{"id":61645,"date":"2026-05-07T15:26:34","date_gmt":"2026-05-07T12:26:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61645"},"modified":"2026-05-07T15:26:34","modified_gmt":"2026-05-07T12:26:34","slug":"why-is-the-rebellion-fragmenting-from-within","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/05\/07\/why-is-the-rebellion-fragmenting-from-within\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Is the Rebellion Fragmenting from Within?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Account of Events<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Adel El-Baz<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1<\/strong>
\nThe media erupted with news of Nur Quba\u2019s defection from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and his return to the homeland. This defection was not an isolated event; it was preceded by the withdrawal of large groups in Kordofan and Darfur, though those departures did not attract the same level of attention. However, Nur\u2019s departure \u2014 as the third-ranking figure in the leadership hierarchy \u2014 carries important indications that the fragmentation of the rebellion has now reached the highest levels of its field leadership. According to reliable press reports, Commander Al-Safana is on his way to Khartoum from a neighboring country. These are major defections expected to shake the upper ranks of the militia leadership and its support bases.<\/strong><\/p>\n

2<\/strong>
\nIn truth, the collapse and erosion of the RSF militia began in the very first days of the rebellion, and this erosion has manifested itself in different forms. The earliest defections occurred when more than 400 officers returned to the army ranks at the onset of the rebellion. Later, the rebellion itself transformed into groups of opportunists and looters, as many fighters abandoned the militia carrying whatever spoils they had gained. Subsequently, internal conflicts emerged within the militia\u2019s support bases after the rebellion was defeated in central Sudan and pushed westward toward areas of tribal influence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The prolonged duration of the war also played a major role in accelerating this erosion, pushing the rebellion into a state of human and material exhaustion and weakening the morale of its fighters, especially in the absence of a clear political horizon. Over time, loyalties shift from a collective cause to individual interests, and fighters begin searching for personal escape routes \u2014 whether through withdrawal or by joining other sides \u2014 thereby accelerating the pace of fragmentation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

3<\/strong>
\nAnyone observing the pattern of rebel movements across the African continent will recognize that what is happening now within the RSF militia is neither new nor surprising. Rather, it is a recurring pattern in most insurgencies witnessed in Africa \u2014 and even in Sudan \u2014 from the 1960s to the present day. Rebellions often begin united under a political, ethnic, or ideological banner, but later fracture internally, giving rise to smaller and more localized groups that either align themselves with existing authorities or establish their own autonomous arrangements. One of the clearest examples is the Sudan People\u2019s Liberation Movement under John Garang and later Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which was repeatedly shaken by internal splits, as were the Darfur rebel movements at the beginning of the millennium.<\/strong><\/p>\n

4<\/strong>
\nThe phenomenon of fragmentation that has affected dozens of rebel movements in Africa \u2014 from Congo to Mali to the Central African Republic and beyond \u2014 is not a marginal aspect of African conflicts; rather, it is almost one of their hidden laws. Writer Michael Woldemariam argues that divisions within armed movements alter the intensity, duration, and outcomes of wars, and that battlefield developments themselves may drive factions toward fragmentation or realignment. He cites the multiple divisions witnessed in Darfur, Mali, and eastern Congo.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In Africa, armed movements often begin as political projects but eventually evolve into war economies. When that happens, the central question is no longer: What does the movement want?<\/em> but rather: Who controls the roads? Who owns the mine? Who monopolizes taxation? And who secures foreign support?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

5<\/strong>
\nWith the rebellion retreating from central Sudan toward Darfur and Kordofan, the most pressing question has emerged: Will the RSF remain a unified organization, or will it enter the same phase of fragmentation experienced by previous African insurgencies? Researchers specializing in African conflicts generally agree on five common causes behind the fragmentation of rebel movements \u2014 causes that appear to apply almost perfectly to this rebellion.<\/strong><\/p>\n

6<\/strong>
\nThe first is a leadership crisis, a phenomenon that emerged from the earliest days of the war. The political and military leadership represented by Hemedti disappeared from the scene, leaving Abdel Rahim and Osman (Operations), along with regional commanders, at the top of the military hierarchy. Regional commanders frequently acted and made decisions without referring back to the central leadership. One of the clearest examples was the expansion beyond the capital into Wad Madani, which was not a centralized decision but rather a spontaneous move initiated by regional commanders and later endorsed by the leadership in the belief that it would yield gains. Instead, the result was the dispersal of forces, leading to their defeat not only in Al-Jazira State but across most of central Sudan. Matters worsened as regional commanders gained relative autonomy and as multiple support bases began pressuring the leadership for weapons, supplies, spheres of influence, salaries, and blood money compensation, creating fertile ground for conflict and division.<\/strong><\/p>\n

7<\/strong>
\nThe second cause is the transformation of the rebellion into a war economy. The top leadership became primarily concerned with the gold trade and controlling mines in Darfur and Kordofan. Among the most notable of these areas are the Songo mines and their surrounding markets \u2014 areas subjected to repeated bombardment yet still functioning and exporting gold via small aircraft to the Central African Republic and from there to the UAE. This region remains under the rebellion\u2019s complete control and constitutes a major source of financing. Meanwhile, mid-level commanders profit from local trade, taxes imposed on goods, or outright looting. In the absence of oversight, accountability, and regular salaries, field commanders resort to these methods to cover the expenses of soldiers, the wounded, and blood money payments. Once factions acquire independent funding sources, the central leadership loses its most important tool \u2014 control over finances \u2014 and with it, control over decision-making, making fragmentation only a matter of time. This pattern has been repeated in Congo, Somalia, and Darfur.<\/strong><\/p>\n

8<\/strong>
\nThe third cause is ethnic and tribal division, something that began in the earliest days of the rebellion as tribes within the so-called support bases split apart. Some supported the rebellion, others remained neutral, while certain groups refused to join it altogether, even from within the Mahamid tribe itself (such as Musa Hilal). Today, discontent is increasingly visible among major tribes such as the Rizeigat. One of the clearest manifestations of this division is the departure of Nur Quba and Al-Safana, alongside other groups complaining of marginalization, such as the Hawazma and the Humr Misseriya. Some of these groups are moving not merely toward defection but toward actively fighting the rebellion itself. As some commanders put it: \u201cWe were once one movement, then we became factions, and now we have become enemies.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

9<\/strong>
\nThe fourth cause is the loss of legitimacy. The rebellion has lost its legitimacy both domestically and internationally and is recognized only by a limited few. It has also lost its popular support base and, in the eyes of many, transformed into groups engaged in looting and abuses. As a result, recruitment has become increasingly difficult, forcing it to rely on mercenaries from neighboring countries, particularly South Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n

10<\/strong>
\nThe military pressure exerted by regular armed forces has also directly contributed to accelerating the fragmentation process. Battlefield defeats and the loss of areas of influence intensify internal disputes within the rebellion and push some commanders and groups to reconsider their positions \u2014 whether by withdrawing or shifting allegiances.<\/strong><\/p>\n

11<\/strong>
\nThe fifth cause is the decline of external support. Although this factor has not fully materialized yet, current indicators suggest the possibility of its reduction, especially in light of regional developments. Any decrease in such support could significantly accelerate the pace of fragmentation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

12<\/strong>
\nIn addition, psychological and media factors play an important role. The spread of news about defections \u2014 even if limited \u2014 creates a cumulative effect within the ranks of the rebellion, reinforcing the perception that the organization is disintegrating and encouraging others to take the same step.<\/strong><\/p>\n

For these reasons, rebellions in Africa tend to collapse not all at once, but gradually, through division and fragmentation until they ultimately fall apart. This pattern appears to be repeating itself now and may eventually lead to the defeat of this rebellion.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Account of Events Adel El-Baz 1 The media erupted with news of Nur Quba\u2019s defection from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and his return to the homeland. This defection was not an isolated event; it was preceded by the withdrawal of large groups in Kordofan and Darfur, though those departures did not attract the …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":58017,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61645","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61645","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61645"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61645\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61646,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61645\/revisions\/61646"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/58017"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61645"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61645"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61645"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}