{"id":59543,"date":"2026-01-03T01:22:07","date_gmt":"2026-01-02T22:22:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=59543"},"modified":"2026-01-03T01:22:33","modified_gmt":"2026-01-02T22:22:33","slug":"59543","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/01\/03\/59543\/","title":{"rendered":"Incomplete Independence and the Absent Vision: How Tactical Alliances Squandered the Opportunity to Build the Sudanese State"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dr Ismail Satti<\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Did Sudan truly gain its independence in 1956?
\nThis question may sound provocative, yet it is essential to understanding the predicament of the modern Sudanese state.
\nIf Sudan attained its formal independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium more than seven decades ago, was declaring independence from within parliament and raising the flag atop the Republican Palace sufficient to realise independence in its deeper sense? Or did genuine independence require liberation from the dominance of traditional elites, from the mentality of power-sharing as entitlement, and from the illusion that the state is a spoil to be passed between victors?
\nHow, then, can we aspire to a greater independence\u2014by building a strong, dignified state among nations\u2014if we have yet to complete the lesser independence?
\nThe Problem of Tactical Alliances in Sudanese Political History
\nFrom the very moment of independence, the Sudanese state has been burdened by a profound structural crisis, one of whose most prominent manifestations has been the persistent resort to short-lived, tactical alliances, constructed around a single objective: toppling an opponent, without agreement on what comes afterwards.
\nThese alliances were not founded on inclusive national covenants or clear state-building programmes, but on temporary arrangements driven by a mentality of immediate tactics rather than a long-term national project. This has caused the failures of the early independence leaders to be reproduced in different forms across the decades.
\nAnyone who reviews Sudan\u2019s political history since the 1950s will observe a recurring pattern:
\nA temporary consensus among tactically aligned but ideologically divergent forces, which collapses as soon as the immediate objective is achieved.
\nThe alliance of ideologically contradictory political forces between 1953 and 1955 to secure independence from the Condominium, without agreement on what would follow.
\nA short-lived civilian alliance in October 1964 to overthrow the Abboud regime.
\nThe reproduction of the same model in April 1985 to topple the Nimeiri regime.
\nThen the 2019 alliance, in which marginal and newly emergent civilian forces united to overthrow the Inqaz regime\u2014not to build a state\u2014ending in internal conflict, deep division, and ultimately comprehensive collapse.
\nAt all these junctures, the objective was clear: the removal of the existing regime.
\nBut the question that was never answered was: What comes next?
\nDid these tactical alliances produce a state, or merely replace one failed system with an even worse one?
\nThese alliances failed to:
\nUnite the political community.
\nEntrench the concept of collective national action.
\nConsolidate national security and build institutions of the state.
\nThey succeeded only in achieving their tactical aims, then gave rise to weaker, more fragile, and more divided regimes\u2014once again opening the door either to military coups or to severe societal polarisation.
\nToday, yet another tactical alliance is taking shape, supported by national forces of diverse backgrounds and ideologies, united\u2014despite their differences\u2014around a single objective: supporting the army, defeating the Janjaweed and their political allies (QHAT, Somoud, Ta\u2019sis), and ending the war.
\nThere is near-consensus that the \u201cpost-war phase\u201d will be resolved through rapid elections, viewed almost as Moses\u2019 staff that will miraculously restore peace and stability in one stroke.
\nYet the fundamental question remains:
\nIf tactical alliances have repeatedly failed since independence, why do we believe they will succeed this time?
\nAnalysing the Causes of Repeated Failure
\nAmong the key reasons are:
\n1. The mentality of a \u201ccommon enemy\u201d instead of a \u201cshared future\u201d
\nSudanese politics is often conducted around the logic of whom we remove, not what we build.
\nAlliances are forged on shared animosity rather than shared vision.
\nOnce the enemy disappears, deferred contradictions erupt.
\n2. The absence of a consensual democratic culture
\nPower is understood as a prize, not a responsibility.
\nPartnership is seen as a temporary necessity, not a lasting choice.
\nAs a result, ordinary disagreements escalate into existential conflicts.
\n3. Centralised decision-making and personalised politics
\nPolitical parties and forces are run according to the mentality of the historic leader or a narrow inner circle, not institutions and programmes.
\nThis makes alliances hostage to personal moods rather than binding commitments.
\n4. A distorted civil\u2013military relationship
\nTime and again, civilian alliances generate political and security vacuums without a clear vision for governing the state, prompting the army\u2014or pushing it\u2014to return as an emergency option.
\n5. Regional and international interference
\nThe absence of a unified national vision leaves political forces vulnerable to external polarisation, turning alliances into instruments for settling non-Sudanese conflicts.
\n6. The lack of a unifying constitutional and institutional framework
\nWithout agreed rules of the game, politics becomes a zero-sum struggle, incapable of sustaining peaceful competition or orderly transfers of power.
\nPractical Solutions: How Do We Break the Vicious Circle?
\nWe propose several solutions for national forces seeking to escape this dilemma that threatens the very existence of the state:
\n1. From a \u201cRegime-Overthrow Charter\u201d to a \u201cState-Building Charter\u201d
\nNo alliance without a binding document defining:
\nThe identity of the state.
\nThe system of governance.
\nCentre\u2013region relations.
\nEconomic policy.
\nForeign policy.
\nReform of the military institution.
\n2. Reforming the party system
\nThrough a political parties’ law that enforces:
\nInternal democracy.
\nTransparency.
\nLeadership renewal and rotation.
\nConstitutional commitment.
\n3. A National Council for Permanent Dialogue
\nAn institutional platform to prevent disputes from accumulating and to manage them before they explode.
\n4. A clear civil\u2013military covenant
\nGuaranteeing:
\nThe non-politicisation of the army.
\nAnd the prevention of state capture by failed civilian elites.
\n5. An electoral system that promotes consensus rather than exclusion
\nA proportional or mixed system that reduces the \u201cwinner-takes-all\u201d mentality.
\n6. Empowering genuine civil society
\nAs institutions of oversight and mediation, not as disguised political fronts.
\nConclusion: The Greater Independence
\nTrue independence is not measured by a flag raised or an old banner restored,
\nbut by the independence of the national will from political selfishness and short-sighted, opportunistic alliances.
\nSudan does not suffer from a shortage of revolutions or alliances, but from a deficit of strategic vision and moral courage to acknowledge past mistakes.
\nThe question is no longer:
\nWill these tactical alliances succeed?
\nThe real question is:
\nDo we possess the will to build enduring strategic alliances that lead us to the greater independence\u2014independence of will, vision, and a shared future?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dr Ismail Satti Introduction Did Sudan truly gain its independence in 1956? This question may sound provocative, yet it is essential to understanding the predicament of the modern Sudanese state. If Sudan attained its formal independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium more than seven decades ago, was declaring independence from within parliament and raising the flag …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":57648,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-59543","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59543","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=59543"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59543\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":59545,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59543\/revisions\/59545"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/57648"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=59543"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=59543"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=59543"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}