the Sudan People\u2019s Liberation Movement\u2013North (SPLM\u2013N) under Abdelaziz al-Hilu can be accepted as a participant in the Sudanese\u2013Sudanese dialogue, given that he serves as Hemedti\u2019s deputy in the Ta\u2019sis (Establishment) alliance\u2014whose military forces include the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as the troops of Al-Hadi …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":6668,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55511","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55511","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=55511"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55511\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":55512,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55511\/revisions\/55512"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6668"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=55511"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=55511"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=55511"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}