{"id":61627,"date":"2026-05-05T23:01:51","date_gmt":"2026-05-05T20:01:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61627"},"modified":"2026-05-05T23:01:51","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T20:01:51","slug":"where-should-external-initiatives-be-headed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/05\/05\/where-should-external-initiatives-be-headed\/","title":{"rendered":"Where Should External Initiatives Be Headed?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\"><strong><em>Othman Jalal<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>(1)<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>Following the failure of the Zionist plan\u2014along with its regional instrument, the UAE micro-state, and its internal claws represented by the terrorist Dagalo militia and its civilian political wing, the \u201cSumoud\u201d coalition\u2014to seize the Sudanese state through the blitzkrieg scenario of April 15, 2023, the partners in this scheme shifted to \u201cPlan B.\u201d This involved deploying soft political power and media propaganda to fracture the cohesion between the Sudanese people, the army, and the joint forces.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>They employed a range of dirty tactics, including portraying the \u201cWar of Dignity\u201d as merely a power struggle between two generals, and attempting to ideologize the Sudanese army by reducing the battle for national honor to a war waged by an Islamist current seeking to regain power.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>(2)<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>They also sought to attribute the causes of the war to the historical political conflict between the center and the periphery, elevating the widely known mercenary Hemedti as an icon of marginal causes and a savior of the marginalized from the domination of the \u201cJallaba\u201d over power and wealth in Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Additionally, they worked to inflame tensions between the armed forces and their allies within the joint forces and mobilized volunteers, while inciting regional and international communities by raising the specter that continued war between the army and the terrorist militia would plunge Sudan into \u201ccreative chaos\u201d and fragmentation. This, they argue, would attract terrorist groups to infiltrate Sudan and intensify cross-border criminal activities, posing a threat to regional and international peace and security.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The strategic objective behind these alarms and falsehoods is to pressure the state and military leadership into accepting the international Quartet initiative and concluding a political settlement that would reinstate the criminal militia and its political wing, \u201cSumoud,\u201d at the center of power and decision-making. This would, in turn, ensure the continuation of Zionist penetration of the Sudanese state and keep it trapped in cycles of identity conflict and civilizational decline.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>(3)<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>In his book <em>\u201cLeft-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder,\u201d<\/em> Lenin states that a true revolutionary is not one who rejects compromise outright or boasts of rigidity at all times, but rather one who possesses the flexibility to compromise when necessity dictates\u2014provided that such compromise is temporary, context-specific, and does not undermine core principles. In other words, one must hold firmly to principles while ensuring that any compromise serves the ultimate objective of the revolution.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Accordingly, the leadership of the army and the state should remain open to regional and international initiatives\u2014but with intelligence, prudence, and strategic awareness\u2014without allowing such openness to weaken, domesticate, or dismantle the internal elements of victory in the \u201cWar of Dignity.\u201d These include strengthening cohesion between the people, the army, and the joint forces; reinforcing the military and equipping it with advanced weaponry; and sustaining the momentum of mass mobilization across all sectors of society. This mobilization should extend to mosques, churches, Sufi institutions, political parties, kindergartens, schools, universities, media outlets, sports clubs, public squares, markets, theaters, public and private institutions, as well as social gatherings such as weddings and funerals.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>(4)<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>There is also a need to reopen popular resistance camps across all states, localities, cities, and villages, and to mobilize and train society\u2014men and women alike\u2014in the use of all types of weapons, from Kalashnikovs to tanks and drones. All segments of society, both inside and outside the country, should be encouraged to contribute financially and through blood donation.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Such was the nature of popular resistance during the time of the Prophet (peace be upon him). On the Day of the Confederates, the faithful\u2014men and women\u2014stood united against the invaders. The courageous Safiyyah bint Abdul-Muttalib became the first woman to kill an enemy combatant in the cause of God. While the men were stationed at the trench, she defended the Muslim women in a fortress and killed a Jewish infiltrator who attempted to scout the stronghold.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>(5)<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>Reviving the spirit of popular resistance and strengthening internal national unity remain the strategic choice before the leadership of the state and the army. This would enable them to engage with external initiatives with dignity and national pride, without compromising the fundamental principle of the \u201cWar of Dignity\u201d: the decisive elimination of the terrorist Dagalo militia on the battlefield, or negotiating only on the basis of its surrender.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Othman Jalal (1) Following the failure of the Zionist plan\u2014along with its regional instrument, the UAE micro-state, and its internal claws represented by the terrorist Dagalo militia and its civilian political wing, the \u201cSumoud\u201d coalition\u2014to seize the Sudanese state through the blitzkrieg scenario of April 15, 2023, the partners in this scheme shifted to \u201cPlan &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":12681,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61627","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61627","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61627"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61627\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61628,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61627\/revisions\/61628"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12681"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61627"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61627"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61627"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}