{"id":61436,"date":"2026-04-15T16:19:23","date_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:19:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61436"},"modified":"2026-04-15T16:19:23","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:19:23","slug":"berlin-conference-a-storm-in-a-teacup-or-much-ado-about-nothing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/04\/15\/berlin-conference-a-storm-in-a-teacup-or-much-ado-about-nothing\/","title":{"rendered":"Berlin Conference: A Storm in a Teacup or Much Ado About Nothing?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Al-Wathiq Kameer<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong>
\nFor the third time since the outbreak of war in Sudan, a European capital is set to host, on April 15, an international conference dedicated to the Sudanese crisis\u2014following Paris and then London in April 2024 and 2025, respectively. Despite the change in venue and some procedural details, the overall framework remains largely the same: a ministerial political track, a humanitarian track aimed at mobilizing support, and a third track that brings together a spectrum of Sudanese political and civilian forces.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, the real question this time is not about good intentions, nor the strength of the language in the final statements, but rather about added value: what can the Berlin Conference contribute, after two years of conferences, appeals, and pledges, to a reality that has witnessed no qualitative transformation\u2014neither in the humanitarian nor in the political sphere?<\/strong><\/p>\n

At first glance, the Berlin Conference appears to be a direct continuation of the same approach that governed the Paris and London conferences. The most notable difference in this edition lies in the more visible presence of the \u201cQuintet Committee,\u201d comprising the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, IGAD, and the League of Arab States. This committee did not emerge in a vacuum; rather, it evolved from the \u201cexpanded mechanism\u201d on the Sudanese crisis, within the context of efforts led by the African Union through its extraordinary ministerial meetings in June 2024, before later crystallizing into a more defined five-party framework.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Over the past period, this mechanism has conducted a series of consultations and communications with Sudanese political and civilian actors\u2014some through direct meetings in Addis Ababa and Cairo, and others via virtual sessions and preliminary contacts. Notably, however, these efforts have failed to build even a modest level of consensus; indeed, the parties themselves have previously refused to sit together at one table. Therefore, highlighting the Quintet\u2019s role in the Berlin Conference alone does not necessarily indicate a genuine shift in approach, but may instead reflect a repackaging of the same tools in a new format.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Here emerges the first major problem with the Berlin Conference: the absence of evaluation. Few have seriously paused to assess the outcomes of the previous conferences or to ask a simple question: what did they actually achieve? Did they make a breakthrough in humanitarian assistance? Did they bring Sudanese factions closer together? Did they help push toward a ceasefire, or produce a credible mechanism to enforce or monitor one? Or has the outcome, at best, remained limited\u2014while the same language about the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe and the urgency of action continues to be repeated without tangible change on the ground?<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the previous two conferences failed to produce a qualitative impact, it is only natural that, before convening the third, a legitimate and straightforward question arises: what is new? What is the added value?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Admittedly, some emphasize the importance of the conference from a humanitarian perspective, arguing that any international effort that helps mobilize resources, improve humanitarian access, or keep Sudan on the global agenda should not be underestimated. This argument carries both moral and political weight, especially given the expanding scale of human suffering, worsening civilian conditions, continued displacement, and collapse of services. However, acknowledging the legitimacy of this humanitarian dimension should not lead to overburdening the conference with expectations it cannot meet. There is a clear distinction between a platform aimed at mobilization and advocacy, and a process intended to advance a complex political settlement in a deeply polarized country.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, the core reservation about the Berlin Conference does not lie in rejecting international efforts per se, but in conflating two distinct levels: humanitarian support and general political pressure on one hand, and a comprehensive Sudanese political process on the other.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In its third iteration, the conference includes not only ministerial and humanitarian tracks, but also a civilian political track. Yet this is not entirely new; both previous conferences carried similar political ambitions but failed to produce even minimal consensus or a meaningful joint statement. What is new this time is not the existence of the political track itself, but the extent of the Quintet\u2019s direct involvement in preparing and shaping it\u2014managing its agenda and proposing a pre-drafted document or unified appeal to participants.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is not a minor procedural detail; it carries clear political implications. The presence of a pre-prepared document suggests that the minimum objective is to extract a political outcome that can be marketed as a success\u2014allowing organizers and sponsors to claim they have advanced not only humanitarian mobilization but also the political track. This is what is meant by a \u201csymbolic political impact\u201d: producing a diplomatic, media, and symbolic gain that portrays the conference as having succeeded in bringing Sudanese civilians together around a common formula, even if the actual impact remains limited in addressing the crisis.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This dynamic is also linked to a broader context concerning the role of European countries and the European Union in the Sudan file. There is an impression that European actors feel, to varying degrees, relatively sidelined\u2014especially as the United States has dominated more influential tracks, notably through the Quartet, in a context that has weakened British influence in particular.<\/strong><\/p>\n

From this perspective, European engagement through the Quintet takes on added significance, especially since the European Union is not only a member but also the primary financier of its activities. Accordingly, the Berlin Conference\u2014like Paris and London before it\u2014can be understood as an attempt not only to mobilize humanitarian support, but also to assert a visible political role and diplomatic presence in the Sudanese file, even if its tangible impact remains limited.<\/strong><\/p>\n

More fundamentally, however, this approach once again appears to \u201cbypass\u201d the root of the problem rather than confront it. The Sudanese crisis does not stem from a lack of statements or general appeals, but from deep, foundational disagreements among political and civilian actors on key issues that cannot be glossed over through general compromise language.<\/strong><\/p>\n

There are stark differences in positions regarding the Rapid Support Forces, the army and its leadership, Islamist actors, and the role of regional and international actors. These are not marginal disagreements but core obstacles to any meaningful consensus. In many cases, the divergence extends to defining the war itself, identifying its parties, and determining the nature of the required solution.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Therefore, betting on achieving consensus on ending the war without addressing these core disputes\u2014or without openly confronting them\u2014appears unrealistic.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Notably, mediators, including the Quintet, often treat these disagreements as issues that can be temporarily bypassed in order to produce a general formula. Yet experience suggests the opposite: the more these core disputes are avoided, the more failure re-emerges in new forms. The more effective approach is not to rush toward ready-made consensus outcomes, but to unpack areas of political conflict and address them patiently and transparently\u2014even if this is slower and less appealing diplomatically.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This dilemma becomes even clearer when considering the controversies surrounding the conference itself. Objections to the Berlin Conference have not come from a single political camp, but from diverse actors with differing positions and assessments of the war. This in itself is significant, as it indicates that reservations about the conference are tied not merely to political alignment, but to the nature of the conference, its methodology, and the question of representation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

One of the most complex issues concerns not just attendance or boycott, but who participates, in what capacity, with what level of representation, and who is excluded. Forces opposed to the Rapid Support Forces often refuse to sit with those they see as close to the government or Islamist groups, while those actors in turn reject sitting with what they consider the opposing camp. In such a deeply polarized context, merely bringing these parties into one place is a limited achievement\u2014not a natural precursor to political consensus.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This conclusion is reinforced by the experience of the Cairo Conference of Sudanese political and civilian forces on July 6, 2024. That meeting, in principle, was more closely connected to the Sudanese context and more likely to open a first breach in the wall of division, given the broad acceptance of Egypt\u2019s invitation. Yet it still failed to produce a joint statement.<\/strong><\/p>\n

If that occurred in a less polarized context than today, what justifies the assumption that Berlin\u2014amid even sharper polarization\u2014can achieve what Cairo could not? Expectations appear to exceed realities, and reliance on externally convened gatherings to produce Sudanese consensus remains premature.<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the humanitarian level, the issue also demands candor. The problem has never been a shortage of conferences or insufficiently strong language, but rather the persistent gap between pledges and actual needs, the lack of mechanisms to ensure aid delivery independent of warring parties, and weak follow-up and implementation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, the legitimate question remains: if previous conferences all acknowledged the scale of the catastrophe, why has this recognition not translated into greater funding, improved access, or effective pressure on those obstructing aid? Repeating acknowledgment is insufficient without a real shift in tools and mechanisms.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Moreover, opposition to the conference is not rooted solely in concerns about sovereignty or the absence of the Sudanese government\u2014important as these are\u2014but also in skepticism toward externally driven solutions that do not emerge from within and are not grounded in a broader Sudanese political will.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This skepticism is shared across diverse actors, despite differing motivations. Some argue that bypassing state institutions undermines solutions; others reject externally imposed settlements altogether; still others question representation or view the conference as a repetition of a failed approach. Across these perspectives, the common thread is doubt that the conference can achieve a meaningful breakthrough without the political foundations necessary for any viable process.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Accordingly, the most important significance of the Berlin Conference lies not in any anticipated breakthrough, but in revealing once again the limits of the prevailing international approach toward Sudan. After three years of war, much of the international community still seems to treat the crisis as manageable through repeated platforms, familiar language, and reliance on immature consensus.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yet realities suggest that the war will not approach its end unless the root causes of Sudanese division are addressed\u2014not merely its symptoms\u2014and unless a comprehensive Sudanese dialogue is enabled, inclusive of all except those responsible for crimes and corruption, within a conducive political environment and without rushing outcomes. The role of mediators should be to facilitate\u2014not to impose unrealistic alternatives.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Conclusion: The Limits of the International Approach<\/strong>
\nThe Berlin Conference may not be entirely meaningless, but it is certainly far less than the expectations placed upon it\u2014and far less than the surrounding noise suggests. It may hold value in keeping Sudan\u2019s tragedy within the sphere of international attention, or in renewing pressure for humanitarian aid and protection. But that is one thing; claiming it as a gateway to a political breakthrough is quite another.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ultimately, the conference cannot substitute for the absence of Sudanese consensus, nor overcome the fundamental disagreements among political and civilian forces, nor replace a serious dialogue that confronts these disputes rather than sidestepping them.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At most, Berlin reflects the continued international inability to move from crisis management to decisive influence over its trajectory. Real peace will not be forged by seasonal conferences, but by a serious, inclusive Sudanese process\u2014politically prepared and supported from the outside by facilitation, not substitution.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Al-Wathiq Kameer Introduction For the third time since the outbreak of war in Sudan, a European capital is set to host, on April 15, an international conference dedicated to the Sudanese crisis\u2014following Paris and then London in April 2024 and 2025, respectively. Despite the change in venue and some procedural details, the overall framework remains …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":54587,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61436","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61436","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61436"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61436\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61437,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61436\/revisions\/61437"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/54587"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61436"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61436"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61436"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}