{"id":59616,"date":"2026-01-04T02:52:08","date_gmt":"2026-01-03T23:52:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=59616"},"modified":"2026-01-04T02:52:08","modified_gmt":"2026-01-03T23:52:08","slug":"19000-uae-linked-automated-accounts-amplify-rsf-narrative-after-el-fasher-atrocities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/01\/04\/19000-uae-linked-automated-accounts-amplify-rsf-narrative-after-el-fasher-atrocities\/","title":{"rendered":"19,000 UAE-Linked Automated Accounts Amplify RSF Narrative After El Fasher Atrocities"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>An analytical report by researcher Mark Owen Jones, published on December 31, 2025, has uncovered what he described as a \u201clarge-scale bot network,\u201d likely linked to the United Arab Emirates, which sought to amplify pro-Rapid Support Forces (RSF) narratives following the events in El Fasher in late October 2025. The campaign utilized a coordinated wave of hashtags that trended in the UAE, Sudan, and other parts of the Middle East.<\/p>\n<p>According to the report, the hashtags appeared in early November 2025\u2014shortly after the El Fasher massacre on October 26\u2014to promote a \u201cremarkably consistent\u201d narrative blaming Sudanese Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the armed forces for starvation, aid obstruction, and the continuation of the war, while portraying the RSF as \u201cdisciplined and humane,\u201d ready for a ceasefire, and depicting El Fasher as a city \u201ccoming back to life\u201d under their control. The report described this as an attempt to whitewash the massacre.<\/p>\n<p><strong>80,000 Tweets, Majority Automated<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Owen Jones\u2019 analysis examined around 80,000 tweets posted by approximately 21,000 accounts across six coordinated hashtags between November 5 and 19. Based on the metrics used, between 18,709 and 19,514 accounts exhibited strong indicators of automation\u2014roughly 89% to 93% of all active accounts in the hashtags. He emphasized that his estimates were \u201cintentionally conservative,\u201d relying on the intersection of multiple indicators rather than a single measure of bot detection.<\/p>\n<p>The report noted that the hashtags collectively generated over 91 million impressions. The mechanical recycling of hashtags, multilingual posting (including Arabic and French), and the use of visual materials such as videos and infographics, all pointed to an \u201corganized effort\u201d to produce and amplify content.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Technical and Behavioral Indicators: Mass Creation, Lack of Genuine Interaction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The report outlined several indicators supporting the automated amplification hypothesis, including:<\/p>\n<p>Repeated bios, naming patterns, generic profile pictures, and numeric identifiers in usernames.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cRandom and unusual\u201d geographic locations (e.g., Spain, Switzerland), suggesting potential VPN use.<\/p>\n<p>Short, concentrated bursts of activity, with similarly sized tweet series for each hashtag.<\/p>\n<p>95% of accounts exhibited negligible engagement (very low interaction).<\/p>\n<p>Mass account creation: 81.4% created within a five-month period in a \u201csingle surge.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>96% used the Twitter Web App\u2014a common choice among automated networks.<\/p>\n<p>Propaganda Framework and Regional Accusations, UAE Selectively Absent<\/p>\n<p>The messages did not only glorify the RSF; they also accused specific regional states of prolonging the war or exhibiting \u201chypocrisy\u201d and \u201cobstruction,\u201d including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Russia. The UAE, however, received rare but positive mentions as a \u201chumanitarian\u201d state providing assistance, with no blame attributed.<\/p>\n<p>The report further noted that prior to focusing on El Fasher, the network had been critical of Saudi Arabia, later shifting to supporting South Yemen\u2019s independence and praising the UAE as a \u201ctrue ally,\u201d which the author viewed as consistent with UAE foreign policy positions.<\/p>\n<p><strong>El Fasher Context: Siege, Starvation, and a \u201cClosed\u201d City<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The report contextualized the campaign within the RSF\u2019s control of El Fasher following a prolonged siege, described as possibly \u201cthe worst single atrocity\u201d of the war. Satellite imagery analyzed by Yale University\u2019s Humanitarian Research Lab revealed drastic changes in city life patterns and the emergence of new burial and incineration sites. El Fasher remained closed to journalists, humanitarian agencies, and UN investigators, while aid convoys were stalled outside due to a lack of security guarantees. International experts declared a state of famine.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Analytical Tools<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Owen Jones cited the use of various data and network analysis tools\u2014including NodeXL and Phantombuster\u2014alongside manual visual inspections of account characteristics, creation dates, and activity patterns. Results were cross-verified across multiple samples and methods.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Report Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The author concluded that the campaign constituted a \u201cpropaganda effort\u201d to flood social media with positive RSF content and negative portrayals of army-supporting parties, timed to limit criticism of the UAE amid accusations of backing the RSF.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>An analytical report by researcher Mark Owen Jones, published on December 31, 2025, has uncovered what he described as a \u201clarge-scale bot network,\u201d likely linked to the United Arab Emirates, which sought to amplify pro-Rapid Support Forces (RSF) narratives following the events in El Fasher in late October 2025. The campaign utilized a coordinated wave &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":59598,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15,25],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-59616","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-local","category-news-2"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59616","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=59616"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59616\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":59617,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59616\/revisions\/59617"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/59598"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=59616"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=59616"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=59616"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}