{"id":61727,"date":"2026-05-20T18:18:19","date_gmt":"2026-05-20T15:18:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=61727"},"modified":"2026-05-20T18:18:19","modified_gmt":"2026-05-20T15:18:19","slug":"ambiguous-paths","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/05\/20\/ambiguous-paths\/","title":{"rendered":"Ambiguous Paths..!!"},"content":{"rendered":"

As I See\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Adel El-Baz<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1<\/strong><\/p>\n

Heavy clouds of major political and military events are gathering on the horizon, moving very slowly through obscure paths whose codes no observer has been able to decipher \u2014 except for a few \u201cstorytellers\u201d wandering the avenues of social media, whose testimony is rarely trusted even when they happen to tell the truth. I reflected on these murky trajectories and thought it worthwhile to share with readers of this column some glimpses into their hidden angles without delving into all their details.<\/strong><\/p>\n

2<\/strong><\/p>\n

Three paths are shrouded in ambiguity: the military path, the political path, and the path of negotiations with the United Arab Emirates.<\/strong><\/p>\n

As for the military path, all movements across the theaters of operation indicate that the army is preparing for a decisive offensive against the militia in Kordofan. The first signs of this have already appeared in the liberation of Al-Katma and Karen, the breaking of the siege on Al-Dilling, and the encirclement of Bara.<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, the army continues to follow the same strategy it has pursued since the beginning of the war: weakening the enemy by destroying its forces, weapons, and supply chains. This is happening daily through strikes targeting convoys moving along Darfur\u2019s roads, in addition to repeated attacks on Nyala, where weapons, drone platforms, and jamming systems are reportedly being stored.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is followed by a slow advance toward strategically decisive areas rather than chasing the militia everywhere, coupled with a policy of strategic patience and intelligence operations that have borne fruit in dismantling the militia from within and attracting some of its commanders, as seen in the defections of figures such as \u201cAl-Nour Quba\u201d and \u201cAl-Savana.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is what we have observed and learned from the army\u2019s movements, yet no one can tell you where the winds of the coming operations are heading.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Is the army waiting for a political settlement in which the militia surrenders without fighting? Or is it continuing with the same strategy of gradual destruction and slow movement?<\/strong><\/p>\n

What makes this path ambiguous is, on one hand, the shadows cast by the other ongoing tracks, and on the other, the signals suggesting that we are approaching major developments on the borders and further defections within the militia itself.<\/strong><\/p>\n

3<\/strong><\/p>\n

The second path \u2014 somewhat less ambiguous \u2014 is the political one.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The government has announced what it called the \u201cSudanese-Sudanese Dialogue Conference,\u201d and the Prime Minister stated that the conference would be held at the end of this month.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The ambiguity lies in the fact that no details have been disclosed regarding the participants, their organizations, their identities, the basis of the invitations, the conference agenda, who will manage it, or what will become of its outcomes. It remains merely an announcement devoid even of a confirmed time or place.<\/strong><\/p>\n

There are indeed movements in this direction. Some advance participants have already arrived in Khartoum, and there is talk of participation by figures affiliated with \u201cSumoud.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

According to the Prime Minister, less than two weeks remain before the conference. Since this is not a secret gathering or some sort of \u201cMasonic\u201d event, what prevents the organizers from establishing an openly declared secretariat with a known headquarters and visible activities?<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is wrong with presenting the conference agenda to public opinion and generating daily momentum toward the event? Such openness would mobilize public engagement and make people actively follow the proceedings of what could later become a historic conference shaping the country\u2019s future.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Why all the secrecy and concealment?<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is not a military matter; it is an open political dialogue, and the public has every right to know what is taking place.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Will we really witness, in less than two weeks, a secret Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue conference held amid a sea of political chaos and haste, only to yield nothing but ashes and endless convoys of speeches? Or will it simply be postponed indefinitely?<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is an unnecessarily ambiguous political track.<\/strong><\/p>\n

4<\/strong><\/p>\n

The final path is that of negotiations with the UAE.<\/strong><\/p>\n

It now appears that this path \u2014 which generated enormous controversy and countless theories \u2014 may have been little more than illusion and mirage. All indicators suggest that nothing is actually happening in Manama: no negotiations with the Rapid Support Forces and no negotiations with the UAE.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The UAE is currently preoccupied with far more urgent matters. It is reportedly facing daily drone attacks, while its ports have become a primary target for Iran and remain under continuous threat.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The UAE\u2019s plans within the so-called \u201cQuad\u201d initiative failed to produce anything meaningful and effectively collapsed following the recent positions taken by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This was compounded by the shift in the American position after the adoption of what Massad Boulos referred to as the \u201cBerlin Principle\u201d as a proposed framework for resolving the Sudanese crisis instead of the Quad initiative.<\/strong><\/p>\n

It also appears that the UAE has lost hope in the international community\u2019s ability to impose a settlement that would restore the militia to Sudan\u2019s political scene, especially in light of the militia\u2019s ongoing fragmentation and repeated defeats.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The UAE\u2019s latest attempt, according to this analysis, has been to open an Ethiopian front in order to regionalize the war. The objective would be to drag the region into a broader conflict, thereby creating conditions for international pressure to force a deal with the RSF.<\/strong><\/p>\n

But all of these calculations, according to the author, have failed and their bets have collapsed.<\/strong><\/p>\n

5<\/strong><\/p>\n

For all these reasons, I believe the ambiguity surrounding this negotiation track was largely a product of social media drama \u2014 or of parties searching for some event that might allow them to reposition themselves once again within the political arena, whether through \u201cvisas\u201d issued by the Janjaweed, through the backing of the international community, or through a deal with the UAE.<\/strong><\/p>\n

What matters to them, ultimately, is simply returning to the homeland.<\/strong><\/p>\n

But the dreams of the civilian forces that believed they would immediately assume power have, in the end, dissolved into scattered dust.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As I See\u00a0 Adel El-Baz 1 Heavy clouds of major political and military events are gathering on the horizon, moving very slowly through obscure paths whose codes no observer has been able to decipher \u2014 except for a few \u201cstorytellers\u201d wandering the avenues of social media, whose testimony is rarely trusted even when they happen …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":58017,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61727","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61727","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61727"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61727\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61728,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61727\/revisions\/61728"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/58017"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61727"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61727"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61727"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}