{"id":61656,"date":"2026-05-11T11:47:37","date_gmt":"2026-05-11T08:47:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61656"},"modified":"2026-05-11T11:47:37","modified_gmt":"2026-05-11T08:47:37","slug":"the-erosion-of-the-rebellion-and-the-phenomenon-of-surrenders-requirements-of-the-current-phase","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/05\/11\/the-erosion-of-the-rebellion-and-the-phenomenon-of-surrenders-requirements-of-the-current-phase\/","title":{"rendered":"The Erosion of the Rebellion and the Phenomenon of Surrenders\u2026 Requirements of the Current Phase"},"content":{"rendered":"

Abdulmalik Al-Naeem<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Several internal and external causes and factors have had a direct impact on the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, which has begun experiencing actual collapse and internal erosion, prompting some of its prominent leaders to save themselves by surrendering to the army and the government.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The surrender of Major General Al-Nour Mohamed Adam, widely known as Al-Nour Guba after his home region, came as a thunderous shock within rebel circles. First, he was considered an original commander within the RSF and previously within the Border Guards. Second, he ranked among the top leadership figures, regarded as the third man after the late Hemedti and Abdul Rahim Dagalo. Third, he was viewed as a commander in an important area in North Darfur that remains under rebel control.<\/strong><\/p>\n

These and other factors raise the fundamental question: why did he defect?<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is true that the rebels\u2019 attack on his people in the Mistariha area \u2014 the stronghold of Sheikh Musa Hilal \u2014 and the killing of several family members deepened and widened the rift between him and the Dagalo family. However, his growing sense of the rebellion\u2019s defeat, the deviation of the mercenary forces from the original agreed path, and the major victories achieved by the army on the battlefield were all internal factors that led to such defections.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Major General Al-Nour surrendered with all his military equipment and fighters, including more than forty combat vehicles. Naturally, he received a warm reception \u2014 perhaps beyond what he had expected. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, even visited him at his residence in the Northern State and reportedly gave him his own armored vehicle as a gesture of honor and perhaps also out of concern for his safety from those he defected from.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Surrenders among the rebel militia leadership continued one after another. News reports now speak of the defection of Major General Bashara Al-Huwaira, commander of the Bara axis, from the RSF, surrendering with more than eleven combat-ready vehicles. This has raised questions \u2014 and even fears \u2014 among citizens about the possibility of the rebellion returning to areas from which it had been expelled, this time under the cover of \u201csurrender.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

While such concerns appear understandable in my view, they remain unlikely, because the rebellion has indeed been struck by a storm of internal decay, disputes, and the loss of unified leadership to such an extent that some of its commanders are no longer thinking of reviving its exhausted body and crumbling bones.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Prominent RSF leaders themselves have exchanged accusations, including Al-Goni Dagalo, brother of the Dagalo family leaders, who reportedly faced accountability measures and the freezing of his assets. Added to this are the actual disappearance of the late Hemedti, Abdul Rahim Dagalo\u2019s disputes with his field commanders, the liquidation of many members for tribal reasons, and the uprising among followers of the rebel leader Al-Hilu in South Kordofan against him and his legitimacy to lead them after becoming a tool in the hands of the rebellion. The conflicts unfolding in Kauda and Dilling further contribute to the militia\u2019s near-total collapse.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Externally, the UAE\u2019s alignment with and support for the rebellion \u2014 and its alleged use of Ethiopia to launch attacks on the airports of Khartoum, El-Obeid, and Kosti \u2014 has brought it into direct confrontation with Arab and African states, as well as regional and international organizations. This includes statements by Massad Boulos, adviser to the U.S. president, condemning the aggression without explicitly naming his patron state, the UAE.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although little reliance can be placed on the timid condemnation statements issued by those countries and institutions, direct and explicit accusations of this nature will weaken the position of both the UAE and the rebel RSF, while placing supporting states in the category of conspirators.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The government and military leadership must deal with these surrendered and defected forces differently from the current approach. First, this is necessary to reassure citizens who have suffered immensely at the hands of the militia. Second, it is important to benefit from and employ these forces in support of the ongoing battle.<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is required is their integration into the armed forces structure, under its command and official military uniform, while keeping them completely away from cities and civilians. Their place now, under these circumstances, should be in the states of Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, where fighting is taking place and where they possess the greatest knowledge of the areas in which they previously led the rebellion. Their place is certainly not in the Northern State, Khartoum, or Al-Jazira, as the battlefield is already well defined.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Externally, the states and organizations that condemned the recent Emirati-Ethiopian aggression against Khartoum Airport must translate their statements into concrete actions on the ground by pressuring the UAE to halt the flow of weapons to the rebellion through Somaliland, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, Libya, and even Kenya and Uganda. Although Kenya and Uganda no longer share direct borders with Sudan following South Sudan\u2019s secession, their territories and airports have allegedly become exploited through Emirati funding to facilitate the transfer of weapons and military equipment to the rebellion.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At this point, all the internal elements of defeat for the rebel militia have become evident. The only factor still breathing life into the militia and enabling it to continue its violations inside Sudan is the flow of Emirati weapons and equipment and the exploitation of neighboring states.<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the international community truly wishes to speak about a humanitarian truce, a political settlement, and Sudanese dialogue, then it should begin by curbing the UAE and halting its weapons supplies. Only then would there be a suitable foundation \u2014 and perhaps a viable environment \u2014 for ending the war and stopping violations against Sudanese citizens, after the militia withdraws from all occupied areas and relocates to remote camps under the command and control of the Sudanese Armed Forces.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Abdulmalik Al-Naeem Several internal and external causes and factors have had a direct impact on the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, which has begun experiencing actual collapse and internal erosion, prompting some of its prominent leaders to save themselves by surrendering to the army and the government. The surrender of Major General Al-Nour Mohamed …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":51141,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61656","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61656","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61656"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61656\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61657,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61656\/revisions\/61657"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/51141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61656"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61656"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61656"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}