{"id":61048,"date":"2026-03-10T01:04:25","date_gmt":"2026-03-09T22:04:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61048"},"modified":"2026-03-10T01:09:07","modified_gmt":"2026-03-09T22:09:07","slug":"hemedti-to-burhan-you-refused-it-seasoned-now-you-eat-it-plain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/03\/10\/hemedti-to-burhan-you-refused-it-seasoned-now-you-eat-it-plain\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cHemedti\u201d to Burhan: You Refused It Seasoned\u2014Now You Eat It Plain"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

For Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, the idea of integration into the Sudanese Armed Forces was nothing short of heresy. Not only did he never reconcile himself to the notion of merging the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the army, he openly and consistently rejected it.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Summary<\/strong><\/span>
\nIn his recent speech in Uganda, Hemedti\u2019s reference to building a \u201cnew Sudanese army\u201d suggested not merely an attempt to tally his gains from the war, but also to highlight the losses of his rival, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Yet Hemedti\u2019s long-standing refusal to accept the integration of the RSF into the armed forces has largely been overlooked in the dominant narratives surrounding the war\u2014particularly in attempts to identify who viewed war as simply another continuation of politics.<\/strong><\/p>\n

During that speech before a gathering of supporters in Uganda, Hemedti made a remark that passed almost unnoticed despite its significance in identifying the origins of the war and the interests of those who ignited it. He said that discussions surrounding agreements such as the Framework Agreement (January 2023), which sought military and security reform after the military\u2019s October 2021 coup against the transitional government, had once centered on integrating the RSF and armed movements into the national army.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cBut today,\u201d he said, \u201cwe are talking about building a completely new army.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

He added that the outcome had vindicated General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces and head of the Sovereign Council. Burhan had rejected the Framework Agreement that would have merged the RSF into the army. Now, however, war had come, and the process of integration would extend even to Burhan\u2019s own army\u2014within a new, national, professional force. Hemedti explained that this new army would be built on proportional representation, meaning fair representation for Sudan\u2019s various communities in line with their population size.<\/strong><\/p>\n

He added with a touch of sardonic humor that Darfur would likely dominate the new army because of its population growth, joking that its people tend to marry multiple wives, unlike communities in central Sudan and along the Nile who often settle for one.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The RSF as a Second Army<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Integration into the armed forces had always been anathema to Hemedti. The depth of this stance was documented by former World Bank legal expert Salman Mohammed Salman in his book Rapid Support Forces: Origins, Expansion, and the Road to the April 2023 War<\/em> (June 2023). The study traces the legal status of the RSF since the passage of its founding law in 2017.<\/strong><\/p>\n

According to Salman, Hemedti was careful to ensure that his forces functioned as a second army in Sudan, operating parallel to the national armed forces. The RSF law included provisions subordinating the force to the army in only two circumstances: during states of emergency within operational war zones, and if the president decided\u2014under constitutional authority\u2014to merge it into the army.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti strongly objected to the latter clause. Salman recounts that he spent nearly a month negotiating with the government over the wording before reluctantly accepting it so that the presidential decree could be issued.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Even then, Hemedti remained deeply opposed to the provision until political conditions shifted after the December 2018 revolution. During the transitional period that followed, the army relied on the RSF to suppress protests and maintain control. In return, the ruling military council removed the presidential integration clause through a constitutional decree in July 2019\u2014effectively securing the RSF\u2019s status as an autonomous parallel force.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cWe Are Already an Army\u201d<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Hemedti\u2019s rejection of integration was not hidden. He repeated it openly on several occasions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In a 2018 interview with journalist Al-Tahir Hassan al-Tom on the program Until the Picture Is Complete<\/em>, the exchange unfolded as follows:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Al-Tahir: What will happen to the RSF after its mission ends? Will it become part of the army?<\/strong>
\nHemedti: Its status will remain Rapid Support Forces. It will continue training and developing. It is a force now.<\/strong>
\nAl-Tahir: So it will remain in existence?<\/strong>
\nHemedti: What do you mean\u2014once the mission ends, they just throw it away?<\/strong>
\nAl-Tahir: It joins the army.<\/strong>
\nHemedti: It already is<\/em> an army.<\/strong>
\nAl-Tahir: Integrated into the army.<\/strong>
\nHemedti: It is not a militia to be integrated. It is already a force.<\/strong><\/p>\n

A similar sentiment appears in the book Janjaweed of the Empire<\/em> by Dr. Ashari Ahmed Mahmoud, who recounts remarks Hemedti made during a memorial speech for a Sudanese army officer on June 4, 2021. At a time when protests in Khartoum were calling not merely for the integration but the dissolution of the RSF, Hemedti dismissed such demands as ignorance of the force\u2019s origins and role.<\/strong><\/p>\n

He argued that the RSF had been created to reassure the former National Salvation regime (1989\u20132019), which feared that armed movements from Darfur might advance on Khartoum. According to Hemedti, the government had once even contemplated demolishing the bridge linking Kosti to the capital in order to block a potential attack from the west. The RSF\u2019s presence, he said, removed the need for such drastic measures.<\/strong><\/p>\n

To dissolve the force after such service, he argued, would be a form of ingratitude\u2014\u201cthey eat the meat and throw away the bones.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

A War of Political Dead Ends<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In that same speech, Hemedti argued that calls for integration were meaningless because the RSF had been established by legislation passed by an elected parliament. It was not simply a battalion or company that could be absorbed at will.<\/strong><\/p>\n

He even warned that such discussions might lead to the country\u2019s fragmentation. In his view, he and Burhan stood on equal footing: Burhan had been appointed after graduating from the military academy, while Hemedti had been elevated by presidential decree despite never attending it. Sudanese colloquial language distinguishes between a \u201ccollege general\u201d and a \u201cfield general,\u201d but Hemedti insisted that both ranks ultimately came from the same authority.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, Hemedti\u2019s talk in Uganda about building a new army seemed less like a simple statement of policy and more like a declaration of political victory over Burhan. His refusal to accept integration\u2014long ignored in discussions of the war\u2014raises a crucial question: who had reached a political dead end from which war appeared to be the only exit?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The \u201cNew Army\u201d Proposal<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Hemedti had already promoted the concept of a new national army in a document issued by the RSF titled \u201cRapid Support Vision\u201d, which called for: <\/strong>\u201cAcknowledging the necessity of establishing a new Sudanese army from the existing multiple forces in order to build a single professional national military institution that reflects Sudan\u2019s diversity in leadership and ranks according to demographic weight.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

This idea also began circulating among some Sudanese political groups, particularly within the \u201cNo to War\u201d camp, where calls to dissolve the current army have gained traction amid criticism of its long record in governance and conflict.<\/strong><\/p>\n

For Hemedti, the war\u2019s first tangible reward came in January 2024, when he signed a political declaration in Addis Ababa with the civilian coalition Taqaddum (Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces). The security reform provisions in that document closely mirrored the RSF\u2019s earlier vision: both called for the creation of a new national professional army representing Sudan\u2019s population proportionally, effectively dissolving the multiplicity of armed forces.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In both texts\u2014the RSF vision and the Addis Ababa declaration\u2014all armed groups were treated as equal components of a fragmented security landscape that would eventually dissolve into a single national army.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Framework Agreement and the Road to War<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Given Hemedti\u2019s long-standing resistance to integration, a question arises: was the Framework Agreement of December 2022\u2014championed by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)\u2014a strategic miscalculation?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The agreement called explicitly for the integration of the RSF into the armed forces, something Hemedti had resisted since the force\u2019s creation in 2017. Yet the revolutionary movement had already gone further, demanding not just integration but the dissolution of the RSF entirely under the slogan:<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe army to the barracks, the Janjaweed dissolved\u2014no militias rule a state.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti once remarked that he would not sit idle while revolutionaries \u201csharpened their knives\u201d to slaughter him.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ironically, the FFC later claimed that the Framework Agreement would have created a single professional army had it not been sabotaged by Islamists who allegedly ignited the war to return to power. But had they fully grasped Hemedti\u2019s deep resistance to integration, they might have realized that the agreement itself could trigger confrontation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The document also barred military forces from engaging in commercial investment\u2014a provision that carried its own implications.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Porridge Burned Me\u201d<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In Sudanese folklore, when someone stirs up conflict among children, they sometimes throw dust in the air and cry, \u201cThe porridge burned me!\u201d One child then throws dust at another, and the fight begins.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In that sense, the Framework Agreement may have acted as the spark.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hemedti\u2019s message to Burhan now seems clear: by stubbornly rejecting the Framework Agreement\u2014which would have integrated the RSF into the army\u2014Burhan ultimately found himself in a worse position.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In Sudanese vernacular, the situation can be summed up by a proverb:<\/strong>
\n\u201cYou refused it seasoned, and now you must eat it plain.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

In Hemedti\u2019s telling, the war has already moved beyond the question of integrating the RSF into the existing army. Instead, the war itself may dissolve the entire military structure into a new army altogether.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim For Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, the idea of integration into the Sudanese Armed Forces was nothing short of heresy. Not only did he never reconcile himself to the notion of merging the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the army, he openly and consistently rejected it. Summary In his …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":61050,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61048","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61048","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61048"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61048\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61049,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61048\/revisions\/61049"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/61050"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61048"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61048"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61048"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}