{"id":56106,"date":"2025-10-22T02:29:15","date_gmt":"2025-10-21T23:29:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=56106"},"modified":"2025-10-22T02:29:15","modified_gmt":"2025-10-21T23:29:15","slug":"international-models-for-drafting-media-laws-and-regulations-to-protect-national-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/10\/22\/international-models-for-drafting-media-laws-and-regulations-to-protect-national-security\/","title":{"rendered":"International Models for Drafting Media Laws and Regulations to Protect National Security"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Sabah Al-Makki<\/strong><\/p>\n

First: Israel \u2014 Institutional Censorship in the Name of National Security<\/p>\n

Israel is among the earliest countries to establish a formal, integrated censorship system known as \u201cmilitary censorship.\u201d This unit is part of the Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) within the Israeli army and operates under the British Emergency Regulations of 1945, which the state retained after its founding.<\/p>\n

This system requires all newspapers, channels, radio stations \u2014 and even foreign correspondents \u2014 to submit material related to security and military matters to a military censor before publication. The censor has the authority to ban, delete, or postpone any material deemed harmful to national security or to \u201cpublic morale.\u201d<\/p>\n

Although the Israeli Supreme Court attempted to set a balancing principle called \u201cnear-certain likelihood of harm,\u201d limiting censorship to cases where the danger from publication is almost certain, this principle is effectively suspended during wartime. Any coverage that might reveal losses or weaken the army\u2019s public image is prohibited.<\/p>\n

From the Lebanon War, through the Gaza incursions, to the 2023 war, the pattern has been consistent: Israeli media speak in the voice of the military institution \u2014 not the other way around. In major crises, censorship extends to digital platforms, with the Defense Ministry coordinating with local tech companies to monitor accounts accused of \u201cserving the enemy\u201d or \u201cnegatively affecting the home front.\u201d<\/p>\n

Journalists are banned from publishing any photo or geolocation of strikes unless officially approved; authorities use \u201cimpression management\u201d mechanisms instead of outright bans. In the recent Israel\u2013Gaza war, censorship intensified to cover details such as rocket impacts, combat locations, military casualties, and even images of destruction in settlements. Official directives barred live coverage without prior authorization.<\/p>\n

In 2024, the Knesset passed a new law empowering the government to close foreign media outlets and seize their equipment if deemed a \u201csecurity threat,\u201d a provision later applied against Al Jazeera\u2019s office. Thus, military censorship has evolved from a security-control tool into a political instrument that shapes the official narrative, silences dissenting voices, and grants the government near-absolute authority over information flow both domestically and internationally.<\/p>\n

Israel provides a model of meticulous institutional censorship under a legal cover, exercised in the name of national security but in practice amounting to comprehensive management of the official narrative \u2014 allowing the world to hear only what the military institution permits and to see only what it allows. In this way, press freedom in Israel becomes a tool of national mobilization rather than a means of accountability, even as the state presents itself to the world as a \u201cdemocratic oasis.\u201d<\/p>\n

Second: Ukraine \u2014 Unified Messaging under Martial Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

When war erupted in Ukraine in February 2022, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared martial law and merged the main national channels into a unified broadcast called \u201cUnited News \u2014 the Unified News Marathon,\u201d so that all channels delivered a single, continuous media message.<\/p>\n

The official aim was to \u201ccounter Russian disinformation and unify the national discourse,\u201d but in practice this temporarily suspended media pluralism in favor of a government-controlled unified narrative.<\/p>\n

During the war, the state seized some opposition channels or outlets owned by business figures with ties to Russia, and enacted laws requiring media institutions to coordinate with the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting before publishing sensitive material, with fines and license revocations for violators.<\/p>\n

Simultaneously, Kyiv supported digital initiatives like the \u201cStopFake\u201d platform for fact-checking and combating foreign propaganda and launched training programs for journalists to strengthen \u201cnational media awareness.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s model strikes a balance between censorship and mobilization: it did not completely close off the independent media sphere, but it set clear national limits during wartime. The battle was fought not only on the ground but also in the digital space, where Kyiv used social media as a weapon to bolster morale and mobilize international support.<\/p>\n

It is an example of \u201corganized media mobilization\u201d \u2014 politically managed, yet leaving a margin for professional journalism; a fragile but effective balance under wartime conditions.<\/p>\n

Third: Russia \u2014 Comprehensive Censorship and the Information War<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has imposed one of the broadest media censorship systems in modern history.<\/p>\n

In March of that year, parliament passed wartime media laws criminalizing \u201cspreading unreliable information about the army\u201d or \u201cdefaming its reputation,\u201d with penalties up to 15 years in prison. Measures included shuttering independent outlets such as Novaya Gazeta and Dozhd (TV Rain), blocking Western sites like the BBC and DW, and expanding the electronic oversight apparatus run by Roskomnadzor to monitor content, block sites, and track digital accounts.<\/p>\n

Moscow did more than block content; it developed an integrated information-management system rooted in national media mobilization. The official narrative was unified across state channels and major talk shows, and \u201cmedia compliance\u201d was tied to the notion of \u201cnational loyalty.\u201d<\/p>\n

The state also built alternative outlets aimed at foreign audiences, such as RT and Sputnik, to present a Russian counter-narrative to what it calls \u201cWestern media hegemony.\u201d<\/p>\n

The government defended these policies as defensive measures to protect the home front from an information war targeting Russia politically, culturally, and economically. Western institutions view this censorship as repression of freedoms, but the reality shows that Russia succeeded in turning information into a distinct battlefield: it controls news flow, prevents internal fragmentation, and uses media both as a domestic mobilization tool and as an instrument of external influence.<\/p>\n

Russia therefore offers a comprehensive model of \u201cweaponizing information\u201d \u2014 based on institutional control, disciplined messaging, and direct linking of media to national security. Despite the controversy over the limits of such censorship, the experience demonstrates that states that fail to control information in wartime risk being defeated in the informational arena even before the battlefield.<\/p>\n

Fourth: Recent Field Practices \u2014 Qatar and the Abu Dhabi System<\/strong><\/p>\n

1. Qatar \u2014 Security-driven Secrecy after an Israeli Strike<\/p>\n

In September 2025, when Israel launched an airstrike on Doha targeting individuals linked to Hamas, Qatari authorities handled the incident with strict security measures.<\/p>\n

In the initial hours, access by international media \u2014 including Al Jazeera \u2014 to the strike site was restricted until Qatari security agencies completed on-site operations and damage assessments. Coverage was permitted later only through coordinated, supervised visits arranged by official bodies, citing security and diplomatic considerations.<\/p>\n

This approach is not exceptional but common in states facing sensitive sovereignty incidents: when information intersects national security, secrecy is prioritized over transparency, even in systems that publicly claim to support press freedom. The same calculus recurs elsewhere when imagery becomes a tool of political or security leverage.<\/p>\n

2. The Abu Dhabi System \u2014 Image before Truth<\/p>\n

The Abu Dhabi regime adopts a strict supervisory approach toward media whenever its political security or international image is at stake. In incidents such as an armored-warehouse fire in Abu Dhabi or major industrial accidents, authorities completely control field access and investigations.<\/p>\n

No international or local media outlet is allowed on the ground or to conduct independent investigations without direct official authorization \u2014 which is often granted exclusively to outlets aligned with the regime or designated partners under so-called \u201capproved media cooperation.\u201d<\/p>\n

This policy rests on four pillars:<\/strong><\/p>\n

1. Total access control \u2014 no journalist enters without official clearance.<\/p>\n

2. Narrative management through official channels \u2014 images and clips are curated and released to fit the regime\u2019s preferred framing.<\/p>\n

3. Selective engagement \u2014 coverage is granted to sympathetic outlets while independent media are kept at bay.<\/p>\n

4. Prioritizing international image over truth \u2014 political interests come before the public\u2019s right to know.<\/p>\n

Thus, Abu Dhabi \u2014 though it funds and claims to support press freedom abroad \u2014 operates an inwardly closed media model that remakes events to suit its needs and conceals any scene that might harm its international image. This is precisely the modus operandi used today in its campaigns against Sudan: money, imagery, and selective censorship crafted to appear as \u201cfield facts\u201d while being politically motivated propaganda.<\/p>\n

What we observe goes further: Abu Dhabi manages funded media campaigns, directly supports local militias, and systematically fuels conflicts in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and other African states. It uses media as a soft veneer for hard, funded destructive projects aimed at advancing its covert agendas and expanding regional influence at the cost of regional stability.<\/p>\n

When a state has both wealth and influence, its first instinct in a crisis is to close the independent camera and then shape the official narrative under the banner of \u201cnational interest.\u201d Practices converge: truth is suppressed first, and then a selected image is presented to the world as the \u201ctrusted news,\u201d turning information from a means of awareness into organized disinformation managed from rooms fortified by money and influence.<\/p>\n

Fifth: Transitioning to the Sudanese Case<\/strong><\/p>\n

From the above, it is clear that media censorship is not exclusive to authoritarian states; it becomes a standard behavior adopted by regimes whenever their image or interests are threatened, justified under the slogan of \u201cprotecting national security\u201d or used to carry out destructive agendas as Abu Dhabi does in the region.<\/p>\n

The examples of Israel, Russia, and Ukraine demonstrate that media-control systems have ceased to be temporary exceptions and have become sovereign tools used to protect the official narrative and consolidate political and security influence domestically and abroad.<\/p>\n

If those states have \u2014 each in its way \u2014 unified their media messaging and prevented moral\/psychological penetration, Sudan now stands at the same frontline, waging a complex war that combines military confrontations with a narrative battle driven from abroad with money, media, and militias.<\/p>\n

Therefore, censorship is no longer merely an emergency option; it is a struggle over consciousness, identity, and national sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Between external disinformation and internal silence, Sudan must redefine its media battle: to build a solid national oversight system that preserves sovereignty and counters lies and misinformation with professionalism, discipline, and inclusive national consciousness.<\/p>\n

Conclusion \u2014 Part One<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, the information war is not the exclusive domain of great powers but a destiny for any state besieged or targeted in its consciousness and existence. If Israel, Russia, and Ukraine settled on building censorship and media-control systems to protect their home fronts, Sudan today needs to do the same according to its national vision and specific challenges.<\/p>\n

The war against Sudan is not only fought on the ground but also on identity, awareness, and belonging.<\/p>\n

In Part Two \u2014 a message to the Minister of Information: The time has come for the media to shift from an administrative margin to an advanced national front. The war on Sudan is not only military; it is a war on consciousness and identity, conducted with words and images as much as with guns.<\/p>\n

What is needed now is not rhetoric or slogans but an integrated regulatory and media framework that leads the battle for awareness with a unified national consciousness, turning media into a sovereign shield that protects the homeland rather than a tool for its penetration.<\/p>\n

The media must rise to the level of the blood and sacrifices of our people in the field. Citizens no longer want silent or submissive media; they want media that expresses the sacrifices of the people and reflects the truth of the dignity struggle Sudanese are waging to defend their land and honor. Citizens have paid a high price \u2014 it is time for media to rise to meet those sacrifices, not to remain silent or offer excuses.<\/p>\n

In the next article we will place the ball in the Ministry of Information\u2019s court. We will examine current challenges, corrective steps, and then ask: will the ministry and media leaders take initiative and lead, or will they join the ranks of the silent and deepen the crisis and bleed the wound further?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Sabah Al-Makki First: Israel \u2014 Institutional Censorship in the Name of National Security Israel is among the earliest countries to establish a formal, integrated censorship system known as \u201cmilitary censorship.\u201d This unit is part of the Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) within the Israeli army and operates under the British Emergency Regulations of 1945, which …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":46578,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-56106","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56106","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=56106"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56106\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":56107,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56106\/revisions\/56107"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/46578"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=56106"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=56106"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=56106"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}