{"id":61385,"date":"2026-04-06T23:46:52","date_gmt":"2026-04-06T20:46:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61385"},"modified":"2026-04-06T23:46:52","modified_gmt":"2026-04-06T20:46:52","slug":"the-berlin-conference-on-sudan-political-risks-lessons-from-the-london-conference-and-sudans-strategic-priorities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/04\/06\/the-berlin-conference-on-sudan-political-risks-lessons-from-the-london-conference-and-sudans-strategic-priorities\/","title":{"rendered":"The Berlin Conference on Sudan: Political Risks, Lessons from the London Conference, and Sudan\u2019s Strategic Priorities"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sudan Events \u2013 Agencies<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Some may ask about the objectives of the Berlin Conference: is it a platform for rescue, or a platform on which Sudan is to be divided? We should not be misled by the polished language with which international conferences present themselves, nor by the glossy headlines invoking peace, humanitarianism, civilian protection, and political inclusivity. The issue in Sudan is no longer merely a disagreement over solutions; it has become a full-scale battle over how the crisis itself is defined: is Sudan a state subjected to a devastating, multi-layered war of aggression, or simply a large \u201chumanitarian file\u201d to be managed by capitals, organizations, and mediators?<\/strong><\/p>\n

This question makes the Berlin Conference, scheduled for April 15, 2026, far more than a routine international meeting. It is another link in a continuous international process that began in Paris on April 15, 2024, moved to London on April 15, 2025, and continued with a ministerial meeting in New York in September 2025. Now it returns in Berlin with largely the same sponsors, language, and methodology\u2014one that seeks to manage Sudan from the outside more than to listen to it from within. This sequence is no longer deniable; European and British official statements have openly described it as a cumulative process, with each stage building on the previous one.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Viewing Berlin as an isolated event is therefore a political mistake before it is an analytical one. The London Conference of April 15, 2025, was not a passing occasion but a foundational moment that revealed the nature of the prevailing international approach toward Sudan. The co-chairs\u2019 statement emphasized Sudan\u2019s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity; rejected partition and parallel governments; and called for a permanent ceasefire, civilian empowerment, and protection of humanitarian pathways. All of this appeared orderly and acceptable on the surface. Yet the core problem was not in the declared language but in the political structure it produced: a broad conference with multiple sponsors, conflicting calculations, and more ambiguity than decisiveness. London emerged with moral language but without the political will to impose a fair framework that protects Sudan and clearly names realities.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is precisely where the danger of the Berlin Conference begins. It does not establish a new path but attempts to steer a process that has failed to resolve its original flaws. Since Paris, the declared focus has been humanitarian. In London, the framework expanded to include both humanitarian and political dimensions. In New York in September 2025, it was explicitly stated that the ministerial meeting builds on Paris and London, focusing on ceasefire, civilian protection, rejection of parallel governance structures, and broader international coordination. In February 2026, European discourse described Berlin as a \u201ckey step\u201d ahead of the April 15 ministerial meeting to be hosted by Germany alongside the African Union, the European Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This is not organizational coincidence; it is a mapped-out trajectory. Berlin is not merely another meeting venue\u2014it is an attempt to reproduce the framework within which Sudan is expected to operate.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This makes it necessary to confront a question many avoid: who has the authority to define Sudan\u2019s crisis before the world? If the answer is that this authority is equally shared among the Sudanese state, the militia fighting it, external actors that have fueled the war, and a curated group of civilian actors selected by sponsoring capitals, then this is not a peace process\u2014it is a process of political re-engineering in which Sudanese sovereignty is gradually withdrawn. The most dangerous aspect of international conferences is not harsh rhetoric, but the subtle hollowing out of substance through polite language. \u201cInclusivity\u201d may mean dissolving the distinction between the state and those who took up arms against it. A \u201cSudanese-owned political process\u201d may be designed, funded, and structured entirely outside Sudan. \u201cCivilian protection\u201d may be invoked without naming who killed civilians, who armed them, who financed the war, and who enabled its continuation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

A serious reading of Berlin must therefore focus on two decisive questions: what do the sponsors want, and what are they capable of doing? The answer to the first is that they seek to establish an international framework to manage Sudan\u2014preventing total collapse and preserving a moral image, without necessarily addressing the root causes of the catastrophe. The answer to the second is that they possess leverage but lack unified political will to resolve contradictions that undermined previous efforts. The London experience demonstrates this clearly. Reporting at the time indicated that disagreements among certain Arab actors prevented a broader final agreement, with divergences over priorities rather than technical details. Thus, while the international system speaks with one moral voice, it does not act with one political voice\u2014and Sudan pays the price for this duality.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Another critical issue is the emphasis on including Sudanese women and civil society in Berlin preparations. While valid in principle, it raises a fundamental sovereignty question. British parliamentary responses published in March 2026 confirmed preparatory meetings that gave Sudanese women a platform to contribute and noted efforts to organize a meaningful and inclusive conference. Yet the key question remains: where is the Sudanese state in this arrangement? Does inclusivity mean genuine national participation, or redefining Sudan as a collection of equal stakeholders, reducing the government to one voice among many? This is where the real distortion begins\u2014not through overt exclusion, but through the gradual dilution of the state\u2019s sovereign standing.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Equally important is the African Union\u2019s statement of March 30, 2026, following a meeting between Commission Chair Mahmoud Youssouf and the UN Secretary-General\u2019s Personal Envoy to Sudan. The statement emphasized close coordination between the African Union and the United Nations, an immediate ceasefire, a Sudanese-owned and inclusive political process, alignment of initiatives, and hopes for tangible outcomes from Berlin. While reasonable in tone, Sudan\u2019s experience warns that correct language can sometimes be used to legitimize flawed arrangements. Declaring Sudanese ownership is not enough; the structure of the conference itself must respect Sudanese sovereignty, recognize the state, and clearly identify militia actors and external interference.<\/strong><\/p>\n

All of this unfolds amid an acute humanitarian crisis, which gives external actors greater justification to act in the name of necessity. The paradox is stark: Sudan does not need more conferences explaining its suffering; it needs one that dares to name the structure of the war, those behind it, those who benefit from its prolongation, and those seeking to use it to reshape power externally. Without such clarity, humanitarian rhetoric risks becoming a tool for perpetuating, rather than ending, the crisis.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The real danger of Berlin is not that it may produce poor language, but that it may produce well-crafted language masking harmful arrangements. A ceasefire may be declared without binding provisions to stop funding, arms flows, and external recruitment. An inclusive political process may proceed without defining the role of the state or requiring disarmament and accountability. Civilian empowerment may be shaped by externally selected actors rather than authentic representation. Unity may be affirmed without confronting the forces that have undermined it.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This places a heavy responsibility on Sudan. It is not enough to reject or criticize international conferences. Sudan must engage in a battle of meaning, not just emotion. It must assert clearly: Sudan is not an empty arena, not a humanitarian file, and not a bargaining project among external sponsors. It is a sovereign state subjected to a war aimed at dismantling its institutions and re-engineering its political order. Any conference that does not begin from this definition is fundamentally flawed.<\/strong><\/p>\n

What should be done is clear. A coordinated diplomatic, media, and legal front must be built before Berlin. A formal memorandum should be sent to all sponsors affirming that Sudan rejects equivalence between state and militia, rejects any formula that undermines its sovereign representation, and rejects any ceasefire without halting external support. Any Sudanese delegation must arrive with written proposals, not general statements\u2014because those who do not write will be written about. A comprehensive evidence dossier must also be prepared in English and Arabic, documenting violations, support networks, and interests sustaining the war.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Simultaneously, a parliamentary and media campaign should be launched in London, Berlin, and Brussels to press two critical questions: what is the status of the Sudanese government in the conference, and where are the concrete measures against external interference?<\/strong><\/p>\n

In conclusion, the Berlin Conference is not destiny, but neither is it insignificant. It is a moment of testing: will Sudan participate as a state that knows what it wants, or be defined externally as an object of management? The real question is not whether the world sympathizes with Sudan, but whether Sudan is prepared to prevent others from rewriting it according to their own interests. Only then does the central issue become clear: is Berlin a platform to save Sudan, or the last platform on which its sovereignty is to be divided under the banner of peace, humanitarianism, and inclusivity?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Position Paper: The Berlin Conference on Sudan \u2013 Political Risks, Lessons from London, and Sudanese Priorities<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The Berlin Conference on Sudan will be held on April 15, 2026, with participation and sponsorship from Germany, the African Union, the European Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is presented as part of a continuous international track that began in Paris (2024), London (2025), and New York (September 2025), gradually shifting from a humanitarian to a political approach.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Berlin\u2019s significance lies in following the London Conference, which affirmed Sudan\u2019s sovereignty and unity but failed to achieve a decisive political breakthrough due to conflicting priorities among international and regional actors. Berlin therefore carries two possibilities: correcting London\u2019s shortcomings or reproducing its ambiguity in a more structured form.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The main risks include weakening Sudan\u2019s sovereign position through a stakeholder-based framework, creating de facto equivalence between the state and militias under the banner of inclusivity, prioritizing humanitarian framing over accountability, ambiguity regarding official representation, and endorsing ceasefire language without mechanisms to stop external support.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the same time, African Union and United Nations coordination offers an entry point to demand explicit recognition of the Sudanese state within the conference structure.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan\u2019s priorities should rest on five pillars:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Rejecting equivalence between the state and militias<\/strong><\/li>\n
  2. Ensuring clear and effective official representation<\/strong><\/li>\n
  3. Linking ceasefire to mechanisms halting external support<\/strong><\/li>\n
  4. Rejecting parallel governance arrangements<\/strong><\/li>\n
  5. Building a unified legal, political, and media case<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Operationally, Sudan should act across four tracks: diplomatic (formal memoranda), negotiating (draft texts), legal (evidence dossiers), and media\/parliamentary (targeted advocacy).<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The core recommendation is to engage politically, not passively accept or rhetorically reject the conference. The real battle is over defining the crisis, legitimacy, and representation. Without proactive engagement, Berlin risks repeating the shortcomings of London\u2014regardless of how reassuring its language may appear.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Sudan Events \u2013 Agencies Some may ask about the objectives of the Berlin Conference: is it a platform for rescue, or a platform on which Sudan is to be divided? We should not be misled by the polished language with which international conferences present themselves, nor by the glossy headlines invoking peace, humanitarianism, civilian protection, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":61386,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61385","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61385","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61385"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61385\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61387,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61385\/revisions\/61387"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/61386"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61385"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61385"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61385"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}