{"id":58014,"date":"2025-12-01T00:01:42","date_gmt":"2025-11-30T21:01:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=58014"},"modified":"2025-12-01T00:08:46","modified_gmt":"2025-11-30T21:08:46","slug":"why-do-islamists-reject-the-ceasefire-and-what-would-they-lose","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2025\/12\/01\/why-do-islamists-reject-the-ceasefire-and-what-would-they-lose\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Do Islamists Reject the Ceasefire\u2014and What Would They Lose?"},"content":{"rendered":"

As I See<\/strong><\/p>\n

Adel El-Baz<\/strong><\/p>\n

1
\nThe Islamists\u2019 opponents argue that their rejection of a \u201cceasefire\u201d stems from a desire to return to power \u2014 and that the only path back is through war. Therefore, they supposedly support its continuation. That, at least, is how Bakri Al-Jak framed it yesterday in his response to journalist Diaa Al-Din Bilal.<\/p>\n

2
\nI cannot understand how any rational observer might believe that political rivals would willingly hurl themselves into the furnace of a war that could wipe them out entirely \u2014 destroying their core strength \u2014 simply to return to power without the force required to protect or sustain that return. The \u201csmart\u201d strategy would be for the Islamists to preserve their strength and allow the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to exhaust each other. Once both sides are depleted, the Islamists\u2019 own forces could devour them. Isn\u2019t that the simplest logic?
\nBut this is koz-phobia \u2014 an obsessive fear of the Islamists \u2014 which blinds both eyes and hearts.<\/p>\n

3
\nWhat would Islamists lose if a ceasefire were signed?
\nMobilized Islamist volunteers would leave the battlefields, put down their weapons, and return to their studies, jobs, and professions \u2014 among them students, engineers, and academics \u2014 leaving the state to grapple with its internal and external political battles alone. From the outset, Islamists have declared that they seek no return to power except through elections \u2014 a position reaffirmed in their last Shura Council meeting after the political transition. They have repeatedly stated they do not wish to participate in any transitional authority.<\/p>\n

4
\nLet us assume the current government accepts a ceasefire and the Islamists withdraw from the warfront. A civilian government emerges, and \u2014 by some miracle \u2014 Western powers succeed in installing their \u201cclient,\u201d Abdalla Hamdok, as prime minister. What exactly would this unfortunate man do with the Islamists?<\/p>\n

He would either
\n\u2022 attempt to uproot them entirely \u2014 fulfilling the prophecy of the \u201cSecond Message\u201d preacher who vowed to tear them out of Sudan \u201conce and for all\u201d;
\nor
\n\u2022 accept them as a deeply embedded political force woven into Sudan\u2019s social fabric \u2014 a reality impossible to erase.<\/p>\n

According to the logic of the UAE\u2019s regional clients, the army is \u201cIslamist,\u201d and the intelligence service is \u201cIslamist.\u201d This means that if Hamdok chose confrontation, he would be facing both military and security institutions \u2014 thereby igniting a new war. Yet this is the same man who filled the world with cries of \u201cNo to war\u201d while lacking even the faintest means to wage one. He has no RSF guns \u2014 for Western powers will never accept a militia accused of genocide as part of a governing authority \u2014 nor does he have the whip or the street leverage of the revolution.
\nIf these are the options before the Islamists\u2019 opponents, then what options do the Islamists themselves have?<\/p>\n

5
\nIf the transitional authority \u2014 formed without them \u2014 simply leaves them to operate freely in political space without intimidation, violence, or targeted removal, then the Islamists will likely re-enter the scene by mobilizing their base. They will focus on community engagement, humanitarian work, and reorganizing their structures in preparation for future elections, even if ten years away.
\nThey would gladly leave the burden of governance to their rivals \u2014 a heavy load in the extremely delicate and unstable post-war phase \u2014 knowing full well these rivals lack even the competence to manage a \u201cwater jug.\u201d Their fate would mirror the parties of the December revolution, whose strength evaporated far quicker than they imagined.
\nThus, the ceasefire would be an added advantage to the Islamists \u2014 on top of whatever gains they believe the war (against the RSF) may have already delivered.<\/p>\n

6
\nBut if their rivals decide to settle scores using state power backed by external support, Islamists are unlikely to surrender themselves to bloodshed. They will defend themselves as they know how, bearing in mind they are the most experienced fighters, the most familiar with the machinery of the state, and currently the closest to the public \u2014 fighting alongside them and offering some of their best youth as martyrs in the \u201cbattles of dignity.\u201d
\nWhoever chooses to confront such a force is either insane \u2014 or foolish.<\/p>\n

7
\nThe question of the Islamists\u2019 stance on the ceasefire cannot be separated from a larger question:
\nWho is capable of bearing the costs of the post-war transition?
\nCeasefires are not merely pauses in gunfire; they usher in a new phase in which all actors must reveal their cards:
\n\u2022 Who has a real popular base?
\n\u2022 Who can sustain organizational resilience?
\n\u2022 Who has a vision for a state \u2014 not merely a lust for power?<\/p>\n

The more the ceasefire looks like a settlement designed to exclude a major political and social force, the greater the likelihood that it will produce a fragile peace on paper \u2014 and a smoldering war beneath the ashes.<\/p>\n

8
\nThe truth that exclusionists ignore is this:
\nIslamists \u2014 whether one agrees with them or not \u2014 are part of Sudan\u2019s social, political, and organizational makeup.
\nWar cannot uproot them.
\nDecrees cannot erase them.
\nA fragile transitional government cannot push them out of history.
\nPolitical forces are not measured merely by their presence in power, but by their presence in society, their reach within state institutions, their organizational capacity, and their popular depth.
\nAnyone who doesn\u2019t understand this needs to reassess both their political awareness and their facts.<\/p>\n

9
\nThose who believe war can erase Islamists \u2014 and those who imagine a ceasefire will end them \u2014 must realize that any project built on hatred and exclusion will only spawn another war. Perhaps even a fractured homeland from which no one emerges victorious.
\nThe ceasefire is not the Islamists\u2019 battle alone; it is a test of Sudan\u2019s entire political consciousness.
\nDo we want genuine peace \u2014 or merely a break before the next war?<\/p>\n

10
\nThe Islamists\u2019 rejection of the ceasefire \u2014 as proposed by international and regional actors \u2014 rests on several arguments expressed in their statements: First: fear for the unity of the country. They believe a ceasefire without dismantling the RSF would result in
\n\u2022 continued state fragmentation,
\n\u2022 the RSF surviving as a parallel force,
\n\u2022 local authorities forming by force of arms,
\n\u2022 and granting political legitimacy to an armed group accused of grave atrocities in Darfur and Khartoum.<\/p>\n

Second: fear of the RSF being reintegrated into political life. Any ceasefire imposed before dismantling the militia would allow its return
\n\u2022 to political influence,
\n\u2022 to economic dominance through gold and trade networks,
\n\u2022 and to military presence under the guise of an \u201cinternal security force.\u201d
\nIslamists describe this as an attempt to reintroduce the militia through international settlements.<\/p>\n

Third: they view the RSF as a foreign proxy\u2014
\n\u201ca cat\u2019s paw of external powers used to advance regional and international agendas that undermine Sudan\u2019s sovereignty.\u201d
\nAny ceasefire that preserves the RSF or grants it special status within the security architecture, they argue, poses a strategic threat equivalent to de facto partition.<\/p>\n

11
\nIn truth, these arguments are the same ones the Sudanese state itself has outlined in its official roadmap \u2014 and they reflect the beliefs of the Sudanese public and of any patriot opposed to the RSF\u2019s return to political or military life.
\nThis alignment between Islamist rhetoric, state discourse, and public sentiment explains why their messaging resonates widely.<\/p>\n

12
\nUltimately, the debate over the ceasefire is not about Islamists alone \u2014 it is about Sudan\u2019s future.
\nWill this country return to being a unified state with a single army and cohesive institutions?
\nOr will it become a marketplace of foreign deals and militias dividing power among themselves?<\/p>\n

A ceasefire that preserves the RSF is, knowingly or unknowingly, a ceasefire that preserves the root of the war \u2014 regenerating its causes and paving the way for the next round of bloodshed.<\/p>\n

Real peace rejects the sharing of power with guns, rejects the existence of a state within a state, and refuses any compromise on Sudan\u2019s unity and the dignity of its people.
\nAnyone who fails to grasp this will soon discover that a ceasefire is not always a path to salvation \u2014 it may well be the shortest road to another war, and to a homeland unlike the one we know.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As I See Adel El-Baz 1 The Islamists\u2019 opponents argue that their rejection of a \u201cceasefire\u201d stems from a desire to return to power \u2014 and that the only path back is through war. Therefore, they supposedly support its continuation. That, at least, is how Bakri Al-Jak framed it yesterday in his response to journalist …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":58017,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-58014","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58014","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=58014"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58014\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":58015,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58014\/revisions\/58015"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/58017"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=58014"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=58014"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=58014"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}